Allen v. MICH. PROP. & CAS. GUAR. ASS'N

341 N.W.2d 500, 129 Mich. App. 271
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 28, 1983
Docket65533
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 341 N.W.2d 500 (Allen v. MICH. PROP. & CAS. GUAR. ASS'N) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Allen v. MICH. PROP. & CAS. GUAR. ASS'N, 341 N.W.2d 500, 129 Mich. App. 271 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

129 Mich. App. 271 (1983)
341 N.W.2d 500

ALLEN
v.
MICHIGAN PROPERTY & CASUALTY GUARANTY ASSOCIATION

Docket No. 65533.

Michigan Court of Appeals.

Decided September 28, 1983.

Marston, Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin & O'Hare, P.C. (by David K. Barnes, Jr.), for plaintiff.

Dykema, Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg (by Craig L. John and Mary Ellen Darin), for defendant.

*273 Before: WAHLS, P.J., and GRIBBS and M. WARSHAWSKY,[*] JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court's June 17, 1982, order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.

Plaintiff commenced a civil action against Dr. Harry M. Gallup, seeking damages for the alleged negligent treatment of her foot ailment. On June 28, 1979, plaintiff obtained a judgment against Dr. Gallup in the amount of $15,000, plus costs and interest. Dr. Gallup was insured by All-Star Insurance Company, a Wisconsin corporation which had been ordered into liquidation prior to the time plaintiff obtained her judgment against Dr. Gallup. All-Star was engaged in the insurance business in Michigan only as a surplus lines carrier.

Plaintiff, being unable to satisfy her judgment, filed a claim for payment with defendant Michigan Property and Casualty Guaranty Association. Under the Property and Casualty Guaranty Association Act (hereinafter, the act), MCL 500.7901 et seq.; MSA 24.17901 et seq., defendant association is required to pay certain obligations of member insurers who have become insolvent. Defendant denied plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff then commenced this action alleging that payment was due under the act. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2, subds (1) and (3), alleging that defendant was not liable to plaintiff under the act because All-Star was not an "insolvent insurer" and the claim was not a "covered claim" within the meaning of the act. The trial *274 court granted the motion and summary judgment was entered.[1]

In interpreting the act, we employ certain well-established principles of statutory construction governing insurance laws. Since the insurance business is one affected with a public interest, laws applicable to insurance are to be liberally construed in favor of the policyholders, creditors and the general public. Statutes relative to insurance will be construed in the most beneficial way which their language will permit to prevent absurdity, hardship or injustice, to favor public convenience and to oppose all prejudice to public interests. The statute is to be given a reasonable construction looking to its purpose and the object it seeks to accomplish. Attorney General ex rel Ins Comm'r v Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 80 Mich App 653, 657-658; 263 NW2d 918 (1978); Dearborn National Ins Co v Comm'r of Ins, 329 Mich 107; 44 NW2d 892 (1950); Comm'r of Ins v American Life Ins Co, 290 Mich 33; 287 NW 368 (1939).

The act was designed to protect insureds and persons with claims against insureds from potentially catastrophic loss in the event the insurer becomes insolvent. Such persons have a right to rely on the existence of an insurance policy and are not likely to be in a position to evaluate the financial stability of the insurance company and have no control over the time at which their claims against the company may arise. Metry, Metry, Sanom & Ashare v Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 403 Mich 117, 121; 267 NW2d 695 (1978).

*275 The parties agree that plaintiff's claim arose prior to the 1980 amendments to the act and that the case is governed by the statutory provisions in existence prior to 1980.[2]

The association created under the act is comprised of

"all insurers authorized to transact in this state any of the kinds of insurance specified in section 7925 * * *. Every such insurer shall be a member of the association, as a condition of its authority to continue to transact insurance in this state." 1972 PA 207, § 7911. (Emphasis added.)

An authorized insurer is one that possesses a subsisting certificate of authority issued by the Commissioner of Insurance. MCL 500.108(1); MSA 24.1108(1).

The association is required to pay and discharge covered claims under § 7931. The term "covered claims" is defined in § 7925:

"(1) `Covered claims' means obligations of an insolvent insurer which: (i) arise out of the insurance policy contracts of the insolvent insurer issued to residents of this state or are payable to residents of this state on behalf of insureds of the insolvent insurer, (ii) were unpaid by the insolvent insurer, (iii) are presented as a claim to the receiver in this state or the association on or before the last date fixed for the filing of claims in the domiciliary delinquency proceedings, (iv) were incurred or existed prior to, on, or within 30 days after the date the receiver was appointed, and (v) arise out of policy contracts of the insolvent insurer issued for all *276 kinds of insurance except life and disability insurance." 1972 PA 207, § 7925. (Emphasis added.)

The terms "insolvent insurer" and "member insurer" are defined in § 7921:

"`Insolvent insurer' means a member insurer for which a domiciliary or ancillary receiver has been appointed in this state after the effective date of this chapter." 1969 PA 277, § 7921(b).

"`Member insurer' means an insurer required to be a member of the association in accordance with the provisions of section 7911." 1969 PA 277, § 7921(a).

Accordingly, defendant association was required to pay plaintiff's unsatisfied judgment against All-Star's insured only if All-Star was an insolvent insurer within the meaning of the act. In order to be an insolvent insurer, All-Star must have been an insurer who was required to be a member of the association under § 7911. Under § 7911, the critical question is whether All-Star was an insurer authorized to transact insurance in this state. Plaintiff contends that since All-Star was permitted to transact insurance in this state it was authorized within the meaning of § 7911. We do not agree.

As noted previously, All-Star was a surplus lines insurance carrier.[3] In Attorney General, supra, p 661, the Court defined surplus lines insurers as:

"[U]nauthorized, out-of-state insurers permitted to write policies for Michigan residents who are unable to obtain suitable coverage at reasonable rates from Michigan-authorized insurers. See MCL 500.1840 et seq.; MSA 24.11840 et seq."

*277 A more thorough explanation is provided in OAG, 1979-1980, No 5612, pp 510-511 (December 20, 1979):

"Surplus lines carriers are insurance companies which are neither chartered nor licensed to sell insurance in the State of Michigan. The purpose of such carriers has been expressed as follows:

"`* * * Historically, the function of surplus lines insurance was to provide lines of insurance that were in excess of the lines, or amounts of a particular line, which could be absorbed by the insurance companies admitted to do business within a state. Today it has come to mean any insurance placed with insurance companies not admitted to do business in a particular state. Non-admitted insurers provide valuable services in addition to their historic function.

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341 N.W.2d 500, 129 Mich. App. 271, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allen-v-mich-prop-cas-guar-assn-michctapp-1983.