FILED SEPTEMBER 23, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
ALLAN MARGITAN, married filing ) No. 39732-7-III individually, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) MARK AND JENNIFER HANNA, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION husband and wife, ) ) Respondents, ) ) PAINE HAMBLEN LLP, A Washington ) Limited Liability Partnership, ) ) Defendant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Allan Margitan, pro se, filed suit against the law firm
representing the party opposing him in a long-running conflict. The trial court granted
the law firm’s CR 12(c) motion for dismissal, concluding that the litigation privilege
applied. Ten months later, Margitan filed a CR 60(b) motion for reconsideration. The
trial court denied the motion and ordered Margitan to pay $4,500 in CR 11 sanctions.
Margitan timely appeals the denial of his reconsideration request and the
imposition of CR 11 sanctions. In addition, he attempts to appeal the order of dismissal
and even one older order, an order denying his motion for default. In accordance with
established precedent, we do not review the untimely appealed orders. No. 39732-7-III Margitan v. Hanna
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration
and in ordering Margitan to pay $4,500 in CR 11 sanctions. We deem this appeal
frivolous and grant the law firm’s request for attorney fee sanctions on appeal.
FACTS
Allan Margitan and Mark and Jennifer Hanna own adjoining properties in
Spokane County, Washington. The two parties have a lengthy litigation history
surrounding property disputes. See, e.g., Hanna v. Margitan, 193 Wn. App. 596,
373 P.3d 300 (2016).
In August 2021, Margitan filed the action that is currently on appeal. The
complaint asserted that the Hannas committed tortious acts within a 2019 action between
the parties. In November 2021, Margitan filed an amended complaint joining the
Hannas’s attorneys, Paine Hamblen LLP, and asserted that Paine Hamblen also engaged
in tortious acts within the 2019 action. The claims against Paine Hamblen alleged
discovery abuses.
On February 16, 2022, counsel for Paine Hamblen requested a calendar date from
Judge Fennessy’s chambers to hear a CR 12(c) motion to dismiss on the pleadings. The
court proposed a date of March 25, 2022. Margitan informed the parties he was
unavailable between March 5, 2022 and April 1, 2022. The court offered an alternate
date of April 15, 2022. Margitan did not object.
2 No. 39732-7-III Margitan v. Hanna
On March 18, 2022, Paine Hamblen filed and served its CR 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings, primarily relying on attorney immunity under the litigation
privilege doctrine. In support of its motion, Paine Hamblen attached pleadings and
transcripts from the 2019 action. Paine Hamblen noted its motion to be heard on the
agreed date, April 15, 2022.
On April 11, 2022, Margitan moved to strike Paine Hamblen’s CR 12(c) motion.
He argued the motion should be converted to a CR 56 motion for summary judgment
because it was accompanied by declarations. Margitan also argued it was unfair and
prejudicial to require him to file a response on short notice because Paine Hamblen filed
and served the motion during his period of unavailability. The court reset the April 15
hearing date to April 22 and set Margitan’s response date to April 19.
After argument, Judge Fennessy granted Paine Hamblen’s motion to dismiss:
So with those observations, I believe that the statements of Mr. Margitan are accepted by this Court. But I don't think that they rise to the level of a cause of action against Paine Hamblen in this circumstance. I understand that there’s [the 2019] case still in front of Judge Moreno relative to the discovery actions that were taken, the behavior that was there, and the underlying circumstance on the property between these parties. But, for those reasons, I believe that the motion to dismiss under [CR] 12[(c)] is well founded, well taken, and I am going to sign the order as proposed by Mr. Ross on behalf of his clients dismissing the cause of action as against Paine Hamblen, LLP.
Rep. of Proc. (April 22, 2022) at 26.
3 No. 39732-7-III Margitan v. Hanna
Ten months later, on February 28, 2023, Margitan filed a CR 60(b) motion to
vacate the order of dismissal. By then, Judge Fennessey had retired and the case had
been reassigned to Judge Hazel. Margitan asserted 12 reasons why his motion should be
granted. His reasons ignored the legal basis supporting dismissal—litigation privilege
immunity. Instead, he reargued the alleged discovery abuses and the claimed “mistake”
and “surprise” for being denied adequate time to respond to Paine Hamblen’s CR 12(c)
motion. Clerk’s Papers at 765.
By order dated April 14, 2023, Judge Hazel denied Margitan’s CR 60(b) motion.
Paine Hamblen moved for CR 11 sanctions for opposing Margitan’s motion. By order
dated May 12, 2023, the court granted Paine Hamblen’s request and ordered Margitan to
pay Paine Hamblen $4,500.
On May 15, 2023, Margitan filed the first notice of appeal that appears in this
court, a notice entitled “Second Amended Notice of Appeal.” Over the next several
months, Margitan continued to file additional amended notices of appeal.
ANALYSIS
Review Limited to Reconsideration Order and Sanctions Order
As a preliminary matter, we first discuss Margitan’s various notices of appeal.
Aside from the timely appeal of the April 14, 2023 order denying reconsideration and the
4 No. 39732-7-III Margitan v. Hanna
May 12, 2023 order granting sanctions, Margitan attempts to appeal the April 2022 order
of dismissal and an earlier order, an order denying his motion for default.
A CR 60(b) motion for reconsideration is not a substitute for a timely appeal and
does not allow a litigant to challenge the underlying judgment. In re Vulnerable Adult
Petition for Winter, 12 Wn. App. 2d 815, 830, 460 P.3d 667 (2020); Bjurstrom v.
Campbell, 27 Wn. App. 449, 451, 618 P.2d 533 (1980). Similarly, “an unappealed final
judgment cannot be restored to an appellate track by means of moving to vacate and
appealing the denial of the motion.” State v. Gaut, 111 Wn. App. 875, 881, 46 P.3d 832
(2002). The scope of our appellate review therefore is limited to the trial court’s denial
of Margitan’s reconsideration motion and its subsequent order imposing CR 11 sanctions.
CR 60(b) is aimed at judgments that were unfairly obtained. Peoples State Bank v.
Hickey, 55 Wn. App. 367, 372, 777 P.2d 1056 (1989). Here, the only legitimate basis for
Margitan’s CR 60(b) motion concerns the titling of Paine Hamblen’s motion as one under
CR 12(c) rather than CR 56 and Margitan’s argument that he lacked sufficient time to
respond to that motion. The other bases of his motion had nothing to do with the order of
dismissal being unfairly obtained.
We agree with Margitan. Paine Hamblen’s choice to include matters outside the
pleadings converted its CR 12(c) motion to a CR 56 motion. Sea-Pac Co. v. United
Food & Com.
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FILED SEPTEMBER 23, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
ALLAN MARGITAN, married filing ) No. 39732-7-III individually, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) MARK AND JENNIFER HANNA, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION husband and wife, ) ) Respondents, ) ) PAINE HAMBLEN LLP, A Washington ) Limited Liability Partnership, ) ) Defendant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Allan Margitan, pro se, filed suit against the law firm
representing the party opposing him in a long-running conflict. The trial court granted
the law firm’s CR 12(c) motion for dismissal, concluding that the litigation privilege
applied. Ten months later, Margitan filed a CR 60(b) motion for reconsideration. The
trial court denied the motion and ordered Margitan to pay $4,500 in CR 11 sanctions.
Margitan timely appeals the denial of his reconsideration request and the
imposition of CR 11 sanctions. In addition, he attempts to appeal the order of dismissal
and even one older order, an order denying his motion for default. In accordance with
established precedent, we do not review the untimely appealed orders. No. 39732-7-III Margitan v. Hanna
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration
and in ordering Margitan to pay $4,500 in CR 11 sanctions. We deem this appeal
frivolous and grant the law firm’s request for attorney fee sanctions on appeal.
FACTS
Allan Margitan and Mark and Jennifer Hanna own adjoining properties in
Spokane County, Washington. The two parties have a lengthy litigation history
surrounding property disputes. See, e.g., Hanna v. Margitan, 193 Wn. App. 596,
373 P.3d 300 (2016).
In August 2021, Margitan filed the action that is currently on appeal. The
complaint asserted that the Hannas committed tortious acts within a 2019 action between
the parties. In November 2021, Margitan filed an amended complaint joining the
Hannas’s attorneys, Paine Hamblen LLP, and asserted that Paine Hamblen also engaged
in tortious acts within the 2019 action. The claims against Paine Hamblen alleged
discovery abuses.
On February 16, 2022, counsel for Paine Hamblen requested a calendar date from
Judge Fennessy’s chambers to hear a CR 12(c) motion to dismiss on the pleadings. The
court proposed a date of March 25, 2022. Margitan informed the parties he was
unavailable between March 5, 2022 and April 1, 2022. The court offered an alternate
date of April 15, 2022. Margitan did not object.
2 No. 39732-7-III Margitan v. Hanna
On March 18, 2022, Paine Hamblen filed and served its CR 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings, primarily relying on attorney immunity under the litigation
privilege doctrine. In support of its motion, Paine Hamblen attached pleadings and
transcripts from the 2019 action. Paine Hamblen noted its motion to be heard on the
agreed date, April 15, 2022.
On April 11, 2022, Margitan moved to strike Paine Hamblen’s CR 12(c) motion.
He argued the motion should be converted to a CR 56 motion for summary judgment
because it was accompanied by declarations. Margitan also argued it was unfair and
prejudicial to require him to file a response on short notice because Paine Hamblen filed
and served the motion during his period of unavailability. The court reset the April 15
hearing date to April 22 and set Margitan’s response date to April 19.
After argument, Judge Fennessy granted Paine Hamblen’s motion to dismiss:
So with those observations, I believe that the statements of Mr. Margitan are accepted by this Court. But I don't think that they rise to the level of a cause of action against Paine Hamblen in this circumstance. I understand that there’s [the 2019] case still in front of Judge Moreno relative to the discovery actions that were taken, the behavior that was there, and the underlying circumstance on the property between these parties. But, for those reasons, I believe that the motion to dismiss under [CR] 12[(c)] is well founded, well taken, and I am going to sign the order as proposed by Mr. Ross on behalf of his clients dismissing the cause of action as against Paine Hamblen, LLP.
Rep. of Proc. (April 22, 2022) at 26.
3 No. 39732-7-III Margitan v. Hanna
Ten months later, on February 28, 2023, Margitan filed a CR 60(b) motion to
vacate the order of dismissal. By then, Judge Fennessey had retired and the case had
been reassigned to Judge Hazel. Margitan asserted 12 reasons why his motion should be
granted. His reasons ignored the legal basis supporting dismissal—litigation privilege
immunity. Instead, he reargued the alleged discovery abuses and the claimed “mistake”
and “surprise” for being denied adequate time to respond to Paine Hamblen’s CR 12(c)
motion. Clerk’s Papers at 765.
By order dated April 14, 2023, Judge Hazel denied Margitan’s CR 60(b) motion.
Paine Hamblen moved for CR 11 sanctions for opposing Margitan’s motion. By order
dated May 12, 2023, the court granted Paine Hamblen’s request and ordered Margitan to
pay Paine Hamblen $4,500.
On May 15, 2023, Margitan filed the first notice of appeal that appears in this
court, a notice entitled “Second Amended Notice of Appeal.” Over the next several
months, Margitan continued to file additional amended notices of appeal.
ANALYSIS
Review Limited to Reconsideration Order and Sanctions Order
As a preliminary matter, we first discuss Margitan’s various notices of appeal.
Aside from the timely appeal of the April 14, 2023 order denying reconsideration and the
4 No. 39732-7-III Margitan v. Hanna
May 12, 2023 order granting sanctions, Margitan attempts to appeal the April 2022 order
of dismissal and an earlier order, an order denying his motion for default.
A CR 60(b) motion for reconsideration is not a substitute for a timely appeal and
does not allow a litigant to challenge the underlying judgment. In re Vulnerable Adult
Petition for Winter, 12 Wn. App. 2d 815, 830, 460 P.3d 667 (2020); Bjurstrom v.
Campbell, 27 Wn. App. 449, 451, 618 P.2d 533 (1980). Similarly, “an unappealed final
judgment cannot be restored to an appellate track by means of moving to vacate and
appealing the denial of the motion.” State v. Gaut, 111 Wn. App. 875, 881, 46 P.3d 832
(2002). The scope of our appellate review therefore is limited to the trial court’s denial
of Margitan’s reconsideration motion and its subsequent order imposing CR 11 sanctions.
CR 60(b) is aimed at judgments that were unfairly obtained. Peoples State Bank v.
Hickey, 55 Wn. App. 367, 372, 777 P.2d 1056 (1989). Here, the only legitimate basis for
Margitan’s CR 60(b) motion concerns the titling of Paine Hamblen’s motion as one under
CR 12(c) rather than CR 56 and Margitan’s argument that he lacked sufficient time to
respond to that motion. The other bases of his motion had nothing to do with the order of
dismissal being unfairly obtained.
We agree with Margitan. Paine Hamblen’s choice to include matters outside the
pleadings converted its CR 12(c) motion to a CR 56 motion. Sea-Pac Co. v. United
Food & Com. Workers Local Union 44, 103 Wn.2d 800, 802, 699 P.2d 217 (1985). An
5 No. 39732-7-III Margitan v. Hanna
important procedural difference between a CR 12 motion and a CR 56 motion is, under
the latter rule, an opposing party is entitled to 17 days to respond.1 Here, Paine Hamblen
filed its mistitled motion to dismiss on March 18, 2022, and Margitan was given until
April 19 to respond. Margitan had more time to respond than permitted by CR 56(c),
even if one were to consider him “unavailable” until April 1, 2022.
We review a trial court’s denial of a CR 60(b) motion for reconsideration for a
manifest abuse of discretion. Hook v. Lincoln County Noxious Weed Control Bd., 166
Wn. App. 145, 158, 269 P.3d 1056 (2012). We discern no manifest abuse of discretion
by Judge Hazel for his refusal to vacate the order of dismissal entered 10 months earlier,
given the additional time Judge Fennessy gave Margitan to respond to Paine Hamblen’s
mistitled motion.
Similarly, we review a trial court’s imposition of CR 11 sanctions for an abuse of
discretion. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299,
339, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). CR 11 sanctions may be imposed against an attorney or a pro
se party for filing a factually or legally baseless pleading. See CR 11(a). When
determining whether CR 11 sanctions are warranted for a factually baseless filing, courts
1 Under CR 56(c), the party moving for summary judgment must allow at least 28 days between filing its supporting documents and the hearing date, and the opposing party may file opposing documents not later than 11 days before the hearing. Thus, the opposing party has at least 17 days from filing and service of the motion to respond.
6 No. 39732-7-III Margitan v. Hanna
should consider what the filing party reasonably believed at the time the pleading was
submitted. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 220, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992).
Margitan’s inclusion of numerous nonlegitimate bases for his motion and inclusion of
one legitimate but insufficient basis supports our conclusion that Judge Hazel did not
abuse his discretion by ordering Margitan to partially compensate Paine Hamblen for its
fees incurred in opposing the hapless motion. The legitimate basis had to do with the
fairness of requiring Margitan to respond one month after Paine Hamblen’s filing of its
motion to dismiss. Margitan, knowing that he had not objected to the original hearing
date and knowing that Judge Fennessey had given him an additional week to respond,
could not have reasonably believed the order of dismissal was unfairly obtained.
Attorney Fees on Appeal
Paine Hamblen requests reasonable attorney fees under RAP 18.9(a) and
RCW 4.84.185. Fees under these provisions are appropriate if the opposing party’s
appeal is frivolous. “‘[A]n appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues upon
which reasonable minds might differ, and it is so totally devoid of merit that there was no
reasonable possibility of reversal.’” Foisy v. Conroy, 101 Wn. App. 36, 42-43, 4 P.3d
140 (2000) (quoting Delany v. Canning, 84 Wn. App. 498, 510, 929 P.2d 475 (1997)).
It appears that Margitan filed his CR 60(b) motion for the sole purpose of trying to
extend his ability to appeal stale orders, including the order of dismissal. The only
7 No. 39732-7-III Margitan v. Hanna
legitimate reason for Margitan seeking reconsideration under the rule was the fairness of
being given one month to respond to Paine Hamblen's mistitled motion to dismiss. Here,
our review of the trial court's two timely appealed orders is very deferential-abuse of
discretion. Given this very deferential standard and the lack of an adequate factual basis
to support the challenge, we must conclude that this appeal is totally devoid of merit and
there was no reasonable possibility of reversal. We therefore grant Paine Hamblen' s
request for reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Murphy, J.