Alkire v. Municipal Court City Of
Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA OP 08-0233
2008 MT 223
TIMOTHY D. ALKIRE,
Petitioner,
OPINION
v.
AND
MUNICIPAL COURT, CITY OF MISSOULA, KAREN TOWNSEND, Acting Municipal Court ORDER Judge,
Respondents.
¶1 Before this Court is a Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control filed by petitioner Timothy D. Alkire (Alkire). Alkire is represented by the Office of the State Public Defender (OSPD). Pursuant to our Order dated May 21, 2008, the respondents, the Municipal Court, the City of Missoula, and Karen Townsend, Acting Municipal Court Judge (the court) have responded through the Missoula City Attorney’s Office.
¶2 Alkire is charged in Missoula Municipal Court with criminal trespass to vehicles. Since it is undisputed that Alkire is deaf or suffers from serious hearing impairments, he requires an interpreter.
¶3 From the record before us it appears that on October 31, 2007, the court entered an order on motions made by Alkire. One motion was to appoint a “team of qualified interpreters.” The court observed that with this motion, Alkire provided the court with “a
paper setting out standard practice for interpreters for the deaf. 1 ” The court’s order states: “That document [the aforementioned paper of standard practices for interpreters] provides the Court with necessary evidence that a team of interpreters is necessary for any trial held in this case.” The court then went on to note that because a team of interpreters is necessary, that does not settle the question of who should pay the cost for this team of interpreters. The court reasoned that § 47-1-201(5)(a), MCA, 2 clearly applies, and, as the most recently enacted statute on the matter of appointing interpreters (it was enacted in 2005), that statute controls over § 49-4-503, MCA, which was enacted in 1979. Because § 47-1-201(5)(a), MCA, was enacted more recently, the court held that it “no longer has the financial responsibility for interpreters requested by the public defender,” notwithstanding § 49-4-503, MCA, which provides that the county bear such costs. The court also ruled that § 47-1-201(5)(a), MCA, was the more specific statute, and that it controlled over the earlier and more general legislation, § 49-4-503, MCA.
¶4 On that rationale the court granted Alkire’s motion for appointment of a team of qualified interpreters. And, pursuant to § 47-1-201(5)(a), MCA, the court also ordered that the OSPD be responsible for all costs associated with the appointment of this team of qualified interpreters. On April 2, 2008, the court reaffirmed this same rationale in its October 31, 2007 order denying Alkire’s renewed motion that the Missoula Municipal Court bear the financial responsibility for payment of the needed interpreters for Alkire’s
1 It appears that an interpreter for the deaf is only able to work an hour at a time, hence the need for a “team.” 2 Section 47-1-201(5)(a), MCA, is one of the statutes enacted in 2005 that created the state-wide public defender system. See Title 47, chapter 1, MCA.
trial. Again, the court ordered the OSPD to be responsible for such costs under § 47-1-201(5), MCA.
¶5 Alkire contends that the trial judge read § 47-1-201(5), MCA, too broadly, and that § 49-4-503, MCA, applies and requires the court to bear the costs of his team of interpreters.
¶6 The City of Missoula’s response is confusing and at odds with the court’s actual orders. The City states that “[t]he Missoula Municipal Court will pay for an interpreter for Alkire at the time of trial” and that it is not responsible for the team of interpreters that Alkire has demanded. The City then faults Alkire for failing to request a hearing on his motion and failing to present expert testimony and evidence for his need of a team of interpreters. The City also argues that the Legislature has provided the OSPD with a budget for these sorts of expenses.
¶7 The City’s argument is beside the point, however. In its October 31, 2007 order (reaffirmed in its April 8, 2008 order) the court clearly accepted the proof that Alkire offered for his need for a team of interpreters and, on the basis of that proof, granted Alkire’s motion for the appointment of a team of qualified interpreters. The only issue raised in Alkire’s Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control properly before us is which entity is responsible for the payment of this team of interpreters. That Alkire is entitled to a team of interpreters—as opposed to one interpreter—was settled by the court already.
¶8 Accordingly, we turn to the two statutory schemes at issue. The first statutory scheme is under Title 49, chapter 4, part 5, MCA. This statutory scheme provides for “Interpreters for the Deaf in Official Proceedings” (hereafter referred to as scheme no. 1).
Specifically, § 49-4-503(1) and (3)(a), MCA, require the court to appoint an interpreter for a deaf person who is involved in a court proceeding. Section 49-4-509, MCA, requires the court to pay the interpreter reasonable compensation for his services plus his actual travel and transportation expenses. Moreover, and of importance here, this section provides that “[w]hen the interpreter is appointed in a criminal proceeding, the fee shall be paid out of the county general fund . . . .”
¶9 The second statutory scheme arises as a combination of § 47-1-201(5)(a); Title 26, chapter 2, part 5; and § 46-15-116, MCA (hereafter referred to as scheme no. 2). Section 47-1-201(5)(a), MCA, provides that the OSPD is responsible for “witness and interpreter fees and expenses provided for in Title 26, chapter 2, part 5, and 46-15-116.” Title 26, chapter 2, part 5, MCA, deals with “Witness Fees.” Under § 26-2-504, MCA, interpreters and translators receive the same compensation as witnesses ($10 per day). Furthermore, under § 26-2-506(2)(a), MCA, witnesses subpoenaed by the public defender must be paid by the public defender under § 47-1-201(5), MCA. Pursuant to § 46-15-116(1), MCA, witnesses in criminal proceedings are paid the witness fees prescribed under Title 26, chapter 2, part 5, MCA.
¶10 As noted, the trial court reasoned that statutory scheme no. 2 controls since § 47-1-201(5), MCA, was enacted in 2005, whereas § 49-4-503, MCA, was enacted in 1979, and, because the Legislature was presumptively aware of statutory scheme no. 1, statutory scheme no. 2 is more specific and, thus, controls. We disagree.
¶11 We conclude that the trial court’s interpretation is incorrect for two reasons. First, the trial judge’s interpretation effectively concludes that the Legislature implicitly
repealed statutory scheme no. 1 when the deaf criminal defendant is indigent and has been appointed a public defender. In Ritchie v. Town of Ennis, 2004 MT 43, 320 Mont. 94, 86 P.3d 11, we stated that
the Legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of existing law. Ross [v.
City of Great Falls, 1998 MT 276, ¶ 17, 291 Mont. 377, ¶ 17, 967 P.2d 1103], ¶ 17. Accordingly, it is further presumed that the Legislature “does not intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same matter unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable.” Ross, ¶ 17 (citation omitted). As a result, a statute may be repealed by implication when a subsequent legislative act is “clearly and irreconcilably inconsistent with the earlier statute.” Ross, ¶ 16. Due to these presumptions, repeal of a statute by implication is not favored. Ross, ¶ 17.
Ritchie, ¶ 20; accord Dayberry v. City of East Helena, 2003 MT 321, ¶ 28, 318 Mont. 301, ¶ 28, 80 P.3d 1218, ¶ 28. Second, the trial court’s interpretation fails to reconcile the two statutory schemes where it is possible to do so, as is required by § 1-2-101, MCA. Accord Mathews v. BJS Construction, Inc., 2003 MT 116, ¶¶ 24-25, 315 Mont. 441, ¶¶ 24-25, 68 P.3d 865, ¶¶ 24-25.
¶12 We conclude that statutory scheme no. 1 is the specific statutory scheme as it
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