[Cite as Allan v. Allan, 2026-Ohio-1187.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
RAIDA ALLAN, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 114193 v. :
TAREQ ALLAN, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellees. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 2, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-18-907570
Appearances:
RaslanPla & Company, LLC, Jorge Luis Pla, Nadia R. Zaiem, and Erika Molnar, for appellant.
Dinn, Hochman & Potter, LLC, Edgar H. Boles, and Andrew J. Yarger, for appellees Qais Allan, 871 Rocky River Drive, Inc., and Pearl Road, Inc.
LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:
Plaintiff-appellant Raida Allan (“Raida” or “Plaintiff”) appeals from
two judgment entries issued by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in a
fraudulent-transfer action she brought against defendants-appellees, Tareq Allan (“Tareq”), Tareq’s brother Qais Allan (“Qais”), and two corporate gas-station entities
— 871 Rocky River Drive, Inc. and Pearl Road, Inc. (together, “the Gas Stations”).
The first judgment entry, dated April 29, 2024, granted judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (“JNOV”) in favor of Qais and the Gas Stations. The second judgment
entry, dated April 25, 2025, denied Raida’s motion for JNOV as to Tareq. After a
thorough review of the facts and the law, we reverse both judgments and remand
the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
I. Background and Procedural History
This case concerns allegations of the fraudulent transfer of two gas-
station businesses during the course of Raida and Tareq’s marital separation and
divorce. This is the second appeal this court has heard in this case. The following
facts are relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
A. Raida and Tareq’s Separation and Divorce
Raida and Tareq were married in October 2002. During the
marriage, Tareq acquired two gas-station businesses. The first gas station, located
on Pearl Road in Middleburg Heights, was owned by Pearl Road, Inc. which, in turn
was originally owned by Raida and was transferred to Tareq through a corporate-
stock transfer of certificated shares during their marriage. The second gas station,
located at 871 Rocky River Drive in Berea, was purchased by Tareq in 2004 through
the entity 871 Rocky River Drive, Inc., which Tareq wholly owned. That same year,
Tallan, LLC — a business solely owned by Tareq — purchased the real property on
which the 871 Rocky River Drive gas station is situated. Raida filed for divorce in 2010. She dismissed her divorce action in
2011. In 2015, Tareq filed for divorce. A trial was had in that divorce case that lasted
14 days and spanned the months July, September, and November 2017.
On April 20, 2018, a final judgment and divorce decree was entered
by the domestic relations court. In its judgment entry following trial, the domestic
relations court stated that, in addition to addressing what constituted marital and
separate property of Raida and Tareq, “the issue that involved the court’s time in
trial was the question of . . . whether [Qais] purchased the two gas stations owned
during the marriage for fair market value or at all.” (Emphasis added.) The court
emphasized the difficulty it faced in making sense of the evidence, noting that the
testimony and exhibits presented by Tareq and Qais were contradictory, confusing,
and, overall, not credible. The court also noted the late disclosure of key documents,
stating, “In addition, some documents appeared very late in the litigation, such as
the corporate resolution relating t0 the transfer of Pearl Road Inc.”
The domestic relations court further noted that if the gas station
business at 871 Rocky River Drive had in fact been transferred to Qais, such a
transfer would have violated a court order staying any sale of the property during
the first divorce proceeding filed by Raida in 2010 but ultimately dismissed in 2011.
The court noted that Tareq refused to acknowledge his violation of the stay order
during his testimony, even though Tareq testified that the business was transferred
during that time. After providing an extensive explanation of the confusing nature of
the evidence and the difficulty in determining whether the Gas Stations had been
transferred, and if so, whether they were transferred for fair market value, the court
ultimately concluded that Tareq “has engaged in financial misconduct in that he
transferred the two gas station businesses with convenience stores and the liquor
licenses to his brother to avoid an equitable division of property” in the divorce. The
court further found that it was “not desirable to split the businesses between [Tareq
and Raida] even if it was appropriate to divest Qais of title in [domestic relations]
court,” because the court found that doing so would require the sale of the
businesses, which, in turn, would only diminish their value. Accordingly, the
domestic relations court determined that the value of the Gas Stations would be
considered marital property for purposes of its distributive award. The court
explained that determining value was difficult due to the incomplete and
contradictory evidence submitted, which included tax and other financial
documents that appeared to have been falsified by Tareq.
In the divorce decree, the domestic relations court awarded Raida the
871 Rocky River Dr. real estate and the marital home, in addition to other assets. It
also ordered Tareq to pay nearly $550,000 in spousal support, child support,
arrearages, and attorney fees to Raida.
Tareq appealed the domestic relations court’s judgment. The
judgment and divorce decree were upheld on appeal. Allan v. Allan, 2019-Ohio-
2111 (8th Dist.). B. The Fraudulent-Transfer Action
On November 28, 2018, Raida filed the lawsuit from which this
appeal derives, against Tareq, Qais, and the Gas Stations. In it she alleged that Tareq
fraudulently transferred the Gas Stations to Qais, without consideration, in an
attempt to make himself insolvent with the knowledge of a likely impending
financial judgment against him in the upcoming divorce proceeding. Raida further
alleged that Qais received the transfers with knowledge of their illegality. Raida
sought rescission of the Gas Station transfers so as to collect on the money judgment
she had obtained against Tareq in their divorce, punitive damages, and other
remedies including the appointment of a receiver over the Gas Stations,
garnishment of the Gas Stations’ accounts, and an injunction against the further
disposition of the Gas Stations.
Qais and the Gas Stations answered the complaint. Tareq, however,
did not file an answer. In their answer, Qais and the Gas Stations asserted the
statute of limitations as a bar to Raida’s fraudulent-transfer claims.
On February 5, 2019, Raida filed an amended complaint in which she
made the same assertions and requests for relief as the original complaint but
additionally alleged that the Gas Station transfers had not been completed under
Ohio law. Raida’s amended complaint asserted that because the transfers were not
complete, the transfers should be deemed to have occurred immediately before the
filing of the lawsuit for statute of limitations purposes pursuant to
R.C. 1336.06(A)(2)(a). Qais and the Gas Stations filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that Raida’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the
claims were barred by res judicata. With respect to the statute of limitations, Qais
and the Gas Stations argued that pursuant to R.C. 1336.09, a claim for fraudulent
transfer must be brought within four years of the transfer or within one year of
discovery of the transfer and that in this case the transfers of the Gas Stations
occurred more than four years prior to Raida filing her fraudulent-transfer action
against them on November 28, 2018. Regarding res judicata, Qais and the Gas
Stations argued that the divorce decree determined the issue of whether there had
been a fraudulent transfer in light of the court determining that title to the Gas
Stations was in Qais’s name and the fact that it decided not to divest Qais of title, but
rather to consider the value of the assets in its determination of the equitable
division of property. Qais and the Gas Stations argued the domestic relations court’s
judgment prevented Raida from attempting to claw-back the transfer through a
separate, subsequent fraudulent-transfer claim.
Raida opposed Qais and the Gas Stations’ motion for summary
judgment. She also filed a motion for default judgment against Tareq in light of his
failure to appear in the lawsuit.
The trial court granted Qais and the Gas Stations summary judgment
against Raida, concluding that Raida had failed to set forth a genuine issue of
material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The court did not articulate its reasons, nor did it indicate whether its ruling was based on the statute of limitations, res judicata, or both. In the same judgment, the
trial court denied Raida’s motion for default judgment against Tareq, again without
explanation. Raida appealed both the grant of summary judgment and the denial of
her motion for default judgment to this court.
C. This Court’s Resolution of the First Appeal
In the first appeal, this court reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Qais and the Gas Stations and remanded the matter
for further proceedings. See Allan v. Allan, 2022-Ohio-1488 (8th Dist.). This court
recognized that the reason the trial court granted summary judgment was unclear
from the summary nature of the court’s order. Therefore, this court analyzed the
applicability of both the statute of limitations and res judicata to the case.
Concerning the statute of limitations, this court found that a genuine
issue of material fact remained regarding whether Raida filed her claims for
fraudulent transfer within the applicable statute of limitations. The court pointed
out that under R.C. 1336.09(A), defining when a transfer is deemed to have
occurred,
(2)(a) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in division (A) of this section and the transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action for relief arising out of a transfer that is fraudulent under section 1336.04 or 1336.05 of the Revised Code, the transfer is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the action.
After reviewing both parties’ evidence, this court concluded that “there exists
disputed evidence as to whether, and when, the transfers of the gas stations were
made and, if so, when those transfers were perfected.” Allan at ¶ 34. Further, this court determined that res judicata did not bar Raida’s
fraudulent-transfer action because Qais and the Gas Stations were not parties to the
domestic relations court’s judgment. This court further noted:
Whether or not the transfers actually took place was not necessary for the domestic relations court to fashion an equitable distribution of the marital property. Accordingly, we cannot say that a final determination of whether the transfers were legitimate, whether they consisted of fraud on Tareq’s part, or whether they consisted of fraud on Qais’s part was an issue that was material and necessary to the final judgment in the divorce decree in order to distribute marital property.[1]
Id. at ¶ 41.
Additionally, in the first appeal, this court reversed the trial court’s
denial of Raida’s motion for default judgment against Tareq, where Tareq had not
appeared in the case by way of filing an answer or otherwise, and thus had not raised
any affirmative defenses, as Qais and the Gas Stations had done. This court ordered
the trial court, upon remand, to grant Raida’s motion for default judgment.
D. Trial Court Proceedings Following Remand
On remand, in its judgment entry finding Tareq in default, the trial
court stated, “[A] hearing on damages will be set by a separate order.” The trial
court, however, never held a hearing to determine damages as to Tareq. Instead, it
1 Although the domestic relations court ultimately determined, for purposes of
equitable distribution, that Tareq had transferred the Gas Stations to Qais to avoid equitable division of the marital property, that determination was made within the context of classifying and distributing assets in a divorce proceeding rather than adjudicating a claim under the Ohio Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. instructed the parties to prepare for trial. A jury trial commenced on March 15,
2024.
After the parties presented their evidence and testimony over the
course of seven days, the jury was instructed. These instructions did not ask the jury
to decide whether the Gas Stations transfers had been perfected for purposes of
determining the transfer date under R.C. 1336.06. Over Raida’s counsel’s repeated
objections, and Qais and the Gas Stations’ counsel’s repeated insistence, the trial
court determined that no instruction on perfection was necessary because
corporate-stock transfers were not capable of perfection under Ohio law and,
therefore, R.C. 1336.06 would not apply. Additionally, while the jury was instructed
that it would determine damages against Tareq, as a defaulting party, the trial court
granted Qais and the Gas Stations’ request to leave Tareq off the jury-verdict forms
as to damages. This, too, was done over Raida’s counsel’s repeated objection.
Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict concluding that
Tareq did fraudulently transfer the Gas Stations to Qais, that Qais did not receive
the Gas Stations in good faith, and that Qais did not pay reasonably equivalent value
for them. The jury awarded Raida $598,191.51 in damages representing the unpaid
divorce judgment, $1,715,175.00 in economic damages, $250,000.00 in
noneconomic damages, and $3,000,000.00 in punitive damages. The jury also
awarded Raida her attorney fees.
After the verdict was read, the trial court excused the jury and then
read aloud the jury’s answers to the parties’ interrogatories. Pursuant to interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2, the jury found that the Gas Stations had, in fact, been
transferred. Pursuant to interrogatory Nos. 4 and 6, the jury found that the Gas
Stations were transferred before November 28, 2014. The jury also answered
interrogatory Nos. 3 and 5 finding that, as relates to each of the transfers, Raida did
not discover the transfers and could not have reasonably discovered the transfers
before November 28, 2017—one year before she filed her lawsuit
1. JNOV Motions
After dismissing the jury and then reading the answers to the jury
interrogatories in open court, the court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to file briefs
on why a JNOV should or should not be entered. Specifically, the court stated:
At this point, I would ask the — the jury has spoken, the jury has spoken through its verdict and has spoken through its interrogatories. I don’t have to tell anybody in this room that the answers to certain questions raise a statute of limitations issue, okay? Specifically, jury interrogatory numbers 4 and 6. There is also an issue in jury interrogatory number 3 and another one about her knowledge, okay? I’m a going to ask the parties to brief — I understand the statute of limitations, but I want — I’m going to ask the parties to brief the Court as it relates to Raida’s knowledge, because the Court wants to become more aware of that. I understand the general 4-year statute of limitations, but I also want the parties to brief the Court on the issue [Raida’s counsel] has raised throughout, that the failure to perfect deems the statute of limitations to occur immediately before the filing of the action.
In their motion for JNOV, Qais and the Gas Stations argued that while
the jury correctly determined the transfers of the Gas Stations occurred before
November 28, 2014, it incorrectly concluded that Raida did not know of and could
not reasonably have discovered the transfers before November 28, 2017. Qais and
the Gas Stations asserted that reasonable minds could only conclude Raida discovered the transfers on June 19, 2015, at the latest, because Raida set forth the
details of each transfer in a pleading she filed in the second divorce case, in which
she alleged counterclaims for fraud against Tareq and cross-claims for fraud against
Qais and the Gas Stations, whom she joined as third-party defendants.2
In opposing Qais and the Gas Stations’ JNOV motion, Raida
advanced several arguments in support of upholding the jury’s verdict in her favor.
Among them, she contended that the record contained evidence showing she did not
discover, and could not reasonably have discovered, the transfers before the
domestic relations court’s judgment entry of divorce issued on April 20, 2018, and
that the jury was entitled to weigh and credit this evidence.
Raida also filed a separate JNOV motion requesting that the court
amend the jury-verdict forms to include Tareq’s name on the damages awards. She
argued that this amendment was necessary because, although the court had entered
a default against Tareq before trial, it never entered judgment for damages against
him and instead had indicated it would leave that determination to the jury.
However, when it came time to instruct the jury on damages as to Tareq, the court
refused to do so over repeated objections by Raida’s counsel, resulting in no
damages award against Tareq despite the existence of a finding of default against
him.
2 Raida’s claims against Qais and the Gas Stations were dismissed by the trial court
before trial. The court kept Qais and the Gas Stations on as parties to the divorce in a limited capacity as stakeholders in the business properties. 2. The Trial Court’s Ruling on JNOV
On July 3, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment granting Qais and
the Gas Stations’ motion for JNOV, finding that “the record does not contain
sufficient evidence that [Raida] did not or could not have reasonably discovered the
transfers before November 28, 2017.” In support of its judgment, the trial court
focused on Raida’s testimony at trial that Tareq had told her in November 2014,
when she phoned him about support payments having stopped, that he had sold “the
gas station” and that she was aware of statements in Tareq’s February 2015 divorce
complaint that asserted that the Gas Stations were no longer part of the marital
estate. The court also highlighted Raida’s statements on cross-examination when
confronted with her June 19, 2015 filing of counterclaims for fraud against Tareq,
and cross-claims for fraud against Qais and the Gas Stations in the divorce
proceeding in which Raida averred that Tareq “purportedly” transferred his
interests in the Gas Stations to his brother for a “purported” sum of money.
The trial court recognized that the domestic relations court’s
judgment entry of April 20, 2018, could be argued to be evidence in support of the
jury’s finding that Raida had not discovered or could not reasonably have discovered
the transfers sooner. The domestic-relations judgment identified inconsistent
evidence presented in the divorce trial regarding the ownership of the Gas Stations,
as well as inconsistent and highly questionable testimony as to whether the Gas
Stations had been transferred and if so, whether they were legally transferred.
However, the trial court stated in his judgment entry on JNOV that, although Raida testified that the domestic-relations journal entry was the “basis or grounds of why”
Raida was before the trial court in her fraudulent-conveyance action, there had been
no testimony that this entry led to her discovery of the transfers. According to the
trial court, Raida’s testimony was, therefore, not sufficient evidence that she was
unaware of the transfers before November 28, 2017.
Finally, the trial court determined that R.C. 1336.06(A)(2)(a) —
regarding when a transfer occurs where an asset is capable of perfection — was
inapplicable. According to the trial court, R.C. 1336.06(A)(2)(a) applies only to
secured transactions and stock transfers are not secured transactions. Therefore,
the court determined that, because the statute did not apply, the statute of
limitations could not be deemed to have begun running the day before the filing of
the fraudulent-transfer action as would happen if the transfer of the asset was
capable of perfection but had not been perfected.
The court noted that the jury found that the transfers were made over
four years prior to Raida filing her fraudulent-transfer action and, therefore, Raida’s
claims were not filed within the four-year statute of limitations found in
R.C. 1336.09. The court further concluded that Raida failed to present sufficient
evidence demonstrating that she did not discover and could not have reasonably
discovered the fraudulent transfer prior to one year before filing her claims on
November 28, 2018. Consequently, under R.C. 1336.09 the trial court concluded
the statute of limitations barred Raida’s claims. E. Filing of the Second Appeal
Raida appealed the trial court’s decision granting Qais and the Gas
Stations’ JNOV. We sua sponte dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable
order, noting that the court had not ruled on Raida’s separate motion for JNOV. On
remand, the trial court issued a judgment on April 25, 2025, concluding that Raida’s
claims against Tareq were barred by the statute of limitations for a fraudulent-
transfer claim, because she did discover or reasonably could have discovered the
transfers before November 28, 2017 — one year prior to filing suit.
Raida’s appeal was reinstated. Raida now raises the following
assignments of error:
I. The court erred in granting Qais Allan, 871 Rocky River Drive, Inc. and Pearl Road Inc.’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
II. The court erred and violated the law of the case established by this court in Allan I.
III. The court erred in not granting Raida Allan’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
IV. The court erred and abused its discretion when it denied Raida Allan leave to file a motion for partial summary judgment.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. The Trial Court Erred in Granting JNOV
In her first assignment of error, Raida asserts that the trial court erred
in granting JNOV in favor of Qais and the Gas Stations. We agree.
Civ.R. 50(B)(1), which governs post-trial motions for JNOV, allows a
party to “serve a motion to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with the party’s motion . . . .” The
standard for granting a motion for JNOV is identical to that for granting a motion
for a directed verdict pursuant to Civ.R. 50(A). See Texler v. D.O. Summers
Cleaners & Shirt Laundry Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 677, 679 (1998). Civ.R. 50(A)(4)
provides:
When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue.
“‘[A] motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict does not
present factual issues, but a question of law, even though in deciding such a motion,
it is necessary to review and consider the evidence.’” Environmental Network Corp.
v. Goodman Weiss Miller, L.L.P., 2008-Ohio-3833, ¶ 22, quoting O’Day v. Webb,
29 Ohio St.2d 215 (1972), paragraph three of the syllabus. The single salient
question of law in a motion for JNOV is “whether the evidence, construed most
strongly in favor of [nonmoving party], is legally sufficient to sustain the verdict.”
Id. at ¶ 23, citing Osler v. Lorain, 28 Ohio St.3d 345, 347 (1986). To be legally
sufficient to sustain the verdict, the prevailing party must have “presented some
evidence going to every element of the claim.” (Emphasis added.) Black v. Hicks,
2020-Ohio-3976, ¶ 70 (8th Dist.), citing Vega v. Tomas, 2017-Ohio-298, ¶ 9 (8th
Dist.). A court may not consider the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses when ruling on a motion for JNOV. Civ.R. 50(B)(3); see also Texler at
679.
As a question of law, appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a
JNOV motion de novo. See Environmental Network Corp. at ¶ 23. “‘De novo review
encompasses an independent examination of the record and law without deference
to the underlying decision.’” Torres v. Concrete Designs, Inc., 2019-Ohio-1342, ¶ 48
(8th Dist.), quoting Gateway Consultants Group, Inc. v. Premier Physicians Ctrs.,
Inc., 2017-Ohio-1443, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).
Raida’s fraudulent-transfer claim was brought under
R.C. 1336.04(A)(1). The applicable statute of limitations for such claims is
articulated in R.C. 1336.09(A), which states:
A claim for relief with respect to a transfer or an obligation that is fraudulent under section 1336.04 or 1336.05 of the Revised Code is extinguished unless an action is brought in accordance with one of the following:
(A) If the transfer or obligation is fraudulent under division (A)(1) of section 1336.04 of the Revised Code, within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation was or reasonably could have been discovered by the claimant . . . .
As noted by this court in the first appeal, under R.C. 1336.09, a
transfer “is defined as ‘every direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, and
voluntary or involuntary method of disposing of or parting with an asset or an
interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of
a lien or other encumbrance.’” Allan, 2022-Ohio-1488, at ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing
R.C. 1336.01(L). Where a transfer involves an asset capable of perfection, but the transfer has not been perfected before the suit is commenced, the transfer is deemed
to have occurred immediately prior to the commencement of the lawsuit.
R.C. 1336.06(A)(2)(a).
The “application of a statute of limitations presents a mixed question
of law and fact.” Schmitz v. NCAA, 2018-Ohio-4391, ¶ 11. When a cause of action
accrues is a question of fact, while application of the limitations period becomes a
question of law where no factual dispute as to the accrual date exists. See id.
Here, the jury was given numerous interrogatories to answer with the
first six touching on issues pertinent to this appeal. Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2
required the jury to answer whether ownership of the gas stations at 871 Rocky River
Drive and Pearl Road, respectively, had even been transferred. The jury answered
“yes” to each of these. Interrogatory Nos. 4 and 6 asked whether the respective
transfers occurred prior to November 28, 2014 — i.e., more than four years before
Raida filed her lawsuit. The jury answered “yes” to each of these interrogatories.
Finally, with regard to interrogatory Nos. 3 and 5, the jury was asked if Raida
discovered that the Gas Stations were transferred, or if she could have discovered
that they transferred, before November 28, 2017? The jurors responded “no” to both
questions. Accordingly, the legal import of the jury’s answers to the interrogatories
is that Raida’s fraudulent-conveyance lawsuit was not barred by the statute of
limitations.
In granting JNOV to Qais and the Gas Stations, the trial court
concluded that the jury’s answers to interrogatories were not supported by sufficient evidence. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, we find that the jury’s finding was
supported by sufficient evidence and that the trial court engaged in impermissible
weighing of the evidence.
To understand why the jury’s finding is supported by sufficient
evidence it is important to understand how the posture of this case affects the
analysis. Fraudulent-transfer cases commonly present in a posture where the
parties agree that a transfer of some asset or property occurred, but dispute whether
the transfer was fraudulent. See, e.g., Saez Assocs. v. Global Reader Servs., 2011-
Ohio-5185, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.) (no dispute between the parties that a transfer of funds
occurred); Yoo v. Ahn, 2018-Ohio-1291, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.) (no dispute between the
parties that a transfer of property took place); Magnum Steel & Trading, L.L.C. v.
Roderick Linton Belfance, L.L.P., 2015-Ohio-3450, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.) (no disagreement
among parties that transfers took place).
Here, by contrast, a threshold question that the jury had to resolve
was whether any transfer occurred at all. This distinction is important because the
four-year and one-year statute of limitations found in R.C. 1336.09 assumes that a
transfer can be identified and did in fact occur. Accord Bash v. Textron Fin. Corp.
(In re Fair Fin. Co.), 834 F.3d 651, 673 (6th Cir. 2016) (observing, “Ohio precedent
weighs in favor of our conclusion that § 1336.09(A)’s one-year discovery period
begins to run when a plaintiff discovers or, upon the exercise of reasonable diligence,
could have discovered the transfer and its fraudulent nature”). (Emphasis added.)
When the existence of the transfer itself is contested and hinges on disputed facts, determining when the transfer could reasonably have been discovered naturally
becomes more complicated. This was the exact situation facing the jury when it was
tasked with deciding whether the information available to Raida prior to one year
before filing her lawsuit would have allowed her to discover both the transfers and
their allegedly fraudulent nature. Thus, any analysis of the statute-of-limitations
question must keep this distinction in mind.
Raida testified that above and beyond the original purchase prices,
she and Tareq had invested hundreds of thousands of dollars into the Gas Stations
between 2011 and 2014 and that the businesses were profitable “money makers.”
She further testified that Tareq never indicated that the businesses were financially
distressed or that he intended to sell them. According to Raida, after she filed the
first divorce action, Tareq cut off her access to the businesses’ financial records.
Raida also testified that she was familiar with Qais’s financial
situation and did not believe he had the financial resources necessary to purchase
the Gas Stations. Qais’s testimony and other documentary evidence as to his
financial situation during the time period of the alleged transfers corroborated
Raida’s testimony. For instance, Qais testified that from 2001 to 2009, he lived in a
one-bedroom apartment while supporting a family of four on his income alone.
Evidence in the form of Qais’s reported income on his social-security statements,
showed that from 2001 through 2008, Qais’s taxable wages ranged from $2,835 to
$33,583. A 2009 mortgage-loan application introduced at trial additionally showed
that Qais had reported income of $2,955 per month and a total of $40,000 in liquid assets. Qais’s 2010 tax return — the year he asserted he had purchased the 871
Rocky River Drive business — reported a total income of $60,431, and Qais’s 2011
tax return reported income of $44,388. Lastly, in a 2012 bank application to
refinance the mortgage on his home, Qais did not report the 871 Rocky River Drive
business as an asset under the section asking him to declare his assets.
Raida further testified that despite extensive discovery during the
divorce proceedings, neither Tareq nor Qais produced stock certificates showing
that ownership of either of the businesses had actually been transferred.
Additionally, Raida also testified that she had consistently maintained throughout
the divorce proceedings that no transfer had occurred and that the businesses
remained marital assets.
Raida presented an expert in the fraudulent-transfer case who
testified regarding the formalities required to complete a corporate stock transfer of
certificated shares like those related to the 871 Rocky River Drive and the Pearl Road
businesses. The expert opined that to complete — or perfect — a transfer of
certificated shares in a company, the transferor must take their stock certificates “to
the company, with their signature on the back, telling the corporation who they
transferred it to.” Once the transferor has endorsed the stock certificate and
surrendered it to the corporation, the corporation can then issue new stock
certificates to the transferee. Here, the expert explained that Tareq never
surrendered endorsed stock certificates back to the corporations such that the
corporations could issue new stock certificates to Qais. The jury was also provided with the domestic relations court’s
April 20, 2018 judgment entry in the divorce case in which the domestic relations
court explained that one of the questions it sought to resolve was whether the gas
stations had been transferred. That judgment expressed a high level of skepticism
regarding Tareq and Qais’s testimony and the documentary evidence they offered
purporting to show that the transfers of the businesses took place.
The domestic relations court repeatedly noted inconsistencies in the
brothers’ testimony and deficiencies in the documents they presented. The court
explained that many of the documents appeared not to have been created or
executed at, or near, the time the brothers claimed the transfers occurred. The court
also pointed out problems with the purchase agreements for the Pearl Road gas
station, including missing essential terms such as the effective date and
consideration, conflicting dates, and either untraceable or unexplained payment
records.
The domestic relations court further noted that Tareq frequently
repudiated documents during his testimony, including denying signatures on
documents produced by his own counsel. Ultimately, the domestic relations court
concluded that the testimony of both Tareq and Qais lacked credibility and that the
documentary evidence surrounding the alleged transfers was confusing and
unreliable.
Given the domestic relations court’s uncertainty regarding the
validity of the alleged transfers and its criticism of the supporting evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Raida lacked information confirming that any
transfer had actually occurred prior to the issuance of the domestic relations court’s
judgment. Again, that judgment was issued on April 20, 2018; Raida filed her
lawsuit asserting claims for fraudulent transfer within one year of that judgment, on
November 28, 2018.
We acknowledge that other evidence presented at trial could have
supported a different jury finding that Raida did discover or had been in a position
of reasonably discovering the transfers prior to one year before filing her lawsuit.
This evidence includes documents filed with the Ohio Division of Liquor Control
between 2011 and 2014 reflecting that Qais owned 871 Rocky River Drive business,
Raida’s testimony that Tareq told her in November 2014 during an argument over
missed support payments that he had “sold the gas station,” and Raida’s June 19,
2015 filing in the divorce action alleging that Tareq had purportedly transferred the
businesses to Qais. However, none of this evidence, as a matter of law, definitively
shows that Raida knew of the transfers or reasonably could have discovered them
based on the documents and other evidence within her possession within one year
of filing suit.
Indeed, the evidence described above was before this court in the first
appeal, where this court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on
statute-of-limitations grounds. As noted, this court concluded that questions of
material fact existed and remanded the case for a jury determination on when the
statute of limitations started to run. See Allan, 2022-Ohio-1488, at ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). This court pointed out with regard to the liquor-control filings that “public filings
asserting ownership of a business are evidence that, but not determinative of, a
transfer of a business took place.” Id. at ¶ 34. Additionally, as already explained
above, there were reasons for Raida to be distrustful of Tareq’s statement that he
had “sold the gas station.”
Lastly, regarding Raida’s June 19, 2015 pleading containing cross-
claims and counterclaims for fraud against Tareq and Qais, we note that that
pleading is particularly cautious regarding Raida’s knowledge. It repeatedly uses
the terms “purportedly” and “purported” when discussing whether Tareq
transferred his interests in the Gas Stations to his brother. The use of “purport” and
“purportedly” indicates uncertainty and suggests that Raida herself did not know of
the transfers, even if she may have had some suspicion.
Again, this touches on the core question in this case, which is: To
have known about or to have reasonably been able to discover that the fraudulent
transfer occurred, a transfer must first have occurred and that transfer must have
been fraudulent. Here, until the domestic relations court stated in the journal entry
of divorce that it concluded transfer of both Gas Stations had occurred, it was
reasonable for Raida not to have discovered the transfers, given the Tareq’s
obfuscation and deception.
The trial court, in granting JNOV, determined that the April 20, 2018
judgment was insufficient evidence of Raida’s lack of knowledge because she never expressly testified that she could not have reasonably discovered the transfers prior
to that judgment. However, that is not the correct analysis.
In Ohio, “a jury has the right to make any logical and immediate
inferences from facts which have been established by the evidence.” Hodory v.
Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 9764, *8 (1st Dist. Dec. 26,
1979); see also State v. Knight, 2016-Ohio-8134, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.) (“A jury can make
reasonable inferences from the evidence.”). “An inference is a deduction logically
following from all of the facts established by the evidence which a jury may but is
not required to make.” Hodory at *8.
As explained above, evidence was presented to the jury in support of
Raida’s position that she did not know and could not reasonably have discovered the
transfers, and evidence was presented in opposition to Raida’s position. We find
that, in granting JNOV in favor of Qais and the Gas Stations on statute-of-
limitations grounds, the trial court improperly engaged in a manifest-weight-of-the-
evidence analysis. Such weighing of evidence is not permitted under Civ.R. 50(B)
for granting JNOV. Civ.R. 50(B)(3); see also Texler, 81 Ohio St.3d at 679. Under
the JNOV standard, the court was required to determine whether the evidence,
when construed in the light most favorable to Raida, supported the jury’s finding
that she did not know and reasonably could not have known of the fraudulent
transfer more than one year before November 28, 2018, when she filed suit. See
Environmental Network Corp., 2008-Ohio-3833, at ¶ 23. For these reasons, we sustain the first assignment of error and reverse the trial court’s judgment granting
JNOV to Qais and the Gas Stations.
B. Raida’s Remaining Assignments of Error
In light of our resolution of Raida’s first assignment of error, we
conclude that her second and fourth assignments of error are moot. The second
assignment of error challenges the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on
perfection under R.C. 1336.06, which, if applicable, could have extended the statute
of limitations for filing her fraudulent-transfer claim if the jury had found that the
Gas Station transfers were not yet perfected. The fourth assignment of error asserts
that the trial court erred in denying Raida leave to file a motion for partial summary
judgment concerning expert testimony related to the issue of perfection. However,
because we uphold the jury’s determination that Raida filed her fraudulent-transfer
claims within one year of when they were or reasonably could have been discovered,
and thus within the statute of limitations prescribed by R.C. 1336.09 — we need not
address whether the transfers were subject to R.C. 1336.06 regarding assets capable
of perfection.
In her third assignment of error, Raida argues that the trial court
erred in denying her motion for JNOV, in which she requested that the court amend
the jury’s damages verdict forms to include Tareq’s name. We note that the trial
court did not reach the merits of Raida’s motion. Instead, in its April 25, 2025 order,
the court denied Raida’s motion solely on the ground that Raida had failed to file
her claims within the applicable statute of limitations. In light of our reversal of the trial court’s judgment granting JNOV in favor of Qais and Gas Stations on statute-
of-limitations grounds, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Raida’s JNOV motion.
In doing so, we note that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. See
Civ.R. 8(C). As such, it is required to be pled by the party asserting the defense in
its first responsive pleading, or it is deemed waived. See Black v. Hicks, 2020-Ohio-
3976, ¶ 93 (8th Dist.). We note that Tareq never filed an answer or other responsive
pleading to Raida’s complaint or amended complaint alleging fraudulent transfer of
the Gas Stations. Therefore, Tareq never asserted the statute of limitations as an
affirmative defense. Indeed, this court pointed out this fact in the first appeal. See
Allan, 2022-Ohio-1488, at ¶ 45 (8th Dist.). Accordingly, the court’s stated basis for
denying Raida’s JNOV as to Tareq is without merit.
Accordingly, we sustain Raida’s third assignment of error and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion
including rendering judgment on Raida’s JNOV as to Tareq, and any other
outstanding motions that are not mooted and revived by this court’s reversal of the
trial court’s grant of JNOV. See Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397,
418 (1987) (“[U]pon remand from an appellate court the lower court is required to
proceed from the point at which the error occurred.”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court
granting JNOV in favor of Qais and the Gas Stations on statute-of-limitations
grounds and denying plaintiff-appellant’s motion for JNOV as to Tareq, on the same grounds. We remand the matter to the trial court to enter judgment consistent with
the jury’s verdict finding Qais and the Gas Stations liable and awarding damages,
and to reinstate the court’s finding that Tareq is in default. Because the jury was not
instructed on and did not make a finding as to damages owed by Tareq, this matter
is remanded to the trial court to determine these damages and to enter judgment in
favor of Raida reflecting that amount. We also remand to the trial court to rule on
the merits of plaintiff-appellant’s JNOV concerning amendment of the jury-verdict
forms, and to rule on any other outstanding motions that have been revived as a
result of this court’s reversal on appeal.
Judgment reversed, and case remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellees costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
____________________________ LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR