Allen v. Arkansas Division of Correction

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedMarch 13, 2024
Docket4:24-cv-00175
StatusUnknown

This text of Allen v. Arkansas Division of Correction (Allen v. Arkansas Division of Correction) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Allen v. Arkansas Division of Correction, (E.D. Ark. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS CENTRAL DIVISION

MICHAEL EDWARD ALLEN PLAINTIFF ADC #176724

V. NO. 4:24-cv-00175-JM-ERE

ARKANSAS DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS and WELLPATH DEFENDANTS

ORDER

On February 26, 2024, pro se plaintiff Michael Edward Allen, an Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”) inmate, filed this civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. Mr. Allen’s complaint alleges that, in September and October 2023, unidentified medical staff failed to provide him prescription medication. Mr. Allen sues the ADC and WellPath in their official capacity only seeking monetary relief. Because Mr. Allen is a three-striker and did not allege that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury, the Court provided Mr. Allen 30 days to pay the statutory filing fee. Doc. 2. Mr. Allen has now paid the filing fee in full. Doc. 5. As stated, Mr. Allen has failed to state a constitutional claim for relief against each Defendant. However, rather than recommend dismissal for failure to state plausible constitutional claim, the Court will delay the screening process1 to give Mr.

1 Screening is mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or a portion Allen an opportunity to file an amended complaint clarifying his constitutional claims and correcting the problems discussed below.

1. Problems With Original Complaint A. Mr. Allen’s Allegations Mr. Allen’s complaint alleges that: (1) when he arrived at the ADC on

September 29, 2023, ADC medical staff immediately denied him prescription medication resulting in his hospitalization; (2) after Mr. Allen was transferred to the ADC’s Randal Williams Unit, medical staff again failed to provide him the correct prescription medication resulting in another hospitalization; and (3) ADC medical

staff continue to inadequately treat his high blood pressure.2 B. ADC The ADC is not an entity that can be sued in a civil rights case brought under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moore v. Plock, 377 Fed. Appx. 563 (8th Cir. 2010) (unpub. per curiam) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).

thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are legally frivolous or malicious may be granted; or (c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). When making this determination, the Court must accept the truth of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, and it may consider the documents attached to the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011).

2 Mr. Allen originally arrived at intake for the ADC in Malvern, Arkansas. Doc. 1 at 4. Malvern, Arkansas is located in the Western District of Arkansas. Accordingly, if Mr. Allen seeks to purse any claims related to the medical care that he received, or did not receive, in Malvern, he must pursue any such claims in a separate lawsuit in the Western District. Accordingly, Mr. Allen cannot proceed on his claims against the ADC. Instead, he must identify individuals who allegedly violated his constitutional rights.

C. WellPath It is well settled that a corporation, such as WellPath, cannot be held liable for the wrongful conduct of its employees in a § 1983 action. Burke v. North Dakota

Dept. of Corrs. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1044 (8th Cir. 2002). A corporation can only be held liable if it had unconstitutional policies or practices that caused Mr. Allen’s injuries. Id.; Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 2006); Sanders v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975-976 (8th Cir. 1993). In his

complaint, Mr. Allen fails to allege that WellPath had any unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice that violated his right to constitutionally adequate medical care and caused him harm. Accordingly, Mr. Allen has failed to state a constitutional

claim for relief against WellPath. D. Sovereign Immunity – Official Capacity Claims Mr. Allen sues Defendants in their official capacity only. A civil litigant cannot recover money damages from state actors sued in their official capacities.

Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Accordingly, Mr. Allen’s claims for money damages from any Defendant in his or her official capacity are barred by sovereign immunity.

To recover money damages from any Defendant, Mr. Allen’s amended complaint must make clear that he is suing each Defendant in his or her individual capacity.3

E. Medical Deliberate Indifference To state a plausible medical deliberate indifference claim against any named Defendant, Mr. Allen must allege facts that, if taken as true, support a reasonable

inference that: (1) he had “objectively serious medical needs”; and (2) each Defendant “actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs.” Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 2019); see also Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 2016).4

3 Along with this Order, the Clerk is sending Mr. Allen a blank 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint form. Mr. Allen should use this form if he files an amended complaint. The form, on page five, specifically asks if defendants are being sued in their personal or official capacity, or both.

4 A medical need is objectively serious if it has been “diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or if it is “so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2018). When a prisoner alleges that a delay in medical treatment has violated his constitutional rights, the “objective seriousness of the deprivation should also be measured ‘by reference to the effect of delay in treatment.’” Laughlin v. Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005); see Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 2001) (a prisoner must demonstrate that the delay in obtaining medical treatment adversely affected his prognosis, or that defendants ignored an acute or escalating situation).

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Related

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Michele Moore v. Joyce Plock
377 F. App'x 563 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Reynolds v. Dormire
636 F.3d 976 (Eighth Circuit, 2011)
Floyd L. Roberson v. Bill Bradshaw
198 F.3d 645 (Eighth Circuit, 1999)
Laughlin v. Schriro
430 F.3d 927 (Eighth Circuit, 2005)
Johnson v. Hamilton
452 F.3d 967 (Eighth Circuit, 2006)
Clemmons v. Armontrout
477 F.3d 962 (Eighth Circuit, 2007)
Jenkins v. County of Hennepin, Minn.
557 F.3d 628 (Eighth Circuit, 2009)
James Saylor v. Randy Kohl, M.D.
812 F.3d 637 (Eighth Circuit, 2016)
Regina Barton v. Chad Ledbetter
908 F.3d 1119 (Eighth Circuit, 2018)
Timothy Barr v. Rebecca Pearson
909 F.3d 919 (Eighth Circuit, 2018)
Barton Roberts v. Sergeant Kopel
917 F.3d 1039 (Eighth Circuit, 2019)
Charles Hamner v. Danny Burls
937 F.3d 1171 (Eighth Circuit, 2019)

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Allen v. Arkansas Division of Correction, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allen-v-arkansas-division-of-correction-ared-2024.