Allanna Warren v. Heartland Homeowners Association, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: October 16, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00205
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3

4 Allanna Warren, 5 Case No. 2:24-cv-00205-APG-MDC

6 Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO vs. DISMISS CASE 7 Heartland Homeowners Association, et al., And 8 Defendant. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S IFP 9 APPLICATION (ECF NO. 20) AS MOOT 10

11 Pro se plaintiff Allanna Warren filed a renewed Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 12 (“IFP”). ECF No. 20. The Court also reviewed plaintiff’s supplement Response to the Application to 13 Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“Response”). ECF No. 21. The Court previously (1) screened and dismissed 14 plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice and (2) denied plaintiff’s IFP application as incomplete. ECF No. 15 19. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint within thirty days and the time to do so has passed. 16 For the reasons discussed in the Court’s screening order (ECF No. 19), the Court 17 RECOMMENDS that this case be DISMISSED. The Court DENIES plaintiff’s renewed IFP 18 application (ECF No. 20) as moot. 19 I. DISCUSSION 20 A. Legal Standard 21 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that 22 23 power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. 24 Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action 25 based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order); Henderson 1 2 v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for lack of prosecution and failure to comply 3 with local rules). 4 In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must consider: (1) 5 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) 6 the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; 7 and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 8 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 9 1987)). 10 B. Plaintiff’s IFP Application 11 The Court previously denied plaintiff’s IFP application as incomplete. ECF No. 19. The Court 12 ordered that plaintiff must (1) answer all questions on the long form with detailed explanations about her 13 income and expenses and (2) that she cannot leave any questions blank or respond that a question is 14 15 “N/A” without an explanation.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff responds that most of the questions in her renewed IFP 16 application are not applicable to her as she crosses out many of the questions. Id. Plaintiff represents in 17 her Response that she believes the Court wants her, “to misrepresent her financial situation so they are 18 justified in denying her application.” ECF No. 21 at 2. The Court denies the renewed IFP application as 19 moot, however, because plaintiff did not comply with the Court’s Order, as she has not filed an amended 20 complaint pursuant to the Court’s previous Order. ECF No. 19. 21 C. Plaintiff’s Complaint 22 The Court screened and dismissed plaintiff’s Complaint and gave her an opportunity to file an 23 amended complaint. Plaintiff reviewed that Order, as detailed in her Response, but she did not file an 24 amended complaint. Even if the Court were to liberally construe her Response as an amended complaint, 25 2 she does not state any claims in the Response or address any of the deficiencies outlined in the Court’s 1 2 Order. The Court thus finds that plaintiff has not complied with the Court’s Order. 3 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 4 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of the plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff has 5 chosen not to comply with this Court’s Order. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also 6 weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable 7 delay in prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 8 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the 9 factors favoring dismissal. 10 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 11 correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. Yourish v. Cal. 12 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 13 the party has disobeyed a Court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 14 15 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases 16 that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the Court’s Order as 17 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of 18 dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every 19 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case but must explore possible and meaningful 20 alternatives.” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. 21 Litigation cannot progress without a plaintiff’s compliance with Court Orders. The only 22 alternative is to enter another order setting another deadline. Issuing another order, however, will only 23 delay the inevitable and further squander the Court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a 24 meaningful alternative given these circumstances. The fifth factor favors dismissal. 25 3 , || After weighing these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal. For the 2 reasons discussed in this Order and the Court’s earlier screening Order (ECF No. 19), plaintiff's case 3 || should be dismissed. Plaintiff will also not be prejudiced because she has an opportunity to object to this 4 || report and recommendation. 5 IT ISSO RECOMMENDED AND ORDERED: 6 The Court RECOMMENDS that plaintiff's Allanna Warren’s case be DISMISSED. 7 The Court ORDERS that plaintiff's renewed Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF 8 No. 20) is DENIED AS MOOT. 9 a IT ISSO RECOMMENDED AND ORDERED. . i a a DATE: October 16, 2025. ifr Ke 11 ff 12 aft f jf ‘Vion. Maximiliand . Couviliewil 13 F inited States Mdfstrate Judge "4 NOTICE 15 Pursuant to Local Rules IB 3-1 and IB 3-2, a party may object to orders and reports and 16 recommendations issued by the magistrate judge. Objections must be in writing and filed with the Clerk 17 of the Court within fourteen days. LR IB 3-1, 3-2. The Supreme Court has held that the courts of appeal 18 9 may determine that an appeal has been waived due to the failure to file objections within the specified

50 time. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985). This circuit has also held that (1) failure to file objections 51 || within the specified time and (2) failure to properly address and brief the objectionable issues waives the 22 || right to appeal the District Court's order and/or appeal factual issues from the order of the District Court. 23 || Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991); Britt v. Simi Valley United Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 24 (9th Cir. 1983). Pursuant to LR JA 3-1, plaintiffs must immediately file written notification with the 25 |! court of any change of address. The notification must include proof of service upon each opposing party’s

attorney, or upon the opposing party if the party is unrepresented by counsel. Failure to comply with this 1 2 rule may result in dismissal of the action. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 5