7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 JERROD DUPREE ALLEN, Case No. 1:23-cv-01549-SAB
11 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT
12 v. (ECF No. 1)
13 CORTEZ SUMMIT, et al., THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 14 Defendants. 15
16 Plaintiff Jerrad Dupree Allen (“Plaintiff”), a pre-trial detainee proceeding pro se and in 17 forma pauperis, initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Bakersfield 18 Police Department Officers Cortez Summit, Victor Coronado, Dominic Ramirez, Alan Guardado, 19 and Rene Garcia. Plaintiff’s complaint is currently before the Court for screening. 20 I. 21 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 22 Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may dismiss a case at any 23 time if the Court determines the complaint “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim 24 on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 25 from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 26 2000) (section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints). 27 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 pleader is entitled to relief ….” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 1 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 2 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Iqbal), 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 3 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly), 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Vague and conclusory 4 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient ….” Ivey v. Bd. of 5 Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 6 Courts are to liberally construe documents filed pro se, and “a pro se complaint, however 7 inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 8 lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted); see also Wilhelm v. 9 Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]here the petitioner is pro se, particularly in 10 civil rights cases, [courts should] construe the pleadings liberally and … afford the petitioner the 11 benefit of any doubt.” (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010))). Nonetheless, 12 while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 13 555. Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be 14 cured by amendment. Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 15 II. 16 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 17 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in as true only for the purpose of the sua sponte 18 screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 19 While he currently resides at the Kern County Jail, Plaintiff indicates the actions subject to 20 the instant complaint occurred prior to his detention. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that, on 21 October 6, 2021, at approximately 12:30 a.m., he was driving a vehicle during a police pursuit that 22 ended when Plaintiff’s vehicle flipped four times and collided with an electrical pole. (Id. at 5.) 23 Plaintiff alleges he was unconscious at some point and for an unknown duration after the pursuit 24 ended. (Id.) While Plaintiff was lying face down, Officer Coronado repeatedly bashed and 25 slammed Plaintiff’s face into the ground and intentionally pressed his knee into a laceration on 26 Plaintiff’s back. (Id.) While Officers Coronado and Garcia were pressing down on Plaintiff’s 27 back, Officer Summit kicked Plaintiff in the right side of his stomach. (Id.) Officer Guardado had 28 control of Plaintiff’s right arm; Officer Coronado had control of Plaintiff’s left arm and head with 1 his knee stretched over and pressing into Plaintiff’s upper back; and Officer Garcia had his right 2 knee placed into the left side of Plaintiff’s back. (Id. at 5-6) Plaintiff alleges he sustained a right 3 broken rib; a contusion on the left side of his face; multiple other contusions, lacerations, and 4 hematomas to his face and head; and blunt force trauma which resulted in amnesia, a concussion, 5 and post-traumatic stress as a result of Officers Summit and Coronado’s actions. (Id.) 6 Plaintiff was taken to Kern Medical Center where unidentified officers ran Plaintiff’s 7 fingerprints and discovered he had a warrant for his arrest. (Id. at 7.) After discovering Plaintiff’s 8 identity, Plaintiff alleges Officer Ramirez intentionally impeded and stopped medical staff from 9 assessing, attending to, and treating Plaintiff’s physical injuries. (Id.) Officer Ramirez allegedly 10 told Plaintiff’s nurse, “Fuck this guy, he is a registered sex offender, he did all this cause [sic] he 11 had a parole violation, I don’t have time for this shit, discharge this son of a bitch and let the jail 12 take care of him.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that at approximately 3:30 a.m., he was found incoherent 13 in a paper suit in an Albertson’s parking lot in Bakersfield by a third party. (Id.) 14 Plaintiff also alleges that on unspecified dates, Officer Ramirez intentionally lied in a 15 report and at the preliminary hearing regarding the October 6, 2021 pursuit to conceal the lack of 16 probable cause to initially pursue the vehicle Plaintiff was driving. (Id. at 9.) Specifically, Officer 17 Ramirez falsely stated that he observed Plaintiff run a red light, that the license plate on the 18 vehicle was not the correct plate for the vehicle, and that Plaintiff was the registered owner of the 19 vehicle on the date of the incident. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges Officer Summit falsely stated in his 20 report that he struck Plaintiff’s right side with his fist. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges Officer 21 Coronado falsely stated in his report that he held Plaintiff’s head into the ground to prevent 22 Plaintiff from hurting himself. (Id.) 23 III. 24 DISCUSSION 25 A. Statute of Limitations 26 Plaintiff appears to bring section 1983 claims that are time-barred. Because 42 U.S.C. § 27 1983 contains no specific statute of limitations, the statute of limitations for claims under section 28 1983 is “the personal injury statute of limitations of the state which the cause of action arose.” 1 Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 631 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). In California, 2 personal injury claims must be filed within two years. Id. However, federal law determines when 3 a cause of action accrues and when the statute of limitations begins to run for a section 1983 4 claim. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (noting that “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause 5 of action is a question of federal law”). Under federal law, a section 1983 claim accrues when the 6 plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.” Belanus v. 7 Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). 8 Here, the accrual date of Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims is October 6, 2021, the date he was 9 aware of his alleged injuries. The statute of limitations of his claim expired two years later, on 10 October 6, 2023. Because Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on November 2, 2023, his 11 claim is untimely unless statutory or equitable tolling applies. 12 In actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitations, courts should 13 also borrow all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period found in state law. Jones v. 14 Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). This applies to both statutory and equitable tolling. 15 In California, a plaintiff “imprisoned on a criminal charge” at the time the cause of action 16 accrued may toll the statute of limitations for a period not to exceed two years. Cal. Code. Civ. 17 Proc. § 352.1. “[A] would-be plaintiff is ‘imprisoned on a criminal charge’ within the meaning of 18 section 352.1 if he or she is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison.” Shaw v. 19 Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 343 F. Supp. 3d 919, 923 (E.D. Cal. 2018), aff'd in part, rev'd in 20 part and remanded, 810 F. App'x 553 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Austin v. Medicis, 21 Cal. App. 5th 21 577, 597 (Ct. App. 2018), reh'g denied (Apr. 11, 2018), review denied (June 13, 2018) (holding 22 that the tolling provision in section 352.1 does not apply during the time a plaintiff spent in a 23 county jail because pretrial custody in a county jail does not qualify as being “imprisoned on a 24 criminal charge”)); but see Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding 25 “actual, uninterrupted incarceration is the touchstone” for assessing tolling under § 352(a)(3), 26 which covers all post-arrest custody). 27 The Court sua sponte finds Plaintiff is not entitled to tolling under section 352.1 because 28 he was not serving a term of imprisonment in a state prison at the time his claims accrued. 1 Although Plaintiff alleges the Defendant Officers “[took] him into custody” and Officer Ramirez 2 allegedly insinuated to a nurse that Plaintiff should be discharged from the hospital to “let the jail 3 take care of him,” Plaintiff alleges that at approximately 3:30 a.m., he was found incoherent in a 4 parking lot in Bakersfield. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Although Plaintiff is currently a pre-trial detainee at 5 the Kern County Jail, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges he has not been in continuous custody from the 6 date of the alleged incident giving rise to his first or second causes of action under section 1983. 7 See Elliott, 25 F.3d at 803. Rather, the complaint indicates on its face that Plaintiff was not 8 arrested until January 5, 2022. (ECF No. 1 at 5-8.) Therefore, the section 1983 two-year statute 9 of limitations period was not tolled under section 352.1(a) and the limitation period appears to 10 have expired before Plaintiff filed this action on November 2, 2023. 11 “Equitable tolling under California law ‘operates independently of the literal working of 12 the Code of Civil Procedure’ to suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure 13 fundamental practicality and fairness.” Jones, 393 F.3d at 928 (quoting Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 14 31 Cal.4th 363, 370 (2003)). “Under California law, a plaintiff must meet three conditions to 15 equitably toll a statute of limitations: (1) defendant must have had timely notice of the claim; (2) 16 defendant must not be prejudiced by being required to defend the otherwise barred claim; and (3) 17 plaintiff’s conduct must have been reasonable and in good faith.” Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 18 916 (9th Cir. 1999) (quotation and citation omitted); see also Cota v. Santa Ana Police Dep't, No. 19 821CV01774MWFJDE, 2022 WL 2193301, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2022) (“A party seeking 20 equitable tolling must show that its delay in filing was objectively reasonable under the 21 circumstances”). 22 While Plaintiff alleges has not exhausted administrative remedies because he was barred 23 from receiving any information regarding the incident, Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding 24 whether he is entitled to equitable tolling of his section 1983 claims. (ECF No. 1 at 5-8.) Plaintiff 25 alleges he was arrested on January 5, 2022, but contends two public defenders withheld 26 unspecified information from Plaintiff until after November 9, 2022. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges 27 the information was intentionally withheld despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests to his public 28 defenders representing him in his state court criminal action to file a grievance regarding the 1 incident. (Id.) However, Plaintiff fails to state how he was barred from receiving information, 2 that Defendants otherwise had notice of the claim, or why Plaintiff otherwise could not file this 3 action within the two-year statutory period. 4 Failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations may be grounds for dismissal at 5 the screening stage if it apparent from the face of the complaint that plaintiff cannot “prevail, as a 6 matter of law, on the equitable tolling issue.” Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 7 (9th Cir. 1993). However, the Court will allow Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint to 8 allege facts establishing each claim is not time-barred or that tolling applies, if he believes he can 9 do so in good faith. 10 B. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action 11 Plaintiff’s first cause of action claims he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in 12 violation of the Eighth Amendment for excessive force by an officer. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) However, 13 the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies only after 14 conviction and sentencing. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) 15 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 n.6 (1989)). In general, under the Eighth 16 Amendment, “prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, 17 and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” 18 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Rhodes 19 v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (“the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which … 20 involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, … are grossly disproportionate to the 21 severity of the crime,” or are otherwise “totally without penological justification.”) (citations and 22 quotations omitted). 23 Here, Plaintiff’s claims are not asserted against prison officials, but against Bakersfield 24 police officers, and arise from events occurring prior to even Plaintiff’s current pretrial detention. 25 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting pretrial detainees “are not 26 convicted prisoners” and therefore have no rights under the Eighth Amendment). Accordingly, 27 irrespective of the apparent time-bar to Plaintiff’s first cause of action, Plaintiff cannot state a 28 cognizable claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 1 Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court shall evaluate Plaintiff’s first cause of 2 action for excessive force by Defendant Officers on October 6, 2021 within the context of the 3 Fourth Amendment. A claim of excessive force in the context of an arrest implicates the 4 protection of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from “unreasonable … seizures,” not the 5 Eighth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Graham, 490 U.S. at 394; see also Gibson v. 6 Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[b]ecause [the plaintiff] had not been 7 convicted of a crime, but had only been arrested, his rights derive from the due process clause 8 rather than the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment.”), overruled 9 on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016). 10 The use of excessive force by law enforcement officers in effectuating an arrest states a 11 valid claim under § 1983. See Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 12 1986). To state a claim for imposition of excessive force, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that 13 he (1) suffered some injury which (2) resulted from force that was clearly excessive to the need for 14 force; (3) the excessiveness of which was objectively unreasonable. See Heitschmidt v. City of 15 Houston, 161 F.3d 834, 839 (5th Cir. 1998). 16 An excessive force claim is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective 17 reasonableness” standard. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. The Ninth Circuit has articulated a three-step 18 analysis to evaluate excessive force claims under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in 19 Graham. See Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Espinosa v. City & 20 Cnty. of S.F., 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010)). First, the Court must assess “the severity of the 21 intrusion” “by considering ‘the type and amount of force inflicted.’” Id. Second, the Court must 22 evaluate the government’s interest “by assessing (1) the severity of the crime; (2) whether the 23 suspect posed an immediate threat to the officers’ or public’s safety; and (3) whether the suspect 24 was resisting arrest or attempting to escape.” Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 537 (quoting Graham, 490 25 U.S. at 396). Third, the Court must balance “the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against 26 the government’s need for that intrusion … to determine whether the force used was ‘greater than 27 is reasonable under the circumstances.’” Id. (citing Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir. 28 2002)). 1 Because reasonableness “is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,” 2 the inquiry requires “attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Graham, 3 490 U.S. at 396. Reasonableness “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on 4 the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. “Not every push or shove, even if it 5 may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” violates the Fourth Amendment. 6 Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F. 2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973)). Rather, “[t]he calculus of 7 reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make 8 split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about 9 the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396–97; see also Ames v. 10 King Cnty., 846 F.3d 340, 348 (9th Cir. 2017). Determination of reasonableness therefore 11 requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th 12 Cir. 2011). Consequently, courts consider other factors, such as the availability of alternative 13 methods of capturing or detaining the suspect in determining reasonableness. Chew v. Gates, 27 14 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1148 (1995). 15 The identified incident relevant to the excessive force inquiry occurred on October 6, 2021, 16 which appears to be time-barred, given Plaintiff’s complaint was not filed until November 2, 2023. 17 (ECF No. 1 at 5.) However, in the event Plaintiff can amend his complaint to allege that his 18 claims stemming from the October 6, 2021 incident are not time-barred or are subject to equitable 19 tolling, the Court turns to whether Plaintiff states a claim for excessive force against any of the 20 Defendant Officers. 21 “Whether a use of force was reasonable will depend on the facts of the particular case, 22 including, but not limited to, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to anyone, whether 23 the suspect resisted or attempted to evade arrest, and the severity of the crime at issue.” S.R. 24 Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff alleges his interaction with the 25 Defendant Officers was preceded by a police pursuit whereby Plaintiff was driving a vehicle that 26 ended because Plaintiff’s vehicle flipped four times and collided with an electrical pole. (ECF No. 27 1 at 5.) Plaintiff fails to allege he stopped resisting, but states he was unconscious for an 28 unspecified duration of time during which the Defendant Officers took him into custody. (Id.) 1 Plaintiff alleges that while he was “pinned face down on the ground” and his arms and head were 2 controlled by other officers, Officer Coronado repeatedly bashed and slammed Plaintiff’s face into 3 the ground and Officer Summit kicked Plaintiff in the right side of his stomach resulting in a 4 broken rib.1 (Id. at 5-6.) Accepting the allegations as true and drawing inferences in favor of 5 Plaintiff, it is plausible that Officer Coronado and Officer Summit’s use of force was not 6 objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations against 7 Officer Coronado and Officer Summit may be sufficient to meet the “low threshold” for 8 proceeding past screening if Plaintiff can establish his October 6, 2021 claims are not time-barred. 9 Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012). 10 However, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for excessive force against Officers Garcia, 11 Guardado, and Ramirez. Plaintiff expressly notes his injuries were “sustained as a result of the 12 actions of Summit, Cortez and Coronado, Victor.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Additionally, Plaintiff only 13 alleges Officer Guardado had “control of [Plaintiff’s] right arm” and Officer Garcia “assisted by 14 placing his right knee into the left side of [Plaintiff’s] back” while taking Plaintiff into custody. 15 Id. These allegations are insufficient to state an excessive force claim against Officer Guardado or 16 Officer Garcia. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (noting “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may 17 later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” violates the Fourth Amendment). The 18 Court also notes Plaintiff does not allege Officer Ramirez engaged in any force on October 6, 19 2021 or was even present while Plaintiff was taken into custody. Accordingly, the Court finds 20 Plaintiff fails to state a claim for excessive force against Officers Guardado, Garcia, and Ramirez. 21 The Court will afford Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint to allege sufficient facts 22 and establish his excessive force claim is not time-barred, if he believes he can do so in good faith. 23 C. Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action 24 Plaintiff’s second claim alleges a violation of the “federal right afforded to prisoners 25
1 Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges Officer Summit falsely stated in his report that while “three other officers 26 had [Plaintiff] faced down upon the ground, while two of those officers (Coronado # 1358 and Garcia #1209) were pressed down upon the back of [Plaintiff], [Officer Summit] struck the rib cage area of the right side of [Plaintiff’s] 27 stomach area with his right hand in the form of a fist.” (ECF No. 1 at 9.) Given his allegation that Officer Summit’s statement that he struck Plaintiff with his fist is false, Plaintiff does not appear to be alleging this conduct constituted 28 excessive force or that it even occurred. 1 regarding access to adequate medical care/assistance.” (ECF No. 1 at 7.) While a prisoner may 2 claim inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment if the mistreatment rises to 3 the level of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, Plaintiff cannot state a claim under 4 the Eighth Amendment because, as previously discussed, he was not a prisoner at the time of the 5 alleged inadequate medical care on October 6, 2021. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th 6 Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). 7 Medical care claims brought by pretrial detainees “arise under the Fourteenth 8 Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual 9 Punishment Clause.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018). The 10 elements of a pretrial detainee's medical care claim under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 11 Amendment are: 12 (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those 13 conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures 14 to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 15 involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused 16 the plaintiff's injuries. 17 Id. at 1125. 18 Here, however, the complaint does not allege Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee on October 19 6, 2021. Rather, Plaintiff alleges he was the subject of a police pursuit that ended in a high impact 20 collision at approximately 12:30 a.m., an ambulance took him from the scene to a hospital, and he 21 was found in a parking lot in a hospital gown by 3:30 a.m. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) While Officer 22 Ramirez was present and told Plaintiff’s nurse, among other things, “I don’t have time for this shit, 23 discharge this son of a bitch and let the jail take care of him,” the complaint fails to state whether 24 Plaintiff was detained at the hospital, arrested, transported to jail, or if Officer Ramirez 25 transported Plaintiff from the hospital in the three hour time period on October 6, 2021. The 26 complaint therefore fails to state a claim for inadequate medical care against Officer Ramirez 27 under the Fourteenth Amendment. 28 “Claims alleging inadequate medical care during and immediately following an arrest are 1 to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.” Espinoza v. California Highway Patrol, No. 16-cv- 2 00193, 2016 WL 4943960, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016) (citing Tatum v. City and Cnty. of 3 S.F., 441 F.3d 1090, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2006)). “Due process requires that police officers seek the 4 necessary medical attention for a detainee when he or she has been injured while being 5 apprehended by either promptly summoning the necessary medical help or by taking the injured 6 detainee to a hospital.” Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1099 (citing Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 7 1408, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Est. of Sanchez v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, No. 8 118CV00977ADABAM, 2023 WL 7612399, at *23 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2023) (same). “Just as 9 the Fourth Amendment does not require a police officer to use the least intrusive method of arrest, 10 neither does it require an officer to provide what hindsight reveals to be the most effective medical 11 care for an arrested suspect.” Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1098. “[T]he critical inquiry is not whether the 12 officers did all that they could have done, but whether they did all that the Fourth Amendment 13 requires.” Id. at 1099. 14 Plaintiff alleges am ambulance arrived at the scene at approximately 12:30 a.m. and 15 transported Plaintiff to the emergency room at Kern Medical Center in Bakersfield. (ECF No. 1 16 at 7.) Thus, it appears that the Defendant Officers promptly summoned medical help and Plaintiff 17 was promptly transported to a hospital. Espinoza, 2016 WL 4943960, at *4 (“Taking an injured 18 detainee to a hospital is a recognized method of satisfying the requirements of the Fourth 19 Amendment”). While Officer Ramirez allegedly made a foully worded statement at the hospital 20 and Plaintiff was later “found incoherent” in a parking lot, Plaintiff fails to allege in more than 21 conclusory fashion that Officer Ramirez impeded and stopped the medical staff from treating 22 Plaintiff or that the nurse heeded Officer Ramirez’s instruction to discharge Plaintiff “and let the 23 jail take care of him." (ECF No. 1 at 7.) The complaint therefore fails to state a claim against 24 Officer Ramirez alleging inadequate post-arrest medical care under the Fourth Amendment. 25 As discussed, Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable claim for inadequate medical care for 26 prisoners under the Eighth Amendment as alleged in the complaint. However, the Court will 27 afford Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint to state a claim for denial of adequate 28 medical care against Officer Ramirez and to establish it is not time-barred, if he believes he can do 1 so in good faith. 2 D. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action 3 Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges his “[Fourteenth] Amendment right to due process 4 of law and to equal protection of the laws was violated.” (ECF No. 1 at 9.) Specifically, Plaintiff 5 alleges that due to Officers Ramirez, Summit, and Coronado’s false statements in a preliminary 6 hearing and police reports, Plaintiff’s “life/liberty [was taken] away without Due Process of law 7 and placed [Plaintiff] in a position resulting in [his] 8th Amendment right against excessive bail 8 being violated, due to false pretenses.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any facts 9 to support his third cause of action. Most glaringly, the complaint fails to identify any bail amount 10 that is allegedly excessive or that there is an underlying criminal case. Instead, Plaintiff provides 11 conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual assertions. 12 The Court notes Plaintiff currently resides in Kern County Jail. It is unclear from the 13 conclusory allegations in the complaint if Plaintiff is challenging existing bail that stems from 14 charges related to the October 6, 2021 incident. To the extent that Plaintiff was arrested on 15 January 5, 2022 for unspecified charges stemming from the October 6, 2021 incident and remains 16 in custody on those charges, properly exhausting state remedies as to his bail hearing or seeking 17 habeas relief are appropriate vehicles to challenge bail in an underlying state court action. 18 However, Plaintiff’s requested relief for his third cause of action is that documentation be 19 filed in Officer Ramirez, Summit, and Coronado’s personnel records for violations of Plaintiff’s 20 rights. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff does not seek habeas relief, “the Excessive Bail Clause 21 prevents the imposition of bail conditions that are excessive in light of the valid interests the state 22 seeks to protect by offering bail.” Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 660 (9th Cir. 2007) 23 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987)). “[A] police officer may be liable for 24 violation of the Excessive Bail Clause for deliberately or recklessly misleading the judicial officer 25 setting bail, or otherwise preventing the judicial officer from exercising his independent 26 judgment.” Morse v. Regents of Univ. of California, Berkeley, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (N.D. 27 Cal. 2011); see Galen, 477 F.3d 652 (noting a plaintiff must show that police officers “deliberately 28 or recklessly misled” the judicial officer and that the plaintiff’s bail “would not have been 1 unconstitutionally excessive but for the officers’ representations”). Stated differently, “a plaintiff 2 can state a claim under the Excessive Bail Clause where law enforcement defendants deliberately 3 or recklessly misled a judicial officer, and the natural result of the deception is for bail to be set at 4 a certain level.” Darling v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. CV 11-7086-RGK (SP), 2015 5 WL 6560472, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 11- 6 7086-RGK (SP), 2015 WL 6553410 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2015), aff'd, 695 F. App'x 216 (9th Cir. 7 2017). 8 Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing a judge in an underlying proceeding would not 9 have set unconstitutionally excessive bail in an unknown amount but for the alleged 10 misrepresentations by the Officers. Plaintiff proffers no facts that tie an unspecified bail amount 11 to Defendant Officers Ramirez, Summit, or Coronado’s alleged false statements or that those false 12 statements are the natural result of bail being set at an excessive level. Plaintiff’s unsupported 13 legal conclusions are insufficient to survive screening. However, the Court shall afford Plaintiff 14 the opportunity to amend his complaint to include specific factual allegations that raise a plausible 15 inference that a constitutional right was violated. 16 IV. 17 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 18 For the foregoing reasons, the complaint fails to state any cognizable claim for violations 19 of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights that is not time-barred. Nonetheless, the Court will grant 20 Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the identified deficiencies which Plaintiff believes, in good faith, 21 are curable. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, that 22 complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must also state what each named Defendant 23 did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–89. 24 Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 25 above the speculative level ….” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations admitted). 26 To the extent Plaintiff must submit a handwritten complaint and supporting exhibits, he is 27 directed to write as legibly as possible and, to the best of his ability, to write his statements on 28 lined paper with only one line of text per line and not multiple text columns. Further, any 1 || amended complaint is limited to 25 pages in length. An amended complaint which exceeds this 2 | limit will be stricken. 3 Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his 4 || second amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” 5 | complaints). Finally, Plaintiff is reminded that an amended complaint supersedes the original 6 || complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927. This means Plaintiffs first amended 7 || complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” E.D. 8 | Cal. L-R. 220. 9 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 10 1. The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; 11 2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a 12 first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 13 order; 14 3. The first amended complaint, including attachments, shall not exceed twenty-five 15 (25) pages in length; and 16 4. If Plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this order, the 17 Court will recommend to a District Judge that this action be dismissed consistent 18 with the reasons stated in this order. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. OF. nf ee 21 | Dated: _May 17, 2024 __ Oe UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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