Allen Keith Anderson Sr. A/K/A Allen K. Anderson v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 12, 2012
Docket02-10-00489-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Allen Keith Anderson Sr. A/K/A Allen K. Anderson v. State (Allen Keith Anderson Sr. A/K/A Allen K. Anderson v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Allen Keith Anderson Sr. A/K/A Allen K. Anderson v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00489-CR

ALLEN KEITH ANDERSON, SR. APPELLANT A/K/A ALLEN K. ANDERSON

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

I. Introduction

In a single point, Appellant Allen Keith Anderson, Sr. a/k/a Allen K.

Anderson appeals his conviction for sexual assault. We affirm.

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. II. Background

The State charged Anderson with the sexual assault of Lori Miller (a

pseudonym). Anderson pleaded not guilty, but a jury found him guilty as charged

in the indictment and assessed his punishment at six years’ confinement. 2 This

appeal followed.

III. Sufficiency

Anderson concedes that under the applicable standard of review, the

evidence in the record establishes that he had sexual intercourse with Miller.

However, he complains that the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that she did not consent to the intercourse.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a

conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct.

2 Because Anderson challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, we will discuss the facts below.

2 at 2789; Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638. The trier of fact is the sole judge of the

weight and credibility of the evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04

(West 1979); Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), cert.

denied, 129 S. Ct. 2075 (2009). Thus, when performing an evidentiary

sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State,

235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Instead, we Adetermine whether

the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and

cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to

the verdict.@ Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We

must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of

the verdict and defer to that resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at

2793; Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638.

As authorized by the indictment, the jury convicted Anderson of

intentionally or knowingly causing the penetration of Miller’s female sexual organ

by inserting his penis or his finger into it while knowing that he did so without her

consent and that she was either unconscious or physically unable to resist or that

she did not consent and was unaware that the sexual assault was occurring.

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(1)(A), (b)(3), (5) (West 2011); Byrd v.

State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d

234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). When assent in fact has not been given, and

the actor knows that the victim’s physical impairment is such that resistance is

3 not reasonably to be expected, sexual intercourse is ―without consent‖ under the

sexual assault statute. Elliott v. State, 858 S.W.2d 478, 485 (Tex. Crim. App.),

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 997 (1993).

B. Analysis

Anderson argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that he

penetrated Miller without her consent because she was either unconscious or

physically unable to resist or unaware that the sexual assault was occurring,

stating that

[t]he State had urine samples taken from Ms. Miller at the hospital but never presented any type of scientific evidence to prove whether Ms. Miller might have been unconscious and/or physically unable to resist due to ingestion of too much alcohol or any type of drugs. To the contrary, the evidence presented by the State actually proves that Lori Miller knew what was going on and told [Anderson] ―no‖ and kicked at him. The probative facts of this case do not support a conviction for the offense alleged in the indictment.

The State replies that Anderson’s entire argument is that ―since there was

(in his view) conflicting evidence regarding the victim’s recollections of the attack,

it follows that he is entitled to a reversal. This is simply not the state of the law in

Texas‖ because a verdict is not subject to acquittal simply because the defense

has presented a reasonable alternative hypothesis. See Wilson v. State, 7

S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (―We have rejected the reasonable

hypothesis construct as a measure of legal sufficiency.‖).

4 1. Evidence on Consent

Lori Miller, a school teacher working on her doctorate degree, testified that

on December 11, 2009, she left her car at a Starbucks and rode with Sherri

Stephens, an acquaintance she had known for almost a year, to a tour of

Christmas lights in the Plano area. They arrived around 7:00 p.m. and boarded

the tour bus with their beverages—Miller had brought a thermos of hot cocoa

with two shots of bourbon in it, and Stephens had brought five beers. The tour

stopped at a convenience store at one point, and Miller bought a four-pack of

miniature wine bottles and drank one of the bottles instead of the cocoa because

it was hot inside the bus. Stephens drank all five beers.

The tour ended around 11:00 p.m., and Miller was tired and wanted to go

home, but Stephens was driving and wanted to go out, telling Miller that she just

wanted to have one drink.3 They ended up at Rob’s Billiards, a bar Stephens

said neither woman was familiar with. Stephens drank a bottle of beer and then

ordered a pitcher of beer and invited two men—Anderson and Charles

Williams—to their table; Miller and Stephens both testified that Miller drank only

water at the bar. Miller said that she was not intoxicated or buzzed at all by this

point. They stayed at the bar until last call, around 2:00 a.m.

3 Contrary to Miller’s testimony, Stephens testified that she did not recall Miller telling her that she was tired and wanted to go home. Instead, Stephens said that she thought they had both planned all along to hang out later.

5 At last call, the men invited Miller and Stephens back to their apartment,

but both women refused. Miller testified that she said she was tired and wanted

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Hooper v. State
214 S.W.3d 9 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Williams v. State
235 S.W.3d 742 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Malik v. State
953 S.W.2d 234 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Brown v. State
270 S.W.3d 564 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2008)
Elliott v. State
858 S.W.2d 478 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1993)
Wilson v. State
7 S.W.3d 136 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Hughes v. State
194 S.W.3d 649 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Isassi v. State
330 S.W.3d 633 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2010)
Byrd v. State
336 S.W.3d 242 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2011)
Taulung v. State
979 S.W.2d 854 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Reproductive Services, Inc. v. Walker
439 U.S. 1354 (Supreme Court, 1978)

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Allen Keith Anderson Sr. A/K/A Allen K. Anderson v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allen-keith-anderson-sr-aka-allen-k-anderson-v-sta-texapp-2012.