Allen v. Superior Insurance Co. of Dallas

192 So. 2d 820, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 4625
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 15, 1966
DocketNo. 6747
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 192 So. 2d 820 (Allen v. Superior Insurance Co. of Dallas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Allen v. Superior Insurance Co. of Dallas, 192 So. 2d 820, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 4625 (La. Ct. App. 1966).

Opinion

LOTTINGER, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in connection with a Workmen’s Compensation suit arising as a result of an injury sustained by the plaintiff on July 13, 1961.

At that time, the plaintiff, Eli Allen was employed by Austin Bridge Company, with a salary of sufficient magnitude so as to qualify the plaintiff for Workmen’s Compensation benefits of $35.00 per week. On July 13, 1961, while putting a jack under a truck, the jack slipped and knocked the plaintiff to the ground, injuring his right leg and knee. Allen was first examined by the company physician, Dr. Webb, who referred him to a Dr. Altenberg, an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed the plaintiff’s condition as a torn medial meniscus. Dr. Altenberg performed a menisectomy on the right knee on July 31, 1961. Allen was subsequently given treatment of whirlpool baths and quadraceps exercises. Shortly thereafter he returned to light duty with his employer and then actually resumed full duty on January 8, 1962. He was paid compensation at the rate of $35.00 per week from the date of his injury up to and including January 8, 1962, when he returned to work. He continued to work for his employer, Austin Bridge Company, until July 27, 1963, when he left their employment, and did not resume work with that firm [821]*821until September, 1963, when he worked for approximately two weeks and was discharged. The plaintiff further claimed that on or about May 15, 1962, while picking up some forms about four feet long and two feet wide, he sustained an injury to his ;back.

The instant suit was filed on May 7, 1963, naming as defendants plaintiff’s employer, Austin Bridge Company, and their ■compensation insurer, Superior Insurance Company of Dallas, Texas.

After a trial on the merits, the District Judge rendered judgment awarding the •plaintiff the sum of $35.00 per week for ■400 weeks, subject to a credit for all payments previously made to him, and in connection therewith furnished written reasons for judgment wherein he recited in substance the percentage of partial permanent •disability assigned to plaintiff’s knee by the various medical witnesses was functional in nature and therefore in fact permanently •disabled the plaintiff.

Defendants have appealed to this Court, specifying as error only that the Trial Judge • erred in concluding that the plaintiff sustained a functional disability that entitled 'him to compensation for total and permanent disability. It is conceded by counsel for defendants that the plaintiff did in fact •suffer the injury complained of on the date .alleged; and that this injury occurred within the course and scope of the plaintiff’s •employment. It is the position of the defendant that the permanent residual disability which exists in the plaintiff’s knee is non-functional in nature, therefore does not interfere with or hinder the plaintiff in the performance of the same work which he was doing at the time of the accident .and therefore is not compensable.

We believe that it is necessary in this instance to briefly review the testimony of each of the witnesses, both lay and medical, with particular reference to whether or not •.the injury sustained by plaintiff is in fact functional

Dr. Chestnutt initially saw the plaintiff on May 22, 1962. At that time he found that the plaintiff had an old operated injury to the right knee with some instability of the knee due to muscular weakness. He attributed the muscular weakness to disuse while the plaintiff was in a cast and a concurrent delayed return of strength to that muscle. Allen’s reflexes were normal and the function of his knee appeared to be normal, except that with motion he had some pain, and there was a slight amount of swelling which Dr. Chestnutt testified as always present after an operation on the knee. He saw Allen again on May 30, at which time he found the muscular tension which had previously existed still present, but not to as great a degree as it had been previously. We might mention here that during the time that Dr. Chestnutt was treating Allen, Allen had already returned to light work. Dr. Chestnutt subsequently saw the plaintiff on June 8, June 15, June 22, June 29, July 5, July 13, July 27, August 11, August 18, September 16, and October 1, 1962. During these visits there was a general improvement in the plaintiff’s condition and on the July 27 visit he found that Allen was sufficiently improved so that he recommended that he return to full duty on a trial basis for three weeks of every month and return to his office for evaluation on the fourth week of each month. He testified that the plaintiff returned to full duty on September 16, 1962, and testified that in his opinion on October 1, 1962, the plaintiff’s knee had sufficiently recovered in order for him to carry out full duty. At that time, Dr. Chestnutt testified that he advised the plaintiff that if he was unable to carry out full duty, to notify his employer and for him also to consult Dr. Chestnutt in two months whether or not he was able to carry out full duty. He also said that since Allen never returned, he assumed that he was continuing to do full duty. He likewise testified that on the basis of his last examination, it was his considered medical opinion that Allen could return to full duty. When asked whether or not in his opinion the permanent disability [822]*822in the right knee would impair Allen’s ability to perform his former job to the extent that his earning capacity would be impaired or reduced, the doctor replied: “No, sir, in my opinion that wouldn’t impair his ability to work . . .”. He also testified:

“Q. At that time, tell us whether or not you felt that any residual permanent disability that he might have would be functional?
A. By functional you mean disabling.
Q. Yes.
A. No, sir.
Q. And nothing has occurred to change your opinion?
A. Nothing has occurred to change my opinion.”

Dr. William Moody, a general practitioner, testified on behalf of plaintiff and stated that he saw plaintiff on June 25, 1963, at which time he found a wasting of the right thigh and reviewed some X-rays taken by another physician. He said that the X-rays revealed that the right leg was about one-half inch short, and at that time estimated that the plaintiff had a ten per cent disability of the right knee. Dr. Moody saw the plaintiff again on July 2, 1963, and on September 26, 1963. On the date of the last visit, he found that the right knee had improved, that the upper part of the leg above the knee was beginning to fill out; that is, the muscles were beginning to return, the lower portion of the leg was still atrophied or shrunken. On cross-examination, Dr. Moody admitted that he had never measured Allen’s knee, and when asked if at the time of his examination on June 25, 1963, whether or not the plaintiff’s knee was swollen, he replied: “I think it was”. He had no record of swelling on his office records. The doctor testified that he was of the opinion that the plaintiff had a ten per cent disability of the right knee. Dr. Moody was of the opinion that the injury sustained by the plaintiff was in fact functional.

Dr.

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Related

Allen v. Superior Insurance
195 So. 2d 142 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1967)

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Bluebook (online)
192 So. 2d 820, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 4625, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allen-v-superior-insurance-co-of-dallas-lactapp-1966.