Allen v. Dunlap

33 P. 675, 24 Or. 229, 1893 Ore. LEXIS 109
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedJune 29, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 33 P. 675 (Allen v. Dunlap) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Allen v. Dunlap, 33 P. 675, 24 Or. 229, 1893 Ore. LEXIS 109 (Or. 1893).

Opinion

Mr. Chile Justice Lord

delivered the opinion of the court:

1. The first objection raised is as to the jurisdiction of equity to grant relief in cases of trespass and waste. The [233]*233general rule that a court of equity will refuse to take jurisdiction and award even a temporary injunction in cases of a mere trespass, is conceded; but there is an established exception in cases of mines, timber, and the like, in which an injunction will be granted to restrain the commission of acts by which the substance of an estate is injured, destroyed, or carried away. In such case, the injury being irreparable, or difficult of ascertainment in damages, the remedy at law is inadequate. The defendants are not claiming that the remedy at law for the alleged trespasses committed and threatened is adequate, if the title or right of possession to the mining claim is in the plaintiffs. It is substantially conceded that, if such is the case, the injury is irreparable and the remedy at law inadequate. The contention of the defendants is that the title or right of possession of the plaintiffs to the mining claim is denied and contested, and that they must first establish such title or right by a judgment at law in ejectment, or for the recovery of its possession before a justice’s court. This contention is manifestly grounded on the assumption that the plaintiffs are not in possession of the mining claim in question, and that the defendants are withholding its possession from them. All the cases cited and relied upon by the defendants are those in which title was involved. But there is no issue of title here by the pleadings or the facts, other than the possessory title acquired by location and possession. Under the statutes of the United States all valuable mineral deposits in land belonging to it are free and open to exploration, occupation, and purchase by its citizens, under the regulations prescribed therein, and by the local customs and laws of miners in the several mining districts so far as they are not inconsistent with the laws of the United States: Rev. Stat. U. S. §§ 2319,2325. They provide the mode to be pursued in the location of such lands, and that the locators are granted the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of the surface included within [234]*234the boundaries of their location. The lands thus located are called mining claims, and the locators are spoken of as owners antecedent to the entry of the government patent. In explaining the nature of these rights, Mr. Justice Brewer said: “ The statutes of the United States provide that upon performance of certain conditions, the discoverer of a mine becomes entitled to a patent. If all these conditions have been performed, the full equitable title is vested in the discoverer, and all that the government retains is the naked legal title, in trust for the equitable owner. If only partially performed, he has an absolute right of possession, and an inchoate title, which further performance will perfect and complete”: Aspen Smelting Co. v. Rucker, 28 Fed. Rep. 221. Such a right of possession, or possessory title, is valuable and protected by law, but it is not declared by the statutes of this state to be real estate title.

The plaintiffs in their complaint claim the right to mine the Black Butte lode as owners thereof by virtue of location and possession, and set forth the particular facts upon which they rely to support their right. They then aver that while in the possession of the mine, and engaged in developing it, the defendants entered upon it with picks and shovels, and commenced to work thereon by proceeding to dig and uncover the ledge with intent to remove the mineral therefrom, and threatened to continue to dig and appropriate the valuable minerals of the mine to their own use, and to permanently deprive the plaintiffs of it; that they are insolvent; and that unless the defendants be restrained, the plaintiffs will suffer great and irreparable loss and injury. The Code provides that a justice’s court has jurisdiction of an action at law to recover the possession of a mining claim, and that the complaint must set forth the facts constituting the plaintiff’s right of possession, with such description of the mining claim as will be sufficient to identify it: Hill’s Code, § 2175, et seq. By [235]*235this provision a remedy is afforded at law to determine the right of possession, or the possessory title to a mining claim. But the facts indisputably show that plaintiffs are in possession of the mining claim. They are not seeking to recover it, but to protect it from the threatened waste and trespass which would despoil the mine of its valuable ore, and affect its substance. To defeat the plaintiffs’ right of possession, and to establish their own, the defendants set up facts designed to show that the plaintiffs have not such right of possession, owing to defects in their location, and their failure to do the annual assessment work, and further set up their own location of the Dunlap and Hard Scrabble mines, a pa rt of which is alleged to cover the mining claim in dispute. The defendants claim the right by location to do the acts alleged to be trespass and waste, and which affect the substance of the mining claim, and they insist that the plaintiffs shall establish their right of possession to the mining claim by judgment for its recovery before an inj unction will issue, when the facts show that the plaintiffs are already in possession of it, and that the injury to it is irremediable at law. It is the defendants who are in a position to bring an action at law in a justice’s court for the recovery of the mine, and to determine whether tlíe right of possession is in the plaintiffs or themselves. It is the proper remedy for the defendants, if they wish to determine the possessory title. The plaintiffs cannot resort to it as they are in possession. The facts alleged show that the acts of trespass committed and threatened to be continued affect the substance of the mine and will cause irreparable injury unless restrained. It is said that the working of mines is something more than the common ordinary use of real estate, and requires the use of more than ordinary remedies to protect the rights of parties entitled to the possession: 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. 605. In aid of the action of trespass or waste, the foundation of the jurisdiction of a court of equity is in the [236]*236probability of irreparable injury, and multiplicity of suits. In our judgment not alone the facts alleged, but the facts proven, show the case is a proper one for the jurisdiction of equity to award an injunction.

2. It is next claimed that there was no valid location of .the Black Butte mining claim, for the following reasons: First, it is argued that there must be a discovery of a mineral-bearing ledge before there can be a location, and that the evidence is insufficient to show that the plaintiffs or their grantors discovered such a vein or lode. We think the evidence shows that prior to the location of the mine, the predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs discovered a ledge or lode of gold-bearing rock or quartz where the Black Butte mine is now situated, and that it is valuable, and probably capable of yielding large returns. The development so far, according to the testimony of several witnesses, indicates that there is a large body of ore, which being greatly decomposed, is easily worked, and is rich in gold.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
33 P. 675, 24 Or. 229, 1893 Ore. LEXIS 109, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allen-v-dunlap-or-1893.