Allen v. Currier Lumber Co.

61 N.W.2d 138, 337 Mich. 696, 1953 Mich. LEXIS 441
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 27, 1953
DocketDocket 29; Calendar 45,916
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 61 N.W.2d 138 (Allen v. Currier Lumber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Allen v. Currier Lumber Co., 61 N.W.2d 138, 337 Mich. 696, 1953 Mich. LEXIS 441 (Mich. 1953).

Opinion

Adams, J.

This is an appeal from 18 separate judgments entered for the several plaintiffs in the Wayne circuit court. The cases are similar in nature and subject matter and were consolidated for trial in the lower court and here on appeal.

The defendant, Currier Lumber Company, in conjunction with 2 subsidiary corporations, built some 250 homes in Ferndale, Michigan, during the latter part of 1941 and in 1942. All the houses had 5 fin *698 islied rooms with exterior dimensions of 30 feet by 24 feet and were sold at prices ranging from $4,250 to $4,750.

The plaintiffs individually purchased 18 of the homes from defendant prior to completion. Contracts were identical except as to description of property and terms and read, in part, as follows:

“The seller hereby agrees to sell a completed residence * * * according to. the following terms:
“The seller is to have said property entirely completed and available for occupancy within - days * * * All construction to have been completed to the satisfaction of the Federal Housing Administration and in conformity with the local and State building code or" requirements. The seller finally agrees to deliver a satisfactory warranty deed to the property.”

During the course of construction, each of the homes was inspected by an inspector of the city of Ferndale and by representatives of the Federal Housing Administration. It does not clearly appear from the record that the required 3 inspections were had by the city and the FHA, but it does appear that each house received a final approval from both. When the houses were completed, each plaintiff received a warranty deed from the defendant and gave a mortgage for the unpaid balance of the purchase price.

■ All the plaintiffs occupied their homes in 1942 with some of them going into possession before their homes were completely finished. Shortly after they took possession, plaintiffs became aware of imperfections and defects in the construction of the homes. In the case of some plaintiffs, the defects were noted within 6 weeks; some were not. discovered for as much as a year later. Complaints on all the houses followed a similar pattern. Exterior paint blistered and peeled, interior Avail paint washed aAvay, base *699 ment sidewalls cracked and leaked, basement floors cracked and in some eases partially disintegrated. Several of the plaintiffs complained to the defendant and in some cases an effort was made to correct the situation. In other cases, plaintiffs repaired both the exterior and interior of their homes. Some added new siding. Most of the plaintiffs found it necessary to repair basement walls and floors. Some tried to prevent leakage through weatherproofing and others resurfaced their basement floors.

Eventually the 18 plaintiffs started 18 separate suits to recover damages for repairs to their homes, alleging in their separate declarations that the. defendant had failed in carrying out representations made to each of the plaintiffs that “said home had been built in good, workmanlike manner and according to the requirements of the Federal Housing Administration.” In its answer, defendant denied that the alleged defects existed and added that if such defects did exist, the complaints were not seasonably made since each of the homes had been inspected and approved by representatives of the FHA.

Some 14 days were required for the trial of the cases. Each of the plaintiffs testified in relation to the condition of their homes, and persons experienced in the building trades gave their opinions as to the cause of the defects. During the course of the trial it was brought out that despite the fact that the specifications submitted to the Federal Housing Administration described the soil in the construction area as sand, it was actually a heavy clay with a high moisture content.

There are no storm sewers in the area and a sanitary sewer served to carry away both surface water and waste water from the homes. As a result, the drainage of the area was inadequate and on more than one occasion, but particularly in 1946, a number of the basements were flooded. Defendant produced *700 expert 'witnesses who testified that in their opinion all the troubles encountered by plaintiffs resulted from the high moisture content of the soil, inadequate drainage and resultant hydrostatic pressure.

At the conclusion of the trial the court found the plaintiffs had sustained their burden of proof and were entitled to judgments for the cost of repairing their homes. Judgments were entered accordingly.

On appeal, defendant claims, first, that when defendant conveyed the homes to the plaintiffs by warranty deed, the obligations of the original agreement were merged in the deed covenants and that the only covenants remaining thereafter were the warranties of freedom from encumbrance and of quiet and peaceful possession; second, that the plaintiffs produced no competent evidence to support the trial court’s judgment that the houses had not been constructed with good workmanship and in compliance with FHA requirements and, third, that the trial judge had disregarded the clear and undisputed testimony of unimpeached witnesses that the only cause of plaintiffs’ damage was inadequate drainage, moisture saturated soil and hydrostatic pressure.

The contract executed between each individual plaintiff and the defendant created several obligations, one of them requiring the defendant to convey the premises to plaintiff by warranty deed and another to complete the building to the satisfaction of the Federal Housing Administration and in conformance with local and State building codes or requirements. A subsequent conveyance by warranty deed satisfied the first of those obligations but not the second, and it is the second of those covenants upon which plaintiffs base their cause of action.

We are of the opinion that the second covenant was not merged with the deed covenants when the warranty deeds were executed and delivered. The *701 deeds were not in full perf ormance of the agreement between the parties.

“As to plaintiff’s claim of merger, it may be conceded that a deed made in full execution of a contract for the sale of land is presumed to merge the provisions of a preceding contract pursuant to which it is made, including all prior negotiations and agreements leading up to execution of the deed, with the long-recognized exception that—-

“ ‘Where, however, the deed constitutes only a part performance of the preceding contract, other distinct and unperformed provisions of the contract are not merged in it. And where a contract of sale provides for the performance of acts other than the conveyance, it remains in force as to such other acts until full performance.’ 18 CJ, p 271.” Goodspeed v. Nichols, 231 Mich 308.

But defendant says that in any event plaintiffs produced no competent evidence to support their position that the houses had not been constructed in a good and workmanlike manner and that FHA requirements had not been followed.

Each of the plaintiffs testified as to the appearance and condition of their homes in 1942 and 1943.

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Bluebook (online)
61 N.W.2d 138, 337 Mich. 696, 1953 Mich. LEXIS 441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allen-v-currier-lumber-co-mich-1953.