Allesxandro v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedDecember 22, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-01882
StatusUnknown

This text of Allesxandro v. Commissioner of Social Security (Allesxandro v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Allesxandro v. Commissioner of Social Security, (E.D. Wis. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

GRACE MARY ALLESXANDRO, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 19-CV-1882 ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

Grace Mary Allesxandro, who is representing herself, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her claim for supplemental security income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons below, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed and the case is dismissed. BACKGROUND On December 6, 2016, Allesxandro filed an application for SSI alleging disability beginning on June 7, 2010 due to a left arm fracture, left arm nerve damage, migraines, arthritis in neck, bulging disc in neck, trichotillomania, depression, sleep apnea, and anxiety attacks. (Tr. 177.) Allesxandro’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 12.) Allesxandro filed a request for a hearing and a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on September 6, 2018. (Tr. 27-62.) Allesxandro testified at the hearing, as did Joseph Entwisle, a vocational expert (“VE”). Ud.)

In a written decision issued February 4, 2019, the ALJ found that Allesxandro had the severe impairments of history of left arm fracture, obesity, depression, and anxiety. (Tr. 14.) The ALJ found that Allesxandro did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,

app. 1 (the “Listings”). (Tr. 15–16.) The ALJ further found that Allesxandro had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, with the following limitations: limited to frequent handling and fingering with the left upper extremity; cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; must avoid exposure to unprotected heights, hazards, and moving machinery; limited to job that are unskilled, simple, and routine; and limited to jobs having only occasional decision making, changes in the work setting, and interaction with supervisors, co- workers, and the public. (Tr. 16.) The ALJ found that Allesxandro had no past relevant work, but given her age, education, work experience, and RFC, jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform. (Tr. 20–21.) As such, the ALJ found that Allesxandro was

not disabled from the date her application was filed until the date of the decision. (Tr. 21.) The ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied Allesxandro’s request for review. (Tr. 1–6.) DISCUSSION

1. Applicable Legal Standards

The Commissioner’s final decision will be upheld if the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and supported his decision with substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011). Substantial evidence is not conclusive evidence; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Although a decision denying benefits need not discuss every piece of evidence, remand is appropriate when an ALJ fails to provide adequate support for the conclusions drawn. Jelinek, 662 F.3d at 811. The ALJ must provide a “logical bridge” between the

evidence and conclusions. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000). The ALJ is also expected to follow the SSA’s rulings and regulations in making a determination. Failure to do so, unless the error is harmless, requires reversal. Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2006). In reviewing the entire record, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner by reconsidering facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Estok v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1998). Finally, judicial review is limited to the rationales offered by the ALJ. Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93–95 (1943); Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 307 (7th Cir. 2010)).

2. Application to this Case Allesxandro challenges the ALJ’s decision solely based on new evidence regarding her mental limitations. (Pl.’s Br., Docket # 11.) However, this evidence cannot be the basis for reversing the ALJ’s decision under sentence four. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Further, Allesxandro has not requested a sentence-six remand, which allows a reviewing court to remand a case to the Commissioner for consideration of additional evidence upon a showing that there is “new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” § 405(g) (sixth sentence). Evidence is “new” if it did not exist or was unavailable to the claimant at the time of the hearing. Schmidt v.

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2005). And it is “material” if it is reasonably probable that the ALJ would have reached a different conclusion had the evidence been considered. Id. at 741-42. Thus, new evidence is only material if it is “relevant to the claimant’s condition during the relevant time period encompassed by the disability application under review.” Jd. (citation omitted). Here, Allesxandro seeks to introduce treatment notes from December 2019 to March 2020 from psychiatrist Dr. Ahmad Khan. (Pl.’s Br. at 1.) Allesxandro established care with Dr. Khan on December 12, 2019; he assessed diagnoses of moderate recurrent major depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder. (/d. at 7.) In subsequent monthly medication checks, Dr. Khan noted that Allesxandro’s mood was dysthymic, anxious, unhappy, and dysphoric. (/d. at 1, 3, 5.) Further, Dr. Khan noted that Allesxandro’s affect during visits was abnormal, constricted, and indifferent. (/d.) However, Allesxandro established care with Dr. Khan ten months after the ALJ rendered his decision. And, as the Commissioner points out, Dr. Khan’s treatment notes do not indicate that they relate to Allesxandro’s condition during the time period under consideration by the ALJ. (Def.’s Br. at 9, Docket # 15.) Thus, it is not reasonably probable that the ALJ would have reached a different conclusion had Dr. Khan’s treatment notes been considered. First, “medical evidence postdating the ALJ’s decision, unless it speaks to the patient’s condition at or before the time of the administrative hearing, could not have affected the ALJ’s decision and therefore does not meet the materiality requirement.” Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473

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Related

Schaaf v. Astrue
602 F.3d 869 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.
318 U.S. 80 (Supreme Court, 1943)
Campbell v. Astrue
627 F.3d 299 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Jelinek v. Astrue
662 F.3d 805 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Shauger v. Astrue
675 F.3d 690 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
James Young v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart
362 F.3d 995 (Seventh Circuit, 2004)
Getch v. Astrue
539 F.3d 473 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)

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Allesxandro v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allesxandro-v-commissioner-of-social-security-wied-2020.