Allen v. Lewis

38 Fla. 115
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJune 15, 1896
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 38 Fla. 115 (Allen v. Lewis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Allen v. Lewis, 38 Fla. 115 (Fla. 1896).

Opinion

Mabry, C. J.:

This is a writ of error from an order of the trial judge granting a new trial to the defendant below, against whom a verdict had been rendered. Section 1267 of the Revised Statutes provides for a writ of error from such an order without waiting for the 'final judgment in the cause. The new trial was granted upon defendant’s motion embodying grounds that the verdict was contrary to law and the charge of the court; that it was contrary to the evidence, not supported thereby, and against the clear preponderance thereof; that it was contrary to the law and the evidence, and against the instructions of the court and the evidence; that the court erred in giving certain specified instructions for the plaintiff, and in admitting certain evidence on behalf of plaintiff; and that the court erred in allowing plaintiff: to amend his declaration after the testimony had been all introduced and the argument concluded before the jury. The trial was had after the adoption of the new rules, and two bills of exceptions were signed, one designed to present the exceptions to the rulings of the court on points not involving the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, and the other presenting the last mentioned phase o'f the evidence, and known as the “evidentiary bill of exceptions.” The assignments of errors presented at the time of apply[120]*120ing for the settlement of the bills of exceptions contained the grounds: 1st. That the court erred in refusing to give certain numbered instructions asked by plaintiff. 2d. The court erred in granting the motion for a new trial.' 3d. The court erred in refusing plaintiff’s motion to vacate the order granting a new trial and to enter judgment on the verdict upon plaintiff’s offer to remit certain damages. 4th. The court erred in giving the instructions asked by the defendant. In the ordinary bill of exceptions designed to present the exceptions to the rulings of the court on points other than that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict, questions propounded to witnesses and objected to, are given with the rulings of the court allowing the same and the exceptions noted. The answers to the questions are not stated in this bill of exceptions, but for each answer reference is made to ascertain pages and lines in the evidentiary bill of exceptions. The charges given and refused are set out in the ordinary bill with the exceptions taken thereto, but no brief statement of the proofs is included therein. The bill recites that “the said charges of the said judge so given, and those refused, were predicated on the evidence at said trial shown in evidentiary bill of exceptions, containing all of the evidence adduced at the trial, which accompanies this bill of exceptions.”

It is now moved to strike from the transcript both bills of exceptions because as to the assignments of error not necessitating the making up of an evidentiary bill of exceptions, neither of said bills contains a brief statement of the proofs showing the propriety or impropriety of the ruling of the court, and as to.the assignments in so far as they, or either of them, cover any ground other than that the verdict is contrary to [121]*121the evidence and not supported thereby, there is no brief statement of the proofs showing the propriety or impropriety of the ruling of the court covered by any such assignment.

It is not questioned by plaintiff in error that if an evidentiary bill is not required, and none is signed, setting out the evidence in full as required by the rule, the ordinary bill would have to set out a brief statement of the proofs showing the propriety or impropriety of the court's rulings on the exceptions taken, but where the evidentiary bill is signed, it is insisted that the rule does not demand a brief statement of the proofs in the ordinary bill, and that a statement therein of the points and rulings thereon with a sufficient reference to the testimony embodied in the evidentiary bill will be sufficient. As to what is the purpose of the rules on the subject there is no question in the mind of the court, and, we think, this purpose is evident from the terms used, taken in connection with the subject-matter. It must be supposed that the new rules were designed to make some change in the former practice prevailing in this court in reference to bringing up cases for review. A reference to this practice will aid in setting forth the change designed and obtaining a clear view of the meaning of the rules. At common law the granting or refusing to grant new trials on the ground that the evidence did not sustaia the verdict was left to the discretion of the trial judge who heard the evidence, and the propriety or impropriety of his action in such matters could not be reviewed on writ of error. Carter vs. Bennett, 4 Fla. 283; Parsons vs. Bedford, 3 Peters, 433. Bills of exceptions were demandable, however, at common law for certain purposes. Any ruling of the trial court involving points [122]*122of law growing out of the evidence, such as its admission or rejection, the giving or refusing instructions thereon, and many other incidents arising during the trial and deemed harmful to the objecting party could be reviewed on bills of exceptions. Such bills did not undertake to give the entire evidence in the case, but only so much of it, or such of its bearing, as was necessary to show the propriety or impropriety of the ruling thereon in point of law. In 1852-3, after the decision in Carter vs. Bennett, supra, the Legislature passed an act permitting a review of orders of the trial courts granting or refusing to grant new trials on the ground that the evidence did not sustain the verdict, as well as on other grounds, and authorized bills of exception for such purpose. This act has continued as law in this State, and is substantially contained in sections 1265 and 1266 of the Revised Statutes. Under this legislation the practice grew up of embodying in a motion for a new trial all grounds of exception whether to rulings reviewable at common law, or to orders made reviewable by the statute, and in the bill containing all the evidence were inserted exceptions to rulings involving only points of law as well as exceptions to the rulings refusing or granting new trials on the sufficiency of the evidence. Under the law allowing both questions of law and fact to be reviewed, and a practice permitting the blending of all [assignments of error in one bill of exceptions in the manner indicated, an appeal or writ of error, with a bill of exceptions, put into this court the entire record, including all the evidence, whether there was any good ground for reversal in this court on account of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence or not. The act of 1852 did not take away the right to an ordinary, or [123]*123common law, bill of exceptions to review points of law growing out of rulings during the trial of the case, independent of the bill allowed for testing the sufficiency of the verdict by the evidence but both become blended into one, and resulted in dragging into this-court the entire record, though not necessary in many cases for the settlement of the points in controversy in this court. Unless there is real merit in a contention that a judgment should or should not be set aside on the ground of the deficiency or sufficiency of the evidence, or that errors of law, if any exist, are harmless in view of all the evidence, there is no useful purpose in bringing all the evidence before the appellate court. To do so increases the cost of a transcript for no purpose, and unnecessarily burdens the court in the disposition of the real questions involved.

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Bluebook (online)
38 Fla. 115, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allen-v-lewis-fla-1896.