Allen v. Morgan

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Allen v. Morgan

269 S.E.2d 753, 48 N.C. App. 706, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 3299

CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina

DecidedSeptember 16, 1980

Docket7929DC1137

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 269 S.E.2d 753 (Allen v. Morgan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Allen v. Morgan, 269 S.E.2d 753, 48 N.C. App. 706, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 3299 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).

Pincite

Opinion

MORRIS, Chief Judge.

As in Allen v. Petit, filed this day, the sole question presented is whether the trial court committed error in entering judgment for defendants based on his finding that they had established adverse possession under color of title to the lands claimed by them.

Plaintiff offered a connected chain of title back to a grant from the State. This constituted a prima facie showing of senior title and, nothing else appearing, established his right to judgment in his favor. Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N.C. 112, 10 S.E. 142 (1889),

Defendants presented evidence of a quitclaim deed to property claimed by them. The deed contained a metes and bounds description. The surveyor, by stipulation characterized as a expert in land surveys, testified that the map introduced in evidence accurately represented plaintiff’s property.

*709 Here the disputed area is a lappage, and plaintiff has shown senior title. “When a junior grant incorporates a portion of a senior grant it is not necessary for the junior grantee claiming title by seven years adverse possession under color to show that the boundaries of the lappage were visible on the ground. (Citations omitted.) The claimant, however, must establish the required adverse possession within those lines. Here the lines of the lappage must be located from the calls in defendant’s deed, the only instrument which defines them.” Price v. Tomrich Corp., 275 N.C. 385, 394, 167 S.E. 2d 766, 772 (1969).

Defendants, having introduced into evidence the deed they intended to use as color of title, were required to fit by proof the description contained in that deed to the land it allegedly covered “in accordance with appropriate law relating to course and distance and natural objects called for as the case may be”, Trust Co. v. Miller, 243 N.C. 1, 7, 89 S.E. 2d 765, 769 (1955), and then establish, if they could, the required adverse possession within those lines. These requirements defendants did not meet, and judgment in their favor was, therefore, erroneously entered.

Reversed.

Judges Clark and Martin (Harry C.) concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MORRIS, Chief Judge.

As in Allen v. Petit, filed this day, the sole question presented is whether the trial court committed error in entering judgment for defendants based on his finding that they had established adverse possession under color of title to the lands claimed by them.

Plaintiff offered a connected chain of title back to a grant from the State. This constituted a prima facie showing of senior title and, nothing else appearing, established his right to judgment in his favor. Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N.C. 112, 10 S.E. 142 (1889),

Defendants presented evidence of a quitclaim deed to property claimed by them. The deed contained a metes and bounds description. The surveyor, by stipulation characterized as a expert in land surveys, testified that the map introduced in evidence accurately represented plaintiff’s property.

*709 Here the disputed area is a lappage, and plaintiff has shown senior title. “When a junior grant incorporates a portion of a senior grant it is not necessary for the junior grantee claiming title by seven years adverse possession under color to show that the boundaries of the lappage were visible on the ground. (Citations omitted.) The claimant, however, must establish the required adverse possession within those lines. Here the lines of the lappage must be located from the calls in defendant’s deed, the only instrument which defines them.” Price v. Tomrich Corp., 275 N.C. 385, 394, 167 S.E. 2d 766, 772 (1969).

Defendants, having introduced into evidence the deed they intended to use as color of title, were required to fit by proof the description contained in that deed to the land it allegedly covered “in accordance with appropriate law relating to course and distance and natural objects called for as the case may be”, Trust Co. v. Miller, 243 N.C. 1, 7, 89 S.E. 2d 765, 769 (1955), and then establish, if they could, the required adverse possession within those lines. These requirements defendants did not meet, and judgment in their favor was, therefore, erroneously entered.

Reversed.

Judges Clark and Martin (Harry C.) concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

269 S.E.2d 753, 48 N.C. App. 706, 1980 N.C. App. LEXIS 3299, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allen-v-morgan-ncctapp-1980.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack