Alkima Williamson v. First Horizon Bank

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedMay 28, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-02540
StatusUnknown

This text of Alkima Williamson v. First Horizon Bank (Alkima Williamson v. First Horizon Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alkima Williamson v. First Horizon Bank, (E.D. La. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALKIMA WILLIAMSON * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 25-2540

FIRST HORIZON BANK * SECTION “N” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before me is Defendant First Horizon Bank’s Motion to Compel. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff Alkima Williamson timely filed an Opposition Memorandum, and Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum. ECF Nos. 15, 17. No party requested oral argument in accordance with Local Rule 78.1, and the Court agrees that oral argument is unnecessary. Having considered the record, submissions and arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, Defendant’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the reasons stated herein. I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Alkima Williamson worked as a Universal Banker for First Horizon Bank from October 11, 2022, until she resigned on January 5, 2024. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 8, 17. Plaintiff filed this § 1981 suit on December 22, 2025, against First Horizon Bank alleging race discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, wrongful and constructive termination, and post-termination retaliation and interference with future contractual rights. Id. ¶¶ 26-45. The Court issued a Scheduling Order on February 3, 2026. ECF No. 8. This Scheduling Order established a trial date of October 26, 2026, and a discovery deadline of September 15, 2026. ECF No. 8 at 1, 3. Defendant issued discovery requests on March 2, 2026. ECF No. 12-2 at 3-27. Despite several extensions, Plaintiff failed to respond by the agreed dates and this motion followed. ECF No. 12-1 at 2-3. In Opposition, Plaintiff’s counsel fails to explain why responses were not delivered by the last April 27, 2026, deadline as promised, but states that the sudden departure of the associate handling the case resulted in the delay. ECF No. 15 at 1-2. Plaintiff served the discovery responses on May 19, 2026. Id. at 2. Plaintiff argues good faith and asserts that sanctions are not appropriate in light of the associate’s sudden departure and need to engage new counsel. Id. at 2-5. Plaintiff also argues that the pre-hearing delivery of responses renders the motion moot. Id. at 5. In Reply, Defendant argues Plaintiff waived her objections by failing to timely respond, objected based on privilege but failed to provide a privilege log, and responded by

indicating that responses would be provided in the future. ECF No. 17 at 1-5. II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS Under Rule 26, [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). A. Duties in Responding to Discovery A party served with written discovery must fully answer each request to the full extent that it is not objectionable and affirmatively explain what portion of an interrogatory or document request is objectionable and why, affirmatively explain what portion of the interrogatory or document request is not objectionable and the subject of the answer or response, and affirmatively explain whether any responsive information or documents have been withheld.1 “Discovery by interrogatory requires candor in responding. . . . The candor required is a candid statement of the

1 Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 580 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (citation omitted). information sought or of the fact that objection is made to furnishing the information.”2 Although a party is not required to make an extensive investigation in responding to an interrogatory, it must review all sources of responsive information reasonably available and provide the responsive, relevant facts reasonably available.3 The fact that an interrogatory calls for a thorough response—one that will take time and effort to answer—does not make it improper.4 Where an interrogatory answer ‘‘‘as a whole disclose[s] a conscientious endeavor to understand the question[] and to answer fully [that question],’ a party's obligation under Rule 33 is satisfied.”5

Likewise, a party must provide full and complete responses to requests for production within thirty days after being served same unless otherwise stipulated or ordered. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(A). The responding party must either state whether the production will be provided or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reason. Id. at 34(b)(2)(B). The production must occur “no later than the time for inspection specified in the request or another reasonable time specified in the response.” Id. at 34(b)(2)(B).6 A party responding to discovery must produce responsive documents not only that are within that party’s actual, physical possession, but also documents that are within the party's constructive possession, custody or control. Id. at 34(a)(1). And while Rule 26(e) imposes an obligation to supplement

2 Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 616 (5th Cir. 1977). 3 Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 579 (quoting Areizaga v. ADW Corp., 314 F.R.D. 428, 437 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (citing 8B WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2174 (3d ed. 2013))). 4 Areizaga, 314 F.R.D. at 437 (citing Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 307–08 (5th Cir. 1973)). 5 Id. (citing Meltzer/Austin Rest. Corp. v. Benihana Nat'l. Corp., No. 11–542, 2013 WL 2607589, at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 10, 2013) (quoting 8B WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2177 (3d ed. 2010))). 6 A party has “control” over documents or materials that it has the legal right to obtain even though it has no copy and even if the documents are owned or possessed by a nonparty. Becnel v. Salas, No. 17-17965, 2018 WL 691649, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2018) (citations omitted); Est. of Monroe v. Bottle Rock Power Corp., No. 03-2682, 2004 WL 737463, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2004) (citation omitted). responses,7 that provision does not provide “an extension of the deadline by which a party must deliver” its information.8 Rather, the purpose of this rule is to prevent prejudice and surprise.9 Courts throughout the country have long interpreted the federal rules to prohibit general, boilerplate objections.10 Boilerplate objections use standardized, ready-made or all-purpose language without regard to the particular discovery request.11 General objections refer to objections that a party responding to discovery asserts as applicable to multiple individual requests set forth in a given set of discovery requests.12 A general objection untethered to specific requests (and is thus also a boilerplate objection) is improper.13

When objecting to a discovery request, the objection must state how the objection “relates to the particular request being opposed, and not merely that it is ‘overly broad and burdensome’ or ‘oppressive’ or ‘vexatious’ or ‘not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’”14 And when a party objects to a request for production, the “objection must state

7 Berenson v. Adm'rs of Tulane Univ. Educ. Fund, No. 17-329, 2017 WL 6372831, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2017); see also Moore v. BASF Corp., No. 11-1001, 2012 WL 12990571, at *2 (E.D. La. May 2, 2012). 8 See Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Reed v. Iowa Marine and Repair Corp.
16 F.3d 82 (Fifth Circuit, 1994)
Muro v. Target Corp.
580 F.3d 485 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Central, Inc.
580 F.3d 119 (Third Circuit, 2009)
Jackson Hospital Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board
257 F.R.D. 302 (District of Columbia, 2009)
Orchestratehr, Inc. v. Trombetta
178 F. Supp. 3d 476 (N.D. Texas, 2016)
Muro v. Target Corp.
250 F.R.D. 350 (N.D. Illinois, 2007)
DL v. District of Columbia
251 F.R.D. 38 (District of Columbia, 2008)
Novelty, Inc. v. Mountain View Marketing, Inc.
265 F.R.D. 370 (S.D. Indiana, 2009)
Areizaga v. ADW Corp.
314 F.R.D. 428 (N.D. Texas, 2016)
Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp.
150 F.R.D. 465 (S.D. New York, 1993)
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Packard Bell Electronics, Inc.
163 F.R.D. 329 (N.D. California, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Alkima Williamson v. First Horizon Bank, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alkima-williamson-v-first-horizon-bank-laed-2026.