All Represented by John Driscoll v. Islamic Republic of Iran

District Court, District of Columbia·Decided September 13, 2024·No. Civil Action No. 2020-0622·Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ALL PLAINTIFFS REPRESENTED BY JOHN DRISCOLL,

Plaintiffs, v. No. 20-cv-622-ZMF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

From 2006 to 2011, sixty-three terrorist attacks on U.S. military service members and

civilians in Iraq killed forty-six and severely injured twenty-three soldiers. The attack victims,

their estates, and their family members (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sought compensation for their

injuries from Defendant, the Islamic Republic of Iran, under the terrorism exception to the Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. This Court previously granted

default judgment as to liability and compensatory damages. See All Pls. Repr’d by John Driscoll

v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 20-cv-622, 2023 WL 5932974, at *1 (D.D.C. July 13, 2023); see

also All Pls. Repr’d by John Driscoll v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 20-cv-622, 2024 WL

3251223, at *1 (D.D.C. June 30, 2024). It now addresses Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will award Plaintiffs punitive damages of $656,372,428.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural history of this case are set forth in the Court’s June 30, 2024

opinion. See Driscoll, 2024 WL 3251223, at *1.

1 II. DISCUSSION

A. Basis for Punitive Damages

The terrorism exception to the FSIA authorizes recovery for “economic damages, solatium,

pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c).1 “Punitive damages are not

compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied . . . to punish reprehensible conduct

and to deter its future occurrence.” Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979)

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). While “it is axiomatic that punitive damages

are ‘not favored,’” Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1958), they “are allowed because

the civil law has long recognized that in certain situations deterrence can better be achieved

through modification of the civil awards than through a requirement of criminal sanctions.” Davis

v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

“[P]unitive damages are never awarded as of right, no matter how egregious the

defendant’s conduct . . . . Rather, they are awarded or rejected in a particular case at the discretion

of the fact finder.” Berger v. Iron Workers Reinf’d Rodmen, Loc. 201, 170 F.3d 1111, 1139 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Four factors bear on the assessment of punitive

damages in FSIA cases: “(1) the character of the defendants’ act, (2) the nature and extent of harm

to the plaintiffs that the defendants caused or intended to cause, (3) the need for deterrence, and

(4) the wealth of the defendants.” Selig v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F. Supp. 3d 40, 75 (D.D.C.

2021) (quoting Est. of Steinberg v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-cv-1910, 2019 WL 6117722,

at *9 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2019)).

1 Under the 2018 amendment to the FSIA, punitive damages are available under the FSIA even for attacks which preceded the amendment. See Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 590 U.S. 418, 427 (2020). 2 Punitive damages are permissible here. Cf. Neiberger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 16-

cv-2193, 2022 WL 17370239, at *18 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2022). First, Iran provided “critical” support

to terrorist groups, permitting the attacks at issue to occur. All Pls. Repr’d by John Driscoll v.

Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 20-cv-622, 2023 WL 4892710, at *11 (D.D.C. June 27, 2023)

(quoting Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 320 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62 (D.D.C. 2018)). Second, these

“heinous” acts “were intended to—and did—cause unconscionable pain and suffering.” Selig, 573

F. Supp. 3d at 75. Third, “[t]here is a need for deterrence because, time and again, courts in this

district have been confronted with families shattered by Iran-backed terrorists.” Id. And fourth,

“Iran is a sovereign and has substantial wealth.” Bluth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 203 F. Supp.

3d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2016).

B. Multiplier for Punitive Damages

A judge has “discretion to tailor a punitive award appropriate to the magnitude of the

underlying injury.” Abedini v. Gov’t of Islamic Republic of Iran, 422 F. Supp. 3d 118, 142 (D.D.C.

2019); see also Berger, 170 F.3d at 1139 (punitive damages are at “discretion of the fact finder”)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Judges on this court have assessed punitive damages in FSIA

cases in very different ways. See Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 75–77 (describing four approaches).

Some have awarded a multiple of the foreign state’s annual expenditures on terrorism. See Braun

v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F. Supp. 3d 64, 87 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing cases). Others have

awarded $150 million to each affected family. See, e.g., Est. of Steinberg v. Islamic Republic of

Iran, No. 17-cv-1910, 2019 WL 6117722, at *10 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2019); Est. of Hirshfeld v.

Islamic Republic of Iran, 330 F. Supp. 3d 107, 150 (D.D.C. 2018); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic,

580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 75 (D.D.C. 2008). Still others have multiplied the amount of compensatory

3 damages by a factor of one to five. See, e.g., Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 324 F. Supp. 3d 54,

65 (D.D.C. 2018); Taitt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F. Supp. 3d 63, 113–14 (D.D.C. 2023).

The current prevailing trend is to make punitive damages equal to compensatory damages.

See M.M. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 708 F. Supp. 3d 22, 52 (D.D.C. 2023); Pennington v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, No. 19-cv-796, 2022 WL 168261, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2022); Neiberger, 2022

WL 17370239, at *19; Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 77; Doe A-1 v. Demo. People’s Republic of Korea,

No. 18-cv-252, 2021 WL 723257, at *10 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2021); Christie v. Islamic Republic of

Iran, No. 19-cv-1289, 2020 WL 3606273, at *28–29 (D.D.C. July 2, 2020); Abedini, 422 F. Supp.

3d at 142. This trend is likely due to the courts’ recognition that “Iran already faces billions in

punitive damages awards,” such that “[a]dding hundreds of millions of dollars to the outstanding

judgments against Iran is unlikely to have a meaningful deterrent effect.” Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at

77 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, as of “2009, Iran had 10 billion

in . . .

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