Allen, Lynwyatt

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 30, 2015
• Docket: WR-83,448-01
• Status: Published

Opinion

WR-83,448-01,02,03 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 9/29/2015 5:55:11 PM Accepted 9/30/2015 10:23:29 AM ABEL ACOSTA CLERK

CAUSENO.WR-83-448-01 RECEIVED CAUSE NO. WR—83-448-02 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 9/30/2015 CAUSE NO.WR-83-448-03 ABEL ACOSTA, CLERK

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL. APPEALS AUSTIN. TEXAS

IN THE MATTER OF THE WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY LYNWYATT ALLEN

REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR COURT TO VACATE ITS ORDER DENYING WRIT AND REMAND FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING IN THE ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR COURT TO VACATE ITS ORDER DENYING APPLICANTS PETITION AND REMAND FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON ITS OWN MOTION.

Cause arising out ofthe I86"‘ District Coun, Bexar County. Texas The Hon. Jefferson Moore, Presiding

KENNETH ERIC BAKER SBN #2404543‘) "OfCounseI“ to DiazIakob. Attorneys L.L.C. Alamo Towers North 901 N.E. Loop 410 Suite 900 San Antonio, Texas 78209 (.210)226-4500 (p) (210) 226-4502 (f) TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

Relief reguested: Reconsideration or the court’s denial of applicanfs Habeas Petition’s without

hearing and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

Procedural statement of the Case

On March 18“‘, 2015, Applicant, Lynwyatt Allen, filed an application for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. (Exhibit AB &C) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. On March 23"‘, 2015 the trial court entered an Order 011 Application for Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit D). The court found that there were controveited issues that

“create a necessity for a hearing, but that the matter is capable of resolution by affidavit”. The court

ordered trial counsel to submit an affidavit confirming or denying the allegations by May 7”‘, 2015 and further directed that trial counsel serve the undersigned post-conviction counsel with a copy of the

affidavit (trial counsel’s affidavit attached as exhibit E). Simultaneously the court issued an

Designating Issues (Exhibit F) finding that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel required

resolution. Trial counsel failed to serve the undersigned counsel until March 20"‘, 2015 (trial

counsel’s letter to the undersigned is attached as Exhibit G). 10 days later the court issued an QlgI_er_

and Conclusions of Law (Exhibit H) recommending relief be denied based on the statement that trial

counsel “sufficiently rebuts all allegations made against him”. This court issued an order denying

applicant’s writs “on the findings of the trail court” (Exhibit I,J,K)

Memorandum 1. Motions filed pursuant to art.11.07 or art. 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

and Rule 79.2gdt

Counsel is aware of the limitations imposed by this foregoing rule and therefore asks the court

to reconsider the denial sua spante based upon the issues and facts presented in this motion or

request. 2. Due process requires an evidentiarv hearing to resolve controverted facts where it is the word of the defendant against the word of counsel; cross examination is foundational to get to the truth in matters where is the word of trial counsel against the word of the defendant.

If a trial court finds there are controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of

applicant’s confinement, i.e., whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel, as the court in this

matter did, then these issues shall be resolved in a timely manner:

Coode of Criminal Procedure 11.07 art 3 (d): If the convicting court decides that there are controverted, previously unresolved facts which are material to the legality of the applicant's confinement, it shall enter an order within 20 days of the expiration of the time allowed for the state to reply, designating the issues of fact to be resolved. To resolve those issues the court may order affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, additional forensic testing, and hearings, as well as using personal recollection

While this court gives deference to the manner in which a trial court gathers evidence due to the

wide variety of claims made in Habeas applications, matters which can only be resolved by a credibility

determination usually require a live hearing where the court can observe the witnesses and where the

statements of the witnesses can be subjected to effective cross examination. This court often orders

evidentiary hearings where the credibility of a witness in at issue. Ex Parre Brown, 205 SW. 3d 538

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Ex Pa/‘te Thompson, 153 S.W. 3d 416 (Tex. Crim. .App. 2005). This is

particularly important in claims of ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel flatly denies the

defendant’s allegations calling him a liar and responding with “not true” to each allegation of the

defendant. (see Exhibit E). The 11'“ circuit stated the problem well in Gallego v. United States, 174

F.3d 1196 (1 1“‘ Cir. 1999) “Where issues come down to the testimony of the defendant against the

contradictory testimony of counsel, the defendant is going to lose every time” Where there is a dispute

between the client and the attorney over what occurred the trial court is required to make a credibility

determination that can best be made after a live hearing. In Gallegos, the court pointed out that

“magistrate does not even state simply why the defendant’s lawyer is the more credible witness in this

case.” Based upon the foregoing the applicant though counsel respectfully requests this court remand

the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing where the completely contradictory statements of

the applicant and trial counsel may be tested by cross examination and the trial court can make a

credibility determination between the two.

Respectfully submitted,

By Kenneth Eric Baker SBN 24045439 Alamo Towers North 901 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 900 San Antonio, Texas 78209 210.226.4500 (P) 210.226.4502 (F) Keb1aw@gmail.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion is was served upon the attorney for the State and on the Trial Court on September 29"‘. 2015. ‘

Attenfiey for Applicant Exhibit A . '

F ILEG. Case N°- ' ONNA KAY MEKINNEY’ _ msrmcr CLERK BEXAR COUNTY’ . .

(The Clerk of the convicting court Wlll fill tlns line In.)

INS MAR I ‘I A l|= 05 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS DEPUTY APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPU§Y———V—-————~——T SEEKING RELIEF FROM FINAL FELONY CONVICTION UNDER CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ARTICLE 11.07

NAME: Lynwyatt Allen

DATE OF BIRTH: 01/25/1991

PLACE OF CONFINEMENT: Dominguez State Jail 6535 Cagnon Rd, San Antonio, TX

TDCJ-CID NUMBER: _01935579 SID NUMBER: 1001292

(1) This application concerns (check all that apply):

xx a conviction N/A parole

xx a sentence N/A mandatory supervision

N/A time credit N/A out-of-time appeal or petition for discretionary review

(2) What district court entered the judgment of the conviction you want relief from? (Include the court number and county.)

186“ District Court, Bexar County

(3) What was the case number in the trial court?

Cause No: 2013CR5726

(4) What was the name of the trial judge?

Teresa Hen"

Effective: Januag 1, 2014 1 (5) Were you represented by counsel? If yes, provide the attorney's name:

Paul J. Goeke, SBN 08059250

(6) What was the date that the judgment was entered?

06/06/2013

(7) For what offense were you convicted and what was the sentence?

Intoxication assault 10 yrs

(8) If youwere sentenced on more than one count of an indictment in the same court at the same time, what counts were you convicted of and what was the sentence in each count?

(9) What was the plea you entered? (Check one.) guilty-open plea _xx_ guilty-plea bargain not guilty

nolo contenders/no contest

If you entered different pleas to counts in a multi—count indictment, please explain:

(10) What kind of trial did you have? NA no jury NA jury for guilt and punishment NA jury for guilt, judge for punishment (11) Did you testify at trial? If yes, at what phase of the trial did you testify?

NA (12) Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction?

_ yes xx no

If you did appeal, answer the following questions:

(A) What court of appeals did you appeal to? NA (B) What was the case number? NA (C) Were you represented by counsel on appeal? If yes, provide the attorney’s name:

NA (D) What was the decision and the date of the decision? NA

(13) Did you file a petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals?

NA yes NA no

If you did file a petition for discretionary review, answer the following questions:

(A) What was the case number? NA (B) What was the decision and the date of the decision? NA

(14) Have you previously filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure challenging this conviction?

_ yes _xx_ no

If you answered yes, answer the following questions:

(A) What was the Court of Criminal Appeals’ writ number? (B) What was the decision and the date of the decision?

(C) Please identify the reason that the current claims were not presented and could not have been presented on your previous application.

(15) Do you currently have any petition or appeal pending in any other state or federal court?

yes xx no

If you answered yes, please provide the name of the court and the case number:

(16) If you are presenting a claim for time credit, have you exhausted your administrative remedies by presenting your claim to the time credit resolution system of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice? (This requirement applies to any final felony conviction, including state jail felonies)

(A) What date did you present the claim?

(B) Did you receive a decision and, if yes, what was the date of the decision?

If you answered no, please explain why you have not submitted your claim: (17) Beginning on page 6, state concisely every legal ground for your claim that you are being unlawfully restrained, and then briefly summarize the facts supporting each ground. You must present each ground on the form application and a brief summary of the facts. Ifyour grounds and briefsummary ofthefacts have not been presented on the form application, the Court will not consider your grounds. If you have more than four grounds, use pages 14 and 15 of the form, which you may copy as many times as needed to give you a separate page for each ground, with each ground numbered in sequence. The recitation of the facts supporting each ground must be no longer than the two pages provided for the ground in the form.

You may include with the form a memorandum of law if you want to present legal authorities, but theCourt will not consider grounds for relief set out in a memorandum of law that were not raised on the form. The citations and argument must be in a memorandum that complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 73 and does not exceed 15,000 words if computer-generated or 50 pages if not. If you are challenging the validity of your conviction, please include a summary of the facts pertaining to your offense and trial in your memorandum. GROUND ONE: Ineffective assistance of counsel

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND ONE: The attorney for Mr. Lynwyatt Allen (Defendant) pressured him into a plea. He was not prepared to go to trial.

Just before trial a plea bargain was presented according to the following terms:

An Application for deferred adjudication and probation could be made and a 15 year cap. The

Attorney for the Defendant represented that no finding of a deadly weapon would be made and

That the Defendant would receive deferred adjudication because he was “eligible”. The

Defendant was actively mi-led by his attorney as to his application for probation being

Granted as well as in the matter of no deadly weapon finding being made. If the attorney had

properly advised the defendant that he might not receive deferred adjudication he would not

have entered a no-contest plea. If the defendant’s attorney had told the defendant that a deadly

weapon finding would be made he would not have entered his plea. I was specifically told there

would be no finding of a deadly weapon GROUND TWO:

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND TWO: N Vi A! /4 GROUND THREE: AH/L ‘(\'

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND THREE: GROUND FOUR:

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND FOUR: A//(L

13 GROUND:

MA VI

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND: MA NW

15 WHEREFORE, APPLICANT PRAYS THAT THE COURT GRANT APPLICANT RELIEF TO WHICH HE MAY BE ENTITLED IN THIS PROCEEDING. VERIFICATION This application must be verified or it will be dismissed for non-compliance. For verification purposes, an applicant is a person filing the application on his or her own behalf. A petitioner is a person filing the application on behalf of an applicant, for example, an applicant=s attorney. An inmate is a person who is in custody.

The inmate applicant must sign either the AOath Before a Notary Public@ before a notary public or the AInmate=s Declaration@ without a notary public. If the inmate is represented by a licensed attorney, the attorney may sign the AOath Before a Notary Public@ as petitioner and then complete APetitioner=s Information. @ A non-inmate applicant must sign the AOath Before a Notaiy Public@ before a notary public unless he is represented by a licensed attorney, in which case the attorney may sign the verification as petitioner.

A non-inmate non-attorney petitioner must sign the AOath Before a Notary Public@ before a notary public and must also complete APetitioner=s lnformation.@ An inmate petitioner must sign either the AOath Before a Notary Public@ before a notary public or the AInmate=s Declaration@ without a notary public and must also complete the appropriate APetitioner=s Information.@

OATH BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF Ecgg

/A \£g,g_)/d<+‘\ Ea» being duly sworn, under oath says: AI am ,

the applieant / (circle one) in this action and know the contents of the above application for a writ of habeas corpus and, according to my belief, the facts stated in the application are true.@

Signature of 27 one)

w SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN T0 BEFORE ME THIS ‘L-“DAY ormdtvelt 20 if .»~9/Q .

~ v» JOAQUIN ALBERYO N romzo. JR. tary PubIic,State otlexos OMV Commission Expives June 17. 2018 Si g n <\ /’

/me ot my Pu my

16 PETITIONER=S INFORMATION Petitioner=s printed name:

State bar number, K9 if applicable: ZELO ch» l 5 Ea. ii‘ 3 W Address: T-F"J\5 Rd: 7?? éa ;LJJr~>~tu ‘rk 7.97.‘;

Telephotézf 93 ” Lfgod Fax: 7'26 '

INMATE=S DECLARATION

I, , am the applicant / petitioner (circle one) and

being presently incarcerated in , declare under penalty of

perjury that, according to my belief, the facts stated in the above application are true and correct.

Signed on , 20 .

Signature of Applicant / Petitioner (circle one)

17 Exhibit B HLEB MNNA KAY MSKINNEY Case No. DISTRICT CLERK I

BEMR COUNTY -

(The Clerk of the convicting court will fill this line in:

MR A "=05 .

1315 IT IN THE COURT or CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS BEPUTY

APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS i3Y__.____,._______ SEEIGNG RELIEF FROM FINAL FELONY CONVICTION UNDER CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ARTICLE 11.07

PLACE OF CONFINEMENT: Dominguez State Jail 6535 Cagnon Rd, San Antonio, TX TDCJ-CID NUMBER: _01935579 SID NUMBER: 1001292

N/A time credit N/A out-of—time appeal or petition for discretionary review

(2) What district court entered the judgment of the conviction you want relief from? (Include the court number and county.)

186"‘ District Court, Bexar County

Cause No: 2013CR5727

Teresa Herr

Effective: Januagg 1, 2014 1 (5) Were you represented by counsel? If yes, provide the attorney's name:

(7) For what offense were you convicted and what was the sentence?

(3) If you were sentenced on more than one count of an indictment in the same court at the same time, what counts were you convicted of and what was the sentence in each count?

(9) What was the plea you entered? (Check one.) guilty-open plea _xx_ guilty—plea bargain not guilty

nolo contemlere/no contest

If you entered different pleas to counts in a multi-count indictment, please explain:

(10) What kind of trial did you have? NA no jury NA jury for guilt and punishment NA jury for guilt, judge for punishment (11) Did you testify at trial? If yes, at what phase of the trial did you testify?

__ yes XX 110

(A) What court of appeals did you appeal to? NA (B) What was the case number? NA (C) Were you represented by counsel on appeal? If yes, provide the attorney's name:

NA (D) What was the decision and the date of the decision? NA

(13) Did you file a petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals?

If you did file a petition for discretionary review, answer the following questions:

(A) What was the case number? NA (B) What was the decision and the date of the decision? NA

(14) Have you previously filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure challenging this conviction?

__ yes _xx_ no

(A) What was the Court of Criminal Appeals’ writ number? (B) What was the decision and the date of the decision?

(C) Please identify the reason that the current claims were not presented and could not have been presented on your previous application.

(15) Do you currently have any petition or appeal pending in any other state or federal court?

yes XX___ [10

If you answered yes, please provide the name of the court and the case number:

(16) If you are presenting a claim for time credit, have you exhausted your administrative remedies by presenting your claim to the time credit resolution system of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice? (This requirement applies to any final felony conviction, including state jail felonies)

__ yes XX [10

(B) Did you receive a decision and, if yes, what was the date of the decision?

If you answered no, please explain why you have not submitted your claim: (17) Beginning on page 6, state concisely every legal ground for your claim that you are being unlawfully restrained, and then briefly summarize the facts supporting each ground. You must present each ground on the form application and a brief summary of the facts. Ifyour grounds and briefsummary of thefacts have not been presented on the form application, the Court will not consider your grounds. If you have more than four grounds, use pages 14 and 15 of the form, which you may copy as many times as needed to give you a separate page for each ground, with each ground numbered in sequence. The recitation of the facts supporting each ground must be no longer than the two pages provided for the ground in the form.

You may include with the form a memorandum of law if you want to present legal authorities, but theCourt will not consider grounds for relief set out in a memorandum of law that were not raised on the form. The citations and argument must be in a memorandum that complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 73 and does not exceed 15,000 words if computer-generated or 50 pages if not. If you are challenging the validity of your conviction, please include a summary of the facts pertaining to your offense and trial in your memorandum. GROUND ONE: Ineffective assistance of counsel

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND ONE: The attorney for Mr. Lynwyatt Allen (Defendant) pressured him into a plea. He was not prepared to go to trial.

Just before trial a plea bargain was presented according to the following terms:

An Application for deferred adjudication and probation could be made and a l5 year cap. The

Attorney for the Defendant represented that no finding of a deadly weapon would be made and

That the Defendant would receive deferred adjudication because he was “eligible”. The

Defendant was actively mi-led by his attorney as to his application for probation being

Granted as well as in the matter of no deadly weapon finding being made. If the attorney had

properly advised the defendant that he might not receive deferred adjudication he would not

have entered a no—contest plea. If the defenda.nt’s attorney had told the defendant that a deadly

weapon finding would be made he would not have entered his plea. I was specifically told there

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND TWO: N \A M /4 GROUND THREE: .«H/‘« 1 \'

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND THREE: I\J\A« I [ GROUND FOUR:

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND FOUR: N1 ?

IMA FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND: MR

14 N UL

I5 WHEREFORE, APPLICANT PRAYS THAT THE COURT GRANT APPLICANT RELIEF TO WHICH HE MAY BE ENTITLED IN THIS PROCEEDING. VERIFICATION This application must be verified or it will be dismissed for non-compliance. For verification purposes, an applicant is a person filing the application on his or her own behalf. A petitioner is a person filing the application on behalf of an applicant, for example, an app1icant=s attorney. An inmate is a person who is in custody.

The inmate applicant must sign either the AOath Before a Notary Public@ before a notary public or the Alnmate=s Declaration@ without a notary public. If the inmate is represented by a licensed attorney, the attorney may sign the AOath Before a Notary Public@ as petitioner and then complete APetitioner=s lnforrnation.@ A non—inmate applicant must sign the AOath Before a Notary Public@ before a notary public unless he is represented by a licensed attorney, in which case the attorney may Sign the verification as petitioner.

A non—inmate non—attomey petitioner must sign the AOath Before a Notary Public@ before a notary public and must also complete APetitioner=s Information.@ An inmate petitioner must sign either the AOath Before a Notary Public@ before a notary public or the AInmate=s Declaration@ without a notary public and must also complete the appropriate APetitioner=s Information.@

OATH BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF TEXAS

W ~ COUNTY OPE; E }_Q_I;K

#45114 (,fL being duly sworn, under oath says: AI am ,.—. ,

the applicant / u (circle one) in this action and know the contents of the above application o '

for a writ of habeas corpus and, according to my belief, the facts stated in the plication are true.@ ~ Signatur of one)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS “DAY OF ESQVC/l\ 20 .-ST.‘

~ , [ 1

~~ "'~’.,$’,‘..{\‘-*‘ moum ALBERIO TORANZO. Notary Public, Stove of lexos My Commission Expires June 17. 2018 JR. ‘ ” Slgnature of ’

Otary ’ P Bhc ‘

16 PETITIONER=S INFORMATION Petitioner=s printed name: My ,J A) L114 EC \¢Q/ State bar number, if applicable: ‘i 3 6‘

Address: i S TFWJ *5 3+ 4*‘ 337 S»! \>< 79205

Telephongf1.9’) 226" 35 0 L7’

Fax: (Z//9,) Z26 P #501 INMATE=S DECLARATION

perjury that, according to my belief, the facts stated in the above application are true and correct.

Signed on , 20

17 Exhibit C Ff.l.-AE§t.'=!. «

. A .

(The Clerk ofthe convicting court will fill this line in.) ‘min ceuntrv INS MAR ‘I 'l A ll: 05 IN THE COURT or CRIMINAL APPEALS or TEXAS .

DEPUTY APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SEEKING RELIEF FROM FINAL FELONY CONVICTION UNDER CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ARTICLE 11.07

PLACE OF CONFINEMENT: Dominguez State Jail 6535 Cagnon Rd, San Antonio, TX

N/A time credit N/A out-of-time appeal or petition fo discretionary review -

(2) What district court entered the judgment of the conviction you want relief from? (Include the court number and county.)

Cause No: 20 I BCR5726

Effective: January 1, 2014 1 (5) Were you represented by counsel? If yes, provide the attorney's name:

Pau.l J. Gocke, SBN 08059250

(5) What was the date that the judgment was entered?

(7) For what offense were you convicted and what was the sentence?

(8) If you were sentenced on more than one count of an indictment in the same court at the same time, what counts were you convicted of and what was the sentence in each count?

(9) What was the plea you entered? (Check one.)

__ guilty-open plea guilty-plea bargain _ _xx__ not guilty

nolo contemiere/no contest

If you entered different pleas to counts in a multi-count indictment, please explain:

(10) What kind of trial did you have? NA no jury NA jury for guilt and punishment NA jury for guilt, judge for punishment (11) Did you testify at trial? If yes, at what phase of the trial did you testify?

(A) What court of appeals did you appeal to? NA

(B) What was the case number? NA (C) Were you represented by counsel on appeal? If yes, provide the attorney's name:

NA (D) What was the decision and the date of the decision? NA

(13) Did you file a petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals?

If you did file a petition for discretionary review, answer the following questions:

(A) What was the case number? NA (B) What was the decision and the date of the decision? NA

(14) Have you previously filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure challenging this conviction?

(A) What was the Court of Criminal Appeals’ writ number? (B) What was the decision and the date of the decision?

(C) Please identify the reason that the current claims were not presented and could not have been presented on your previous application.

(15) Do you currently have any petition or appeal pending in any other state or federal court?

yes xx_ no

If you answered yes, please provide the name of the court and the case number:

(16) If you are presenting a claim for time credit, have you exhausted your administrative remedies by presenting your claim to the time credit resolution system of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice? (This requirement applies to any final felony conviction, including state jail felonies)

(A) What date did you present the claim? (B) Did you receive a decision and, if yes, what was the date of the decision?

If you answered no, please explain why you have not submitted your claim: (17) Beginning on page 6, state concisely every legal ground for your claim that you are being unlawfully restrained, and then briefly summarize the facts supporting each ground. You must present each ground on the form application and a brief summary of the facts. Ifyour grounds and briefsummary of thefacts have not been presented on the form application, the Court will not consider your grounds. If you have more than four grounds, use pages 14 and 15 of the form, which you may copy as many times as needed to give you a separate page for each ground, with each ground numbered in sequence. The recitation of the facts supporting each ground must be no longer than the two pages provided for the ground in the form.

You may include with the form a memorandum of law if you want to present legal authorities, but the Court will not consider grounds for relief set out in a memorandum of law that were not raised on the form. The citations and argument must be in a memorandum that complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 73 and does not exceed 15,000 words if computer-generated or 50 pages if not. If you are challenging the validity of your conviction, please include a summary of the facts pertaining to your offense and trial in your memorandum. GROUND ONE: Ineffective assistance of counsel

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND ONE: The attorney for Mr. Lynwyatt Allen (Defendant) pressured him into a plea. He was not prepared to go to trial.

Just before trial a plea bargain was presented according to the following terms:

An Application for deferred adjudication and probation could be made and a 15 year cap. The

Attorney for the Defendant represented that no finding of a deadly weapon would be made and

That the Defendant would receive deferred adjudication because he was “eligible”. The

Defendant was actively mi—led by his attorney as to his application for probation being

Granted as well as in the matter of no deadly weapon finding being made. If the attorney had

properly advised the defendant that he might not receive deferred adjudication he would not

have entered a no-contest plea. If the defendant’s attorney had told the defendant that a deadly

weapon finding would be made he would not have entered his plea. I was specifically told there

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND TWO: W Vi GROUND THREE: M/‘«

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND THREE: N //L GROUND FOUR:

FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND FOUR: N: P

4MA FACTS SUPPORTING GROUND: M/x 15 WHEREF ORE, APPLICANT PRAYS THAT THE COURT GRANT APPLICANT RELIEF TO WHICH HE MAY BE ENTITLED IN THIS PROCEEDIN G. VERIFICATION This application must be verified or it will be dismissed for non—compliance. For verification purposes, an applicant is a person filing the application on his or her own behalf. A petitioner is a person filing the application on behalf of an applicant, for example, an applicant=s attorney. An inmate is a person who is in custody. The inmate applicant must sign either the AOath Before a Notary Public@ before a nota.ry public or the AInmate=s Declaratione without a notary public. If the inmate is represented by a licensed attorney, the attorney may sign the AOath Before a Notary Public@ as petitioner and then complete APetitioner=s Information. @ A non~inmate applicant must sign the AOath Before a Notary Public@ before a notary public unless he is represented by a licensed attorney, in which case the attorney may sign the verification as petitioner.

A non-inmate non-attorney petitioner must sign the AOath Before a Notary Public@ before a notary public and must also complete APetitioner=s Information.@ An inmate petitioner must sign either the AOath Before a Notary Public@ before a notary public or the Alnmate=s Declaratione without a notary public and must also complete the appropriate APetitioner=s Information.@

OATH BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF ECEC iéq Al/d -4 the app]-ieant / (circle E Q one) in this Q ,being duly sworn, under oath says: Al am action and know the contents of the above application for a writ of habeas corpus and, according to my belief, the facts stated in the application are true.@ -

Sigzéfie of one)

W SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS

@ I é-1(I\DAY OF/Y\I»‘{V’&j‘\ 20 {ST .

~~ .... ' 415"’: JOAQUIN ALBERTO IORANZO. otorv Public. My Commission June I 5*°"~’~‘

7. JR. °' 79°‘ Expires 201 8 Si g n «

ure ot my Pu PETITIONER=S INFORMATION Petitioner=s printed name: Kfl Cf!" E4 KC/ State bar number, if applicable: -ZE-‘:0 i S 1 3 Address: E ‘T.{~"’J\$ 7* 7?: éw Mme, “TX 7327

TeIepho£7/ ”\) " [+300 Fax: 126 ~

I9 , am the applicant / petitioner (circle one) and being presently incarcerated in , declare under penalty of

perjury that, according to my belief, the facts stated in the above application are true and correct.

17 Exhibit D NO. 20l3CR5726-W1 2013CR5727—W1 20] 3CR2728-W]

EX PARTE § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § 186” JUDICIAL DISTRICT LYNWYATT ALLEN § BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION WRIT The Court having concluded that the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel contained in an application for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus create a necessity for a hearing, but that the matter is capable ofresolution by means of affidavits, it is ORDERED, as follows:

That the Clerk forward a copy ofthe writ application and its attachments to Paul Joseph Goeke, 115 E. Travis St., Suite 1145, San Antonio, Texas 78205.

l. That, on or before May 07, 2015, Paul Goekc file with this court his written afiidavit confirming or denying the allegations of ineffective assistance.

a. Please respond to Applicanfs allegations regarding the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including, but not limited to, the following:

(I) Counsel pressured Applicant into taking a plea because he was not prepared to go to trial. (2) Applicant was misled by Counsel as to his application for probation being granted as well as in the matter of no deadly weapon finding being made. (3) Had Counsel properly advised the Applicant that he might not receive deferred adjudication he would not have entered a no—c0ntest plea. (4) Counsel specifically told Applicant that there would be no finding of deadly weapon.

After you have reviewed the Ap_plicant’s writ application, please address any other issues raised by Applicant not specifically listed above and of which you have knowledge or information. 7

If there is any additional information not present before the court at this time that is relevant to the court’s understanding of this matter, please include any such information to clarify this issue.

Simultaneously, Paul Goeke shall deliver the affidavit and summation to Attorney for Applicant Kenneth Eric Baker, 115 E. Travis, Suite 333, San Antonio, Texas 78205. After these matters have occurred, this Court will forward its Order including its findings to the Court of Criminal Appeals for its disposition of the matter.

information contained in an affidavit filed pursuant to this order does not represent a violation of the attorney—client privilege. See TEX. R. EVID. 503(cl)(3)(stati.ng that communications relevant to issues concerning breach of counsel’s duty to his client represents an exception to the rule governing attorney~client privilege).

Failure to abide by this order is subject to a charge of contempt.

SIGNED and ENTERED this“ ~ ‘,1 ;’;f/1'1/<5‘ day of '-/M!” 5 '5 \ , /‘ ~ 20:1

~ ~ ’JE’F:;FE}iSON W Judge exar County, Texas MOORE 186"‘ Judicial District Court g,r

cc: Attorney for Applicant Kenneth Eric Baker 115 E. Travis, Suite 333 San Antonio, Texas 78205. Exhibit E THE STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF BEXAR ¢»O'3€03€O7

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally Paul J. Goeke, who, being duly sworn, deposed as follows:

Undersigned counsel has been directed by the District Court to provide an

affidavit in response to a Pro Se Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Lynwyatt Allen.

In response to this Honorable Court's order of 23rd day of Mag 2015 please find the following: [

Objection: This Honorable Court’s order violates the attorney-client privilege. In

anticipation of this objection, the Court observes in the order that this Writ of Habeas

Corpus alleges a breach of an attomey’s duty to a client and an exception to the privilege

is created by Texas Rules of Evidence 503(§) (3). With the objection anticipatorily

overruled, please find the following:

In the following affidavit, undersigned counsel does not use the more formal construct of describing the affiant as “undersigned counsel”, but adopts the less awkward colloquial use of the first person.

1(a)(1): The Applicant alleges that “Counsel pressured Applicant into taking a plea

because he was not prepared to go to trial”.

Response to 1(a)(1): Not True.

Applicant was in no way pressured into taking a plea.

The original plea bargain offer to Applicant had been a flat fifteen (15) year

sentence on the intoxication manslaughter indictment, and a ten (10) year sentence on

each of the intoxication assault indictments with an affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon, all to run concurrently. This offer did not change until immediately

before trial. The prosecutor had changed from Assistant District Attorney (Mr.) David

Henderson to Assistant District Attorney (Mr.) Eric Fuchs. It was Mr. Fuchs who relented

on the day of trial by offering a 15 year "cap" without requiring the Court to make a

finding of the use of a deadly weapon, thus allowing Applicant to apply for adjudicated

(regular) community supervision. This offer made possible a sentence of less than fifteen

years without an affirmative finding leading to earlier parole eligibility. The likelihood of

adjudicated community supervision being granted was described to Applicant as being

extremely remote.

I was completely prepared ‘to go to jury trial.

I had retained Dr. Michael Arambula, a highly qualified forensic psychiatrist, who

subsequently testified at Applicant's sentencing hearing in much the same manner as he A

would have testified in a jury trial. In addition to being a forensic psychiatrist, Dr.

Arambula has an advanced post doctorate in Pharmacy (referred to as a Pharm D.) This unique combination makes Dr. Ararnbula among the most highly qualified to testify with

regard to psychopharmacology, the study of effects of alcohol and other chemicals on the A

mind and body.

The assertion that I was not prepared for trial is demonstrably ludicrous, as

evidenced by the testimony of this expert witness and several character witnesses from

out of town during the sentencing hearing that resulted from his voluntary plea. These are

_ the very witnesses who would have testified to a jury. Based upon the unraveling of the

initial defense and the changing of the plea offer to a “cap” with the option of the court not entering an affirmative 3(g) finding, Applicant made an intelligent and fully informed

decision to waive a jury and enter a plea bargain agreement.

Each of the very witnesses that I would have used in his jury trial testified

in his sentencing hearing. They would not have done so were I not prepared for trial. He

simply wisely decided to limit his exposure, as the truth of his behavior became

unavoidable.

1(a)(2): Applicant alleges that “Applicant was misled by Counsel as to his

application for probation being granted as well as in the matter of no deadly

weapon finding being made”.

Response to 1(a)(2): Not True.

This is a complete and utter falsehood. The Applicant was always informed that

the possibility of probation from the court was extremely remote. Applicant was advised

that the main benefit of this plea bargain was that the sentences were certain to run

concurrently and that there was a possibility that the Hon. Judge Herr would be

somewhat solomonic with regard to the “cap” of fifteen (15) years and the full range of

punishment, each offense having a minimum sentence of two (2) years. Unfortunately for

Applicant, the prosecution successfully countered this possibility by literally "packing the

courtroom" with fiiends and family of the decedent and complainants.

One complainant had been extremely disfigured in the collision, a fact which the

prosecution underlined by displaying a “before” photo showing that he had previously

been “movie star” handsome. His live testimony then made his unfortunate disfigurement

obvious. This case was unique in my experience in that the head-on collision leading to the

death and injuries was actually captured on the dashboard camera of a patrol car. The

police officer was responding to reports of Applicant’s vehicle traveling on the wrong

side of the highway for a long distance, almost striking other drivers who then phoned

911.

The officer testified that he was rushing to the scene to intercept Applicant by

"bumping" him off the road before such a tragedy as this could occur. This unique

situation led to the actual capture of the violent head—on collision between the victims’

and Applicant’s trucks on that officer's "dash cam".

I relate this event in order to explain the environment in which Judge Herr was

required to pronounce sentence. When the video of the collision was played in open court, a relative of one of the victims ran from the courtroom, loudly retching; a dramatic

occurrence which dominated the subsequent news coverage. This, combined with

Applicant's poor testimonial performance and other aspects of this case led to the

growing inevitability of the maximum sentence being pronounced in open court in the

presence of the many friends and family of the dead and disfigured victims.

1(a)(3): Applicant alleges that “had Counsel properly advised the Applicant that he

might not receive deferred adjudication he would not have entered a no-contest

plea”.

Response to 1(a)(3): Not True.

Again, a complete and utter falsehood. Since my licensure in 1983, deferred adjudication has not been available even for simple DWI and with the subsequent creation of the Penal Code offenses of Intoxication Assault and Intoxication Manslaughter in the 73"’ legislature (effective September 1, 1994), deferred adjudication

has never been available for these offenses as well. These matters were explained to

Applicant and his family at length and in detail in response to their initial inquiries

regarding the potential for plea bargaining and sentencing from the beginning of my

representation.

Applicant was initially (and throughout my representation) completely and clearly

informed of the sentencing realities pursuant to Texas Law and that he could not receive the use of a deferred adjudication for these offenses under any circumstance and that with

deadly weapon being formally alleged, he could only receive probation (adjudicated

community supervision) from a jury after a trial.

topic of deferred adjudication never arose in conjunction with the discussion of the The

plea bargain offer.

1(a)(4): Applicant alleges “Counsel specifically told Applicant that there would be

no finding of deadly weapon”.

Response to 1(a)(4): Not True. Applicant had always been told that the trial court could

not grant probation in the presence of an affirmative finding of the use of a deadly

weapon.

Again, a complete and utter falsehood. The Applicant was advised that there was

in a judgment a possibility that Judge Herr might not enter a deadly weapon finding

sentencing him to prison. He was advised that, under the right circumstances, Judge Herr "splitting the baby", might reward him for having waived a jury and entering a plea by

with a sentence less than the maximum and/or by possibly not entering a deadly weapon

finding in the judgment. It should be noted that up until the time of impending jury selection, the offer had

been a flat 15 years to do, (not a cap) with an affirmative finding of the use of a deadly

weapon. In a jury trial, Applicant was faced with the possibility of being denied probation

by the jury and then facing with the possibility of Judge Herr ordering any jury sentences

to be run consecutively. It is because the plea changed to a "cap" of 15 years concurrent

without the requirement that the court enter a deadly weapon finding and the resulting

possibility of a sentence under the cap and/or without a deadly weapon finding, that

Applicant elected to enter into a plea bargain agreement. Again, the possibility of

community supervision from the court was always described to Applicant as being

Pursuant to this Honorable Court's Order at 1(b) please find the following: After

you have reviewed Applicant’s writ application, please address any other issues

raised by Applicant not specifically listed above and of which you have knowledge

or information:

Response to 1(b): Not Applicable

Pursuant to this Honorable Court's Order at 1(c) please find the following:

This Honorable Court instructs that if there is any additional information not

present before the court at this time that is relevant to the courts understanding of

this matter, please include any such information to clarify this matter, Pursuant to

this order, please find the following:

Placing this case in full context will help the court to understand the unique A

dynamics involved leading up to Applicant’s plea. I was a zealous and committed advocate for Applicant from the moment his father

Bob Allen first appeared in my office until the time that I was unforrned that Applicant

had filed a gm s_e__ writ of habeas corpus challenging my effectiveness. Mr. Allen came to me concerned that his son (Applicant) would be irrevocably injured were he to be moved to general population in the Bexar County Jail. Applicant

had received a cervical fracture in the collision which led to his arrest. This fracture

placed him at risk for spinal cord injury in the violent atmosphere of Bexar County Jail

general population.

Despite the fact that Mr. Allen could not pay me, I put aside other work and

sought Applicant’s release from custody on personal recognizance. I was successful in

this regard.

I told Mr. Allen at the time that Applicant’s only hope for probation was fi'om a

jury, given the death and severity of injuries he had caused. The plan from the outset was

trial by jury.

Mr. Allen described his son as young and inexperienced, not given to drinking

alcohol and the type of drinker who would not even finish a beer. Mr. Allen described

how his son had become romantically involved with an older woman and that this

involvement lead to an episode of drinking with her friends during which he had become

When he was left behind by the group, he had drunkenly found his way to his '

intoxicated.

truck, driven off and caused the fatal accident.

I determined to present the mitigating aspects of this scenario to a jury hoping for

probation under the circumstances. In this regard, I hired Dr. Michael Arambula, a

forensic psychiatrist and Pharm D, making him authoritative in psychopharmacology (the effect of drugs and alcohol on the mind). I also planned to present individuals who knew Applicant as an inexperienced non-drinker-whose naiveté would be viewed as mitigating

by the jury.

As the case progressed however, it became apparent that Mr. Allen’s version of

the event was a complete fiction.

A picture emerged that Applicant had in fact started drinking heavily in this new relationship and had probably embarrassed his girlfriend with his drunken behavior on

the night in question. When she sought to have him stay behind to “sleep it off’, he experienced this as an humiliating abandonment by his “first love”, became suicidal and

tried to “end it all” by intentionally driving down the wrong side of the highway without

regard to the innocent lives he might effect thereby.

The initial medical records brought to me by Applicant’s father were consistent with the false story he gave me about Applicant’s naiveté with alcohol. As trial

approached, I obtained more complete records in discovery that revealed Applicant’s

growing history of alcohol abuse, records in which he admitted periodic binge drinking

leading up to the offense in question and a developing alcoholism consistent with his

family history and one which he had been desperate to conceal from them.

Applica.nt’s mother is Native American. Her brother's alcohol addiction led to

multiple DWI arrests, imprisonment and eventual death from acute alcohol poisoning. I expressed my concerns that (1) this had been withheld from me (2) with the well-known

genetic basis for alcoholism and (3) how incompatible this was with his defense of na‘1’vete'. As trial approached and l inquired about the witnesses with whom he was drinking on the night of the accident, it became clear that their presence would further

undermine his claims of inexperience and seal his fate.

I was forced to adapt my trial strategy to conceal these truths from the

prosecution. As it was, Applicant and I were careful to structure his testimony to avoid

any mention of his former girlfriend's name, a commercial photographer with a webpage

who could easily be found on the Internet by a quick thinking prosecutor. It was evident

that had the prosecution made contact, it would have led to disastrous results.

The Sentencing Hearing

While I was prepared to present mitigation to Judge Hen‘ in the sentencing

hearing, I had not anticipated how effectively the prosecution would counter this by

literally packing the courtroom with the friends and family of the victims. This seemed to

place sociopolitical pressure on the sentencing judgesl informed Applicant that I might

be able counter this during the 30-day period of continuing jurisdiction.

It is true that I did not expect or predict that Judge Herr would give Applicant no

leniency at all under the terms of the plea bargain agreement, sentencing him to the

maximum allowed under the "cap". This likelihood only developed during the sentencing

hearing. I believe that the Honorable Judge Herr may have experienced some political

"pressure" from the packed courtroom and the above-described events. Subsequent '

developments lend credence to this theory: Judge Herr later did manifest significant

leniency (when not in open court) by actually granting Applicant significant credit for

time served while on electronic monitoring, as though Applicant had served that time in

the county jail when in fact he had not, credit to which he was simply not entitled under

the law. Such a grant of leniency was specifically addressed and found to be unauthorized

in Tagorda vs. State 977 SW2d 632 (Ct. App.— Ft. Worth) (1998). This leniency was thus

quietly expressed in a subsequent amended judgment modifying (in private) the original

judgment entered by Judge Herr and thus was not announced in open court and not

readily apparent to the aforementioned crowd of family and friends. I had hoped that

Judge Herr would also elect to refrain from making an affirmative 3(g) finding in the

judgment. The latter was not to be, however.

I believe the resulting amended judgment legitimizes my belief that the Hon. Judge Herr was uncharacteristically harsh in her open court actions, something that I

could not have reasonably predicted prior to the actual hearing. I advised Applicant of my

growing concerns at counsel table during the hearing. I also advised him of the trial

court’s continuing jurisdiction and control over the contents of the actual judgment as

opposed to her pronouncements in open court. Her maximum sentence of 15,10, and l0

years respectively with an affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon were all

pronounced in open court. Her leniency was expressed privately in an amended

judgment. I had approached Judge Herr in open court several days after the sentencing

hearing and asked her to consider these alternatives. The prosecutor in attendance at the

time did not comment on the request.

In this affidavit, I have expressly described each of Applicant's assertions as

complete and utter falsehoods for a reason: it is because they are complete and utter

falsehoods and because he knows that they are.

I was a zealous advocate for Applicant before, during and after his trial zmd I am

therefore somewhat mystified by the completely baseless claim of Ineffective Assistance

10 of Counsel, particularly because Applicant was advised of a legitimate avenue for

seeking a new trial.

After his sentencing, Applicant and his family were repeatedly informed of the

thirty (30) day motion for new trial jurisdiction and were urged by me to contact experienced Board Certified Criminal Law Specialists in order to attempt to set aside the

resulting sentence. I received a number of calls from qualified lawyers and spoke with

several experienced criminal defense lawyers about areas of possible post-conviction

relief and my willingness to assist in this regard. For example, this case was extensively litigated in a pretrial motion to suppress

regarding the validity of the warrantless blood draw. That motion was overruled by the

court. It is highly likely that the trial court was in error in that regard. The prosecutor at

the time (Mr. Fuchs) confided in me his concern that my suppression argument was valid and his fear that the judgment could be overturned on appeal whenl structured the plea in

such a way as to preserve Applicant's right to appeal rulings on pretrial motions. In

response to my having structured the plea to appeal the motion to suppress, the prosecutor supplemented the stipulations in a way he believed would defeat such an

appeal.‘ That avenue was not pursued then, due to the pendency of the above described

credit for time served. However, it should have been raised in this writ of Habeas Corpus

by seeking an out of time appeal in that regard, as that issue would in my opinion have a

high likelihood of success, certainly higher than that of a patently absurd claim of

1 in addition to the forensic blood draw, the state had hospital records with plasma alcohol concentrations based on clinical laboratory analysis. The prosecutor supplemented the stipulations with these hospital records, erroneously believing such supplementation would defeat the appeal of the pretrial motion. It would not. The case law establishes that, if Applicant's decision to enter a plea bargain agreement was in any way influenced by the court's erroneous ruling on the motion to suppress, relief should be forthcoming. My original trial plan was to challenge the hospital blood draw pursuant to the holding of Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (201 1) and the absence of the hospital technician. '

ll ineffective assistance of counsel. The Applicant's post-conviction pursuits would have

been better placed in that regard and why that has been abandoned is beyond me except

fO1‘AppliCant'S acting 2r_o _s_§ and without competent legal advice in this regard.

I had previously advised Applicant and his family of the post-conviction strategy

of seeking an out of time appeal challenging the denial of the motion to suppress. I had

explained that Applicant could file a motion for new trial and/or give notice of appeal

regarding the motion to suppress ruling. I also explained that doing so might draw

attention to the unauthorized credit for time served and cause an interested prosecutor to

challenge this credit.2

There also remained the possibility of the trial court reconsidering the deadly

weapon finding by removing or omitting it in the judgment. As it developed, the trial

court amended the judgment by awarding credit for time served. Judge Herr actually did

this after her jurisdiction had expired in a manner which could now (and then) be

challenged as invalid. Unfortunately, the affirmative finding of the use of a deadly

weapon remained. The better strategy for Applicant would have been to employ

experienced counsel and seek an out of time appeal of the motion to suppress through a

post conviction writ of habeas corpus, a strategy which is probably now foreclosed by the “one writ rule”. By acting gm _s§ and not following my advice, he has (1) lost a legitimate challenge to his conviction and (2) threatened the continuing viability of his unauthorized

credit for time served. If the prosecution now challenges that credit for time sewed, he will probably lose it. Additionally, he will not be able to challenge the trial court’s

2 I had discussed this dilemma with Applicant during the period of continuingjurisdiction by the trial court. Because the attorney client relationship became contentious, I reduced part of this advice to writing and delivered it to Applicant in jail. See Attached Exhibit A.

12 erroneous denial of his motion to suppress the warrantless blood draw, thus ruling out

any further challenge to his sentence.

Undersigned counsel will respond further as directed by the court.

I declare the foregoing to be true and correct under penalty of perjury.”

R) "Further affiant sayeth not."

Paul J’. Goeke

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this to certify which witness my hand and seal of office. 1 5)»

day of 2015,

Notary Public, State of Texasfl County of Bexar

13 Exhibit F NO. 2013CR5726-W1 20]3CR572’7~W.l 2013CR5728-‘W1

EX PART § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

§ 186” JUDICIAL DISTRICT

L-YNWYATT ALLEN ‘

§ BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER DESIGNATING ISSUES The Court having concluded that controverted, previously unresolved facts which are material to the legality of Applicant's confinement exist and need to be resolved, there is a necessity for the suspension of the time limitations enunciated in Article 1 l.O7 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 § 3(d) (West 2012).

Applicant has alleged the following issue which the court finds requires resolution:

21. lneffeetive Assistance of Counsel

Findings will be forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals for its disposition of the matter.

SIGNED and ENTERED on iii- /£17.

ON MOORE Judfgef’.l'86"‘ Judicial District Court County, Texas Exhibit G PAUL J. GOEKE ATTORNEY AT LAW MILAM BUILDING, SUITE H45 I5 E. TRAVIS STREET I

SAN Ax-roxro, Texas 73205-1755 (2 IO) 222-2959 acme cermruzo CRIMINAL LAW SPECIALIST "W ‘2 '°’ 333'°°53 MEMBER COLLEGE OF THE TEXAS BDARD or LEGAL s9:ciAI.IzA\'IoN RES: (2 IO) 495-SI44 STATE BAR OF TEXAS

May 20, 2015

VIA HAND DELIVERY Kenneth Baker 115 E. Travis, Ste. 333 San Antonio, Texas 78205

RE: State of Texas v. LynwyattAIlen,' Cause Nos. 201 3~CR—5 726, 20] 3-CR—5 72 7, 201 3-CR-5 728

Dear Sir:

Enclosed please find one (1) copy of the Affidavit in Response to the pr_o se writ of Habeas Corpus to be filed in the above referenced matter. Please excuse the delay in sending your copy.

Should you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact this office.

Sincerely,

Paul J. Goeke Attorney at Law

Eric.

OF COUNSEL BENNIE E. RAY J. GARY TRICHTER 1\<[m:E MCCOLLUM 7Io w, mm smear, sun‘: c 2000 smm-4 smear CENTRAL EXPRESSWAY. SUITE 304 an is N. Ausrm, TEXAS 78701 HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002 DALLAS, TEXAS 75206 I-500-DWI-IDIO ~ (5:2) 479-7775 I-eooowl-iolo I-BODDWI-IOIO - (EM) 69!-3975 fiARV@l’EXASD\NILAW.COM

‘NO. 2013C R5726-W1 20l3CR5727-W1 20l3CR5728-W1

EX PARTE § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § 1ss“‘ JUDICIAL DISTRICT

LYNWYATT ALLEN § BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS ORDER Applicant, Lynwyatt Allen, has filed a pro se application for a post-conviction writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, collaterally

attacking his conviction in cause number 20l3CR5726; 20l3CR5727; 20l3CR5728. TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 1 1.07 (West 2012).

HISTORY OF THE CASE On or about June 6, 2013, Applicant plead guilty to the offense of intoxication assault.

Applicant was sentenced to ten (10) years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections -

lnstitutional Division. Applicant did not file a direct appeal. This application for writ of habeas

corpus was filed on March l7, 2015. The District Attorney received a copy of this application on

March 18, 2015.

ALLEGATIONS OF APPLICANT 1. In App|icant’s sole ground for relief, Applicant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel.

~ 0 Specifically, Applicant alleges that Trial Counsel and

represented that no finding of a deadly weapon would be made and that Applicant

would receive deferred adjudication because he was “eligible." Also, Trial Counsel

misled Applicant to believe that his application for probation was being granted and

had Trial Counsel informed Applicant that he would not receive probation and that a t-I

fitiiili deadly weapon finding would be made, he would not have entered a no-contest plea.

FINDINGS OF FACT l. On or about June 6, 2013, Applicant plead guilty to the offense of intoxication assault.

Applicant was sentenced to ten (10) years confinement in the Texas Department of

Corrections — Institutional Division.

2. Applicant did not file a direct appeal.

3. The trial court requested and received an affidavit from Applicant’s Trial Counsel, Paul J.

Goeke (Attachment: Affidavit). Although the court finds the affidavit credible, the court

takes issue with portions of the affidavit in which the affiant speculates as to the court’s ems. ~$____,-_._..___...., , \_ ____‘m ,. ...

decisions for ce_rt_ain rulings.

3. “The original plea bargain offer to Applicant had been a flat fifteen (15) year sentence on the intoxication manslaughter indictment, and a ten (l0) year sentence on each of the intoxication assault indictments with an affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon, all to run concurrently. This offer did not change until immediately before trial. The prosecutor had changed from Assistant District Attorney (Mr.) David Henderson to Assistant District Attorney (Mr. ) Eric Fuchs. It was Mr. Fuchs who relented on the day of trial by offering a 15 year “cap”

without requiring the Court to make finding of the use of a deadly weapon, thus allowing Applicant to apply for adjudicated (regular) community supervision. This offer made possible a sentence of less than fifteen years without an affinnative finding leading to earlier parole eligibility. The likelihood of adjudicated community supervision being granted was described to Applicant as being extremely remote. I had retained Dr. Michael Arambula, a highly qualified forensic psychiatrist, who subsequently testified at App1icant’s sentencing hearing in much the same manner as he would have testified in ajury trial. In addition to being a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Arambula has an advanced post doctorate in Pharmacy (referred to as a Pharm D.) This unique combination makes Dr. Arambula among the most highly qualified to testify with regard to psychopharmacology, the study of effects of alcohol and other chemicals on the mind and body. The assertion that I was not prepared for trial is demonstrably \f131|3P1S7S

ludicrous, as evidenced by the testimony of this expert witness and several character witnesses from out of town during the sentencing hearing that resulted from his voluntary plea. These are the very witnesses who would have testified to ajury. Based upon the unraveling of the initial defense and the changing of the plea offer to a “cap” with the option of the court not entering an affirmative 3(g)

06112015 finding, Applicant made an intelligent and fully informed decision to waive ajury and enter a plea bargain agreement. Each of the very witnesses that would have used in his jury trial testified in his sentencing hearing. They would not have done so were I not prepared for trial. He simply wisely decided to limit his exposure, as the truth of his behavior became unavoidable. ” . “This is a complete and utter falsehood. The Applicant was always informed that the ossibili of pro Eatron from the court was extremely remote. Applicant was

run concurrently and that there was a possibility that the Hon. Judge Herr would be somewhat solomonic with regard to the “cap” of fifteen (15) years and the full range of punishment, each offense having a minimum sentence of two (2) years. Unfortunately for Applicant, the prosecution successfully counters this possibility by literally “packing the courtroom” with friends and family of the decedent and complainants. One complainant had been extremely disfigured in the collision, a fact which the prosecution underlined by displaying a “before” photo showing that he had previously been “movie star” handsome. His live testimony then made his unfortunate disfigurement obvious. This case was unique in my experience in that the head-on collision leading to the death and injuries was actually captured on the dashboard camera of a patrol car. The police officer was responding to reports of Applicant’s vehicle traveling on the wrong side of the highway for a long distance, almost striking other drivers who them phoned 911. The ofiicer testified that he was rushing to the scene to intercept Applicant by “bumping" him off the road before such a tragedy as this could occur. This unique situation led to the actual capture of the violent head-on collision between the victims’ and Applicant's trucks on that officer’s “dash cam". I relate this event in order to explain the environment in which Judge Herr was required to pronounce sentence. When the video of the collision was played in open court , a relative of one of the victims ran from the courtroom, loudly retching; a dramatic occurrence which dominated the subsequent news coverage. This, combined with Applicant's poor testimonial performance and other aspects of this case led to the growing inevitability of the maximum sentence being pronounced in open court in the presence of the many friends and family of the dead and disfigured victims."

a Judication has not ‘been available even or stm e an W1 su se uent

Ma"fislaTIghter'iFthé 73'“ legislature (effective September 1, 1994), deferred adjudication has never been available for these offenses as well. TheTfi’atters were explained to Applicant and his family at length and in detail in response to their initial inquires regarding the potential for plea bargaining and sentencing from the beginning of my representation. Applicant was initially (and throughout V1310-PXS7

my representation) completelflnd clearly infonned of the sentencing realities pursuant to Texas Law and that he could not receive deferred adjudication for circumstance and that with the use of a deadly weapon being fonnally alleged, he could only receive probation (adjudication community supervision) from a jury after atrial. The topic of deferred adjudication never

@6i12@1S SEQEIISB

arose in conjunction with the discussion of the plea bargain offer.” . “Not true. Applicant had always been told that the trial court could not grant

Again, a complete and utter fal§hood. The Ap licant was adviseTcF that weapon

right circumstances, Judge I-lerr might reward him for having waived ajury and entering a plea by “splitting the baby” with a sentence less than the maximum and/or by possibly not entering a deadly weapon finding judgment. It should be !_.rLSIcl0I£II\

noted that up until the time of impending jury selection, the offer had been a fiat l5 years to do (not a cap) with an affinnative finding of use of a deadly weapon. In a jury trial, Applicant was faced with the possibility of being denied probation by thejury and then facing with the possibility of Judge Herr ordering any jury sentences to be run consecutively. It is because the plea changed to a “cap” of 15 years concurrent without the requirement that the court enter a deadly weapon finding and the resulting possibility of a sentence under the cap and/or without a deadly weapon finding, that Applicant elected to enter into a plea bargain agreement. Again, the possibility of community supervision from the court was always described to Applicant as being extremely remote.” . “Placing this case in full context will help the court understand the unique dynamics involved leading up to Applicant’s plea. I was a zealous and committed advocate for Applicant from the moment his father Bob Allen first appeared in my office until the time that I was unforrned (sic) that Applicant had filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus challenging my effectiveness. Mr. Allen came to me concerned that his son (Applicant) would be irrevocably injured were he to be moved to general population in the Bexar County Jail. Applicant had received a cervical fracture in the collision which led to his arrest. This fracture placed him at risk for spinal cord injury in the violent atmosphere of Bexar County Jail general population. Despite the fact that Mr. Allen could not pay me, I put aside other work and sought Applicant’s release from custody on person recognizance. I was successful in this regard. I told Mr. Allen at that time that Applicant’s only hope was from a jury, given the death and severity of injures he had for probation caused. The plan from the outset was trial byjury. Mr. Allen described his son as young and inexperienced, not given to drinking alcohol and the type of drinker who would not even finish a beer. Mr. Allen described how his son had become romantically involved with an older woman and that this involvement lead to an episode of drinking with her friends during which he had become intoxicated. When he was lefi behind by the group, he had drunkenly found his way to his truck, driven off and caused the fatal accident. I determined to present the mitigating aspects of this scenario to a jury hoping for probation under the circumstances. In this regard, I hired Dr. Michael Arambula, a forensic psychiatrist and Pharm D. making him authoritative in psychopharmacology (the effect of drugs and alcohol on the mind). I also planned to present individuals who knew Applicant as an inexperienced non-drinker whose naivete would be viewed as mitigating by thejury. As the case progressed however, it became apparent that 51031190

Mr. Allen’s version of the event was complete fiction. A picture emerged that Applicant had in fact started drinking heavily in this new relationship and had probably embarrassed his girlfriend with his drunken behavior on the night in question. When she sought to have him stay behind to “sleep it off’, he experienced this as an humiliating abandonment by his “first love”, became suicidal and tried to “end it all” by intentionally driving down the wrong side of the highway without regard to the innocent lives he might effect thereby. The initial medical records brought to me by Applicant’s father were consistent with ‘3£SlclFJ'E€I!\

the false story he gave me about Applicant’s naivete with alcohol. As trial approached, I obtained more complete records in discovery that revealed Applicant’s growing history of alcohol abuse, records in which he admitted periodic binge drinking leading up to the offense in question and a developing alcoholism consistent with his family history and one which he had been desperate to conceal from them. Applicant’s mother is Native American. Her brother’s alcohol addiction led to multiple DWI arrests, imprisonment and eventual death from acute alcohol poisoning. I expressed my concerns that (1) this had been withheld from me (2) with the well-known genetic basis for alcoholism and (3) how incompatible this was with his defense of naivete. As trial approached and l inquired about witnesses with whom he was drinking on the night of the accident, it became clear that their presence would further undennine his claims of inexperience and seal his fate. I was forced to adapt my trial strategy to conceal these truths from t.he prosecution. As it was, Applicant and I were careful to structure his testimony to avoid any mention of his former girlfriend’s _name, a commercial photographer with a webpage who could easily be found on the lntemet by a quick thinking prosecutor. lt was evident that had the prosecution made contact, it would have led to disastrous results.” “While I was prepared to present mitigation to Judge Herr in the sentencing hearing, I had not anticipated how effectively the prosecution would counter this by literally packing the courtroom with the friends and family of the victims. This seemed to place sociopolitical pressure on the sentencing judge. I infonned Applicant that I might be able to counter this during the 30-day period of continuingjurisdiction. It is true that I did not expect or predict that Judge Herr would give Applicant no leniency at all under the tenns of the plea bargain agreement, sentencing him to the maximum allowed under the “cap”. The likelihood only developed during the sentencing hearing. . In this affldavit, l have ex ressl described each if Applicantfs aslsertions as complete and utter falsehoods for a reason: it is becfiisfihey are co—rn;)Ttea‘nd utter falsehoods and because he knows that they are. for applicant before, during and after his trial and 1 am therefore somewhat mystified by the completely baseless claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, particularly because Applicant was advised of a legitimate avenue for seeking a new trial. After his sentencing, Applicant and his family were repeatedly informed of the thirty (30) day motion for new trial jurisdiction and were urged by me to contact experienced Board Certified Criminal Law Specialist in order to attempt to set aside the resulting sentence. I received a number of calls from qualified lawyers SIP-JZI190

and spoke with several experienced criminal defense lawyers about areas of possible post-conviction relief and my willingness to assist in this regard. For example, this case was extensively litigated in a pretrial motion to suppress regarding the validity of the warrantless blood draw. That motion was overruled by the court. It is highly likely that the trial court was in error in that regard. The prosecutor at the time (Mr. Fuchs) confided in me his concerns that my suppression argument was valid and his fear that the judgment could be overturned on appeal when l structured the plea in such a way as to preserve E>£S'ld0'[£11\

Applicant’s right to appeal rulings on pretrial motions. In response to have structured the plea to appeal the motion to suppress, the prosecutor supplemented the stipulations in a way he believed would defeat such an appeal. That avenue was not pursued then, due to the pendency of the above described credit for time sewed. However, it should have been raised in this writ of Habeas Corpus by seeking an out of time appeal in that regard, as that issue would in my opinion have a high likelihood of success, certainly higher than that of patently absurd claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Applicant’s post-conviction pursuits would have been better placed in that regard and why that has been abandoned is beyond me except for Applicant’s acting pro se and without competent legal advice in this regard. I had previously advised Applicant and his family of the post-conviction strategy of seeking an out of time appeal challenging the denial of the motion to suppress. I had explained that Applicant could file a motion for a new trial and/or give notice of appeal regarding the motion to suppress the ruling. i also explained that doing so might draw attention to the unauthorized credit for time served and caused an interested prosecutor to challenge this credit. There also remained the possibility of the trial court reconsidering the deadly weapon finding by removing or omitting it in the judgment. As it developed, the trial court amended the judgment by awarding credit for time served. Judge Herr actually did this after herjurisdiction had expired in a manner which could now (and then) be challenged as invalid. Unfortunately, the affimtative finding of the use of a deadly weapon remained. The better strategy for Applicant would have been to employ experienced counsel and seek an out of time appeal of motion to suppress through a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus, a strategy which is probably now foreclosed by the “one writ rule”. By acting pro se and not following my advice, he has (I) lost legitimate challenge to his conviction and (2) threatened the continuing viability for his unauthorized credit for time served. If the prosecution now challenges that credit for time served, he will probably lose it. Additionally, he will not be able to challenge the trial court’s erroneous denial of his motion to suppress the warrantless blood draw, thus ruling out any further challenge to his sentence.” CONCLUSIONE OF LAW SI'BZ'LT,90

1. Under the two-prong standard for reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims,

Applicant must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient 09S'[d-@T£I;r’\

performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); See also McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 842-43

(Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

Trial counsel sufficiently rebuts all allegations made against him and provided a detailed

account of his work on the case, the court concludes that his representation of Applicant

did not below an objective standard of reasonableness. Therefore, this court ,1’ r——

recornrnends that Applicant’s second, third and fourth grounds for relief pertaining to

ineffective assistance of counsel be DENIED. See Strickland v. Washinglon, 466 U.S.

668 (1984).

Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended

that this application be DENIED. SI!‘-)ZI1‘9(-J

0RDERS IA‘ The District Clerk of Bexar County, Texas, is hereby ordered to prepare a copy of this 15 document, together with any attachments and forward the same to the following persons by mail or the most practical means: T9SId‘E)

a. The Court of Criminal Appeals Austin, Texas 78711

b. Nicholas “Nico” LaHood Criminal District Attorney Cadena - Reeves Justice Center Bexar County, Texas 78205

c. Lynwyatt Allen TDCJ ID: 01935579 Dominguez Unit 6535 Cagnon Road San Antonio, Texas 78252

SIGNED, ORDERED and DECREED on / U //45% Z 0/5

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