In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________
NO. 09-17-00239-CR ____________________
ALLEN JAMES HANCOCK, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
_______________________________________________________ ______________
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 13-18338 ________________________________________________________ _____________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Allen James Hancock appeals his conviction for capital murder. In one issue,
he argues the evidence admitted in his trial fails to support the jury’s verdict finding
him guilty. After considering his arguments, we affirm the judgment but reform it to
correct a clerical error that it contains. As reformed, the final judgment is affirmed.
1 Background
One night in late-June 2013, several people, including MacGarrett Jack,
Preston Wilson, and Joshua Caesar, were at Jack’s home with others, some of whom
were playing dominoes. While there, one or more individuals, with guns, approached
Jack’s carport and announced to the group they were being robbed. The testimony
in the trial shows that Jack, who was at a table playing dominoes, bolted toward the
door to his home. Gunshots were then fired toward the group. During the robbery,
Jack, Wilson, and Caesar 1 were struck by bullets, which proved fatal. The
pathologist who examined Jack’s, Wilson’s, and Ceasar’s bodies determined that
they died from the gunshot wounds they suffered after being shot at Jack’s home.
In December 2013, the State filed an indictment alleging that Hancock
murdered Jack and Wilson during the same criminal transaction.2 The case against
Hancock went to trial in June 2017. During the trial, the State called three men, Sam
1 The indictment names Hancock as the person who shot Jack and Wilson. 2 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (West 2019). We cite the current version of any statutes referenced in the appeal since the amendments to them, if any, have not affected our resolution of the issues Hancock has raised in his appeal. 2 Brown,3 Arthur Smith, 4 and William Lee, 5 who were among the men with Jack at
his home the night the shooting occurred. Lee testified in the trial, and his testimony
reflects that he was seriously wounded by the gunfire that night. According to Lee,
he remembered a gunman wearing a camouflage bandana as the man approached
Jack’s home. Lee testified that he saw the gunman’s bandana fall from his face,
allowing Lee to briefly view the man’s face. Lee agreed that when the gunshots rang
out, he dove for cover, so he did not see anyone firing a gun. The bullets that struck
Lee resulted in him losing sight in his left eye.
When Brown testified in the trial, he stated he saw “three to four” African-
American individuals in black clothes wearing camouflage bandanas over their faces
as they approached Jack’s home. Brown explained he could not see the men’s faces,
that no one ever showed him any pictures of the men, and that he could not recognize
anyone in the group should he see them again. Smith’s testimony differs from
Brown’s only with respect to the fact Smith saw only one man approach Jack’s
3 We identify the individuals who were present but who were not killed during the robbery with pseudonyms. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (granting victims of crimes “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”). 4 A pseudonym. 5 A pseudonym. 3 home. Smith described that man as an African-American male with a camouflage
bandana covering his face. Smith agreed that he could not identify that man.
The evidence established that Lee went to the hospital where he was treated
for his injuries after the shooting occurred. Shortly after Lee came out of surgery,
the police came to the hospital and showed Lee six photos, including Hancock’s, the
only suspect included in the group of photographs Lee viewed at the hospital. Lee
testified that he could not identify anyone from the six photos he examined while
hospitalized because he was medicated, recovering from surgery, and had lost sight
in his left eye.
Lee then testified that in mid-July 2013, he was watching television when he
saw a news report about a person the police arrested. While the arrest mentioned in
the newscast did not involve the shootings at Jack’s home, the broadcast mentioned
that police wanted to talk to Hancock about the triple-homicide that occurred in June
2013. Lee agreed that he saw a photograph of Hancock during the newscast. Lee
called the police the next day and asked them to come to his home. When the police
responded to Lee’s request, they showed him the same photos they showed him at
the hospital. But on this occasion, Lee identified Hancock as the person he saw
holding a gun at Jack’s home. Lee testified that when he saw Hancock’s image on
television, he immediately recognized Hancock’s image as the person who he saw
4 holding a gun the night someone shot him. According to Lee, the broadcast caused
him to “flashback” to the night of the shooting. Lee explained that he was 100%
certain that Hancock is the person he saw with a gun that night. Lee also identified
Hancock as he sat by defense counsel as the person he saw that night.6
Several employees of the Beaumont Police Department testified about the
investigation the police conducted into the murders. Officer Heather Wilson was one
of the officers who went to the scene the night the robbery occurred. She was one of
nineteen witnesses the State called during the trial. According to Officer Wilson,
upon arriving at Jack’s home, she learned from another officer that a collision
involving two vehicles occurred that same night on a street near Jack’s home. When
Officer Wilson went to the scene of that collision, she found a white truck in an
intersection located about two blocks from Jack’s home. Near the truck, Officer
Wilson found debris in the road from another vehicle that was no longer at the scene,
including parts from a mirror and pieces of plastic. The police took photographs of
that scene and collected the debris around the white truck as part of their
investigation into the murders at Jack’s home.
6 Hancock’s counsel did not file any pretrial motions or make any objections during the trial to Lee’s testimony about his out-of-court or in-court identifications of Hancock as the gunman he saw at Jack’s home. 5 Officer Michael Roberts is another officer who testified in Hancock’s trial.
Officer Roberts was investigating another reported hit-and-run collision in another
part of Beaumont the night the three men were murdered at Jack’s home. According
to Officer Roberts, Latrina Hall reported an alleged hit-and-run accident involving
her black SUV that night, which she claimed occurred on a street in Beaumont that
is several miles from the scene of the murders. Officer Roberts spoke to Hall and
went to her mother’s home to inspect the damages associated with Hall’s report of
the hit-and-run collision. Officer Roberts testified that Hall told him a white or silver
colored truck sideswiped the passenger side of her black SUV while she was driving
the SUV. Hall could not provide Officer Roberts with any further description about
the truck. Later that same night, Officer Roberts learned from one of the officers
involved in the murder investigation that a witness claimed to have seen a dark-
colored SUV speeding away after hearing gunshots in her neighborhood. Officer
Roberts called Hall to question her further about the circumstances involving her
report. When he reached her by phone, she told him that she was at her apartment in
Port Arthur. At that point, Officer Roberts relayed the information Hall gave him to
the detectives involved in investigating the murders.
Several witnesses testified to circumstances that allowed the jury to connect
Hall’s SUV to the SUV involved in the collision that occurred near Jack’s home. For
6 example, Jenny Lounsbury, a forensic scientist employed by the Texas Department
of Public Safety, explained that she compared the mirror assembly found near the
white truck to a part taken by police from Hall’s SUV. According to Lounsbury, the
mirror assembly matched Hall’s SUV. While holding pieces from the scene and from
Hall’s SUV, Lounsbury testified that “at one time, these two items were joined
together similar to putting back a piece of the puzzle.” And Lounsbury explained
that other pieces of debris found at the scene near Jack’s home were “consistent
with” the color and type of plastic used in manufacturing Hall’s SUV. Nonetheless,
Lounsbury also stated that many pieces of the debris taken from the scene near the
white truck did not belong to Hall’s SUV.
Hall’s testimony also provides support to the jury’s conclusion that Hancock
had Hall’s SUV the night of the murders. During Hall’s testimony, Hall agreed that
she also faced charges for the murders. Nonetheless, Hall denied she was involved
in the crimes at Jack’s home. According to Hall, the night of the shootings, she was
working as a nurse’s assistant at a local nursing home. Police confirmed that part of
her story. Hall also explained that Hancock dropped her off at work during the
afternoon, which was before the men were murdered. She stated that Hancock then
drove away in her black SUV. Hall acknowledged that she and Hancock were dating
at that time, and she testified that she regularly allowed Hancock to use her car. Hall
7 explained that while she was working her shift, she saw a television broadcast
reporting a triple homicide and advising that the police were looking for a black SUV
that someone saw leaving the scene.
During her testimony, Hall explained that Hancock picked her up when her
shift ended that night, but that he was not driving her SUV. According to Hall,
Hancock told her he had backed her car into a pole. When Hancock took Hall to her
SUV, she noticed the passenger-side window and mirror were missing from her car.
According to Hall, her SUV was not damaged when Hancock dropped her off at
work. Hall testified that, to support an insurance claim, she decided to report the
SUV had been in a hit-and-run accident in a location that she picked without
knowing anything about Hancock’s involvement in the murders at Jack’s home.
Over the next few weeks, Hall acknowledged that she gave officers in the
murder investigation at least five inconsistent accounts about who had been driving
her SUV the night the murders occurred. Hall blamed Hancock for the decisions she
made to lie to the police about what happened to her SUV. According to Hall,
Hancock told her to tell the police that a man named “Mike C” was the person
driving her car after he dropped her off at work. On cross-examination, Hall agreed
she lied to the police about the person she allowed to use her SUV at least twice the
first night she spoke to the police, and she agreed she continued to lie to police for
8 over a month when they questioned her about who was driving her car. For instance,
when first questioned at the police station about the murders, Hall admitted she
fabricated the story about someone sideswiping her SUV.
Late that summer, the police charged Hall with murder, arrested her, and
placed her in jail. On August 8, 2013, Hall spoke to detectives again about the
shootings at Jack’s home. While Hall maintained she was not involved, she told
police that she and Hancock were dating and that Hancock had her SUV the evening
the murders occurred. During her testimony, Hall stated that Hancock told her to lie
to the police about who had her car the night the murders occurred. Hall agreed that
she was still facing charges alleging she committed capital murder. Yet Hall told the
jury she did not have any agreement with the State regarding the murder charges and
was testifying against Hancock because she wanted to help “the victim’s family.”
The investigation the police conducted into the shootings included examining
some of the exterior windows on Jack’s home and examining Hall’s SUV. This part
of the investigation included examining those items for biological evidence.
Angelica Hernandez, a crime scene technician employed by the Beaumont Police
Department, testified that when she examined the SUV for fingerprints, Hancock’s
fingerprints were not in Hall’s SUV. Hernandez also examined some of the windows
outside Jack’s home but found no fingerprints on them.
9 While numerous other witnesses testified in the trial, we do not discuss their
testimonies because we have focused on the testimony that Hancock challenges
directly in his argument claiming the jury did not have enough evidence to tie him
to the murders.
Sufficiency Challenge
Hancock argues he is entitled to an acquittal because the evidence in his trial
fails to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is the person who Lee saw holding
a gun at Jack’s home or to show that he was a party to the shootings. According to
Hancock, the State failed to provide the jury with enough evidence to prove him
guilty of murdering Jack and Wilson. Hancock suggests that the jury could not have
reasonably relied on Lee ’s testimony that Hancock was the person Lee saw holding
a gun given that Lee failed to pick Hancock out of the photo array the first time the
police asked him if he could identify anyone involved in the shootings. Hancock also
suggests the evidence shows that Lee’s memory about the person he saw the night
the shootings occurred was based on the newscast he viewed in mid-July 2013.
Hancock also suggests that the absence of physical evidence tying him to the
shootings indicates the State failed to meet its burden of proof. He contends that
even if the jury could have reasonably credited the testimony given by Lee and Hall,
their testimony does not “connect [him] with the actual shooting[.]” Hancock askes
10 that this Court “sit as a thirteenth juror and disagree with [the] jury’s resolution of
[the] conflicting or non[-]existing evidence” the jury considered during his trial.
Hancock concludes that except for “what appears to be the tainted identification
made by [Lee], there is no evidence or testimony that directly connects” him “with
the murders.”
Standard of Review
To convict a person of capital murder, the State must prove the person
committed murder together with one of the aggravating factors listed in the statute
that defines capital murder.7 Here, the State charged Hancock with committing
capital murder, alleging he intentionally or knowingly caused the deaths of Jack and
Wilson during the same criminal transaction.8 That said, under the law of parties, a
defendant is criminally responsible not only for his acts but those of others whose
criminal acts can be attributed to him. 9
7 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a) (West 2019); see also id. § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2019) (explaining murder occurs when a person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another). 8 See id. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (murdering more than one person during the same criminal transaction). 9 Id. § 7.01 (West 2011). 11 The Due Process Clause requires a defendant’s conviction to be supported by
legally sufficient evidence to prove he committed the crime. 10 In assessing whether
a defendant’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, “we consider all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on
that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”11
The standard of review that applies in a criminal case “recognizes the trier of
fact’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence after
drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence.”12 In our review, we determine
“whether the necessary inferences made by the trier of fact are reasonable, based
upon the cumulative force of all of the evidence.”13 Thus, we presume the factfinder
resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in a way that favors upholding
the jury’s verdict. 14 In our review, we may not reevaluate the weight and credibility
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 11 Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19); see also Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902. 12 See Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 13 Id.; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
12 of the evidence in the record and then substitute our own judgment for the one made
by the factfinder.15 Instead, we must “defer to the jury’s credibility and weight
determinations[.]” 16 And while “the parties may disagree about the logical
inferences that flow from undisputed facts, ‘[w]here there are two permissible views
of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.’” 17 Still, juries are not allowed to arrive at a verdict based on “mere
speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions.”18 On the other
hand, the State is not required to produce direct evidence to prove its case because
the law does not require each fact admitted into evidence to “point directly and
14 Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 922; see also Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 15 See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 (reviewing court must not sit as “thirteenth juror,” disagree with the weight the jury gave to the evidence or “disagree [ ] with a jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence”) (citations omitted). 16 Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; see also Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (reviewing court must not usurp the jury’s role by “substituting its own judgment for that of the jury”). 17 Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). 18 Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 15-16 (explaining that speculation is “theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence presented”). 13 independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the
incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” 19
Analysis
At the outset, we observe that Hancock’s counsel was able to fully explore the
credibility of each witness and whether each had a motive to lie during the trial. As
the trier of fact, the jurors were the sole judges of the credibility of the testimony
admitted in the trial and of its weight.20 Thus, the jury was free to believe all, some,
or none of each witness’s testimony. 21 In our review, “[w]e may not re-weigh the
evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.” 22 During the trial, Lee
explained the reasons for any discrepancies in his testimony and the jury could have
reasonably credited his explanation about why he failed to identify Hancock’s
photograph the first time he saw it. Further, Lee explained, and the jury could
reasonably accept, Lee’s account that he could not recall Hancock’s image the first
time he saw it because he was medicated and still recovering from surgery.
19 Id. at 13. 20 See Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 860. 21 See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Monreal v. State, 546 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. ref’d). 22 Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). 14 Additionally, Lee testified he remembered seeing Hancock’s face from the
recollection he had about the events at Jack’s home and that his recollection was not
based on what he saw on television. 23 As the entity given the right to judge Lee’s
credibility, the jury could have reasonably found Lee’s testimony credible.
The standard of review also requires this Court to defer to the jury’s resolution
over whether Hall testified truthfully in the trial.24 Hancock complains that Hall’s
testimony is not reliable, but the jury chose to find otherwise. Its conclusion, on this
record, was not unreasonable. For instance, the jury was entitled to conclude that
Hall lied to police to protect Hancock but later changed her mind and testified
truthfully in the trial.
In Hancock’s case, there is additional circumstantial evidence that allowed the
jury to conclude that Hancock was a party to the murders at Jack’s home. For
example, Hall testified that Hancock told her to lie to police about who had her car
the night the murders occurred. Under the circumstances proven in the trial, the jury
23 Gilmore v. State, 397 S.W.3d 226, 240-41 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d) (affirming conviction where witness positively identified defendant during trial but, while recovering in the hospital, identified defendant while watching a television news report of the crime despite not previously being able to identify defendant from a photographic line-up; rather, identifying another person from the line-up). 24 See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. 15 could have reasonably believed this testimony. And when defendants ask others to
give the police false information relevant to an official investigation into a crime,
the jury can infer they know they are guilty. 25
In part, Hancock’s arguments focus on the lack of fingerprints, DNA, and
clothing that, had such items been located, could have tied Hancock to Hall’s SUV
or the scene of the crime. But, the absence of such evidence does not exclude
Hancock from the group of people who might have had Hall’s car or been at Jack’s
home. 26
Hancock also argues that because no witnesses testified that they saw him fire
a gun, he could not be found guilty of capital murder. But under the charge the court
25 See Jackson, 443 U.S. 318-310 (explaining that the reviewing court must give deference to the jury’s responsibility to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony to decide the ultimate facts); see Fountain v. State, 401 S.W.3d 344, 358 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (explaining a defendant’s conduct in making up false statements to cover up the commission of a crime, as well as enlisted others in defendant’s attempts to lie, indicate consciousness of guilt to prove commission of the offense); see also Garza v. State, 358 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962) (explaining that efforts of an accused to induce a witness to testify falsely may be shown as indicating a consciousness of guilt). 26 See, e.g., Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (instructing that the absence of DNA does not indicate innocence when such evidence may not have ever existed); see also Holberg v. State, 425 S.W.3d 282, 287-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (explaining exculpatory evidence does not necessarily negate other inculpatory evidence). 16 gave the jury in Hancock’s case, the jury was entitled to find Hancock guilty as a
party to the shootings. As a party, the State did not need to prove that it was
Hancock’s gun that inflicted any of the fatal wounds. 27
We conclude the combined and cumulative force of the evidence allowed the
jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hancock was guilty of capital murder.
We overrule Hancock’s sole issue and affirm the jury’s verdict.
Reformation of Judgment
While the jury’s verdict is affirmed, a clerical error exists in the trial court’s
judgment in Cause Number 13-18338. While neither party pointed out the error in
their briefs, the record shows that Hancock was indicted and convicted under section
19.03(a)(7)(A) of the Penal Code, not section 19.03(a)(6)(A) as the judgment
recites. 28
27 See Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (holding the evidence sufficient to establish party liability for a homicide when the defendant was part of a group of people that “simultaneously and jointly attacked” the victim, even though the defendant himself did not inflict the mortal wound to the victim); Harmon v. State, No. 09-16-00304-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 7818 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 26, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming defendant’s murder conviction based on sufficient evidence establishing defendant’s actions causing the victim’s death; or, in the alternative, defendant’s participation as a party to the offense that contributed to the victim’s death). 28 Compare Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(6)(A) (West 2019) (defining the manner that capital murder may be committed as murdering another while 17 We have the authority to reform the trial court’s judgment to make the record
speak the truth.29 We may act sua sponte to reform an incorrect judgment, and we
may have a duty to do so.30 To correct the clerical error that exists in the judgment,
we reform the judgment by deleting the language that Hancock was convicted under
section “19.03(a)(6)(A) PC” and replace that reference with the number
“19.03(a)(7)(A) PC.” As a result, the judgment, as reformed, reflects the provision
in the Penal Code on which the judgment is based.
Having overruled Hancock’s issue, the judgment as reformed is affirmed.
AFFIRMED AS REFORMED.
_________________________ HOLLIS HORTON Justice
Submitted on September 12, 2018 Opinion Delivered May 29, 2019 Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
incarcerated for capital murder), with id. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (defining the manner capital murder may be committed as murdering more than one person in the same criminal transaction). 29 See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 30 French, 830 S.W.2d at 609; Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 530 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet ref’d). 18