Alisa Love v. Superior Court of Essex County, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. New Jersey
• Decided: June 10, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-05810
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ALISA LOVE, Civil Action No. 26-5810 (SDW) (AME)

Plaintiff,

WHEREAS OPINION & ORDER v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ESSEX June 10, 2026 COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge. THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon Plaintiff Alisa Love’s (“Plaintiff”) filing of a Complaint (D.E. 1) and an application to proceed in forma pauperis, (D.E. 1-2 (“IFP application”)), and this Court having sua sponte reviewed the Complaint for sufficiency pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a); and WHEREAS a district court may allow a plaintiff to commence a civil action without paying the filing fee—that is, in forma pauperis—so long as the plaintiff submits an affidavit demonstrating she is “unable to pay such fees,” but must dismiss a case that is frivolous, “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1), (e)(2)(B); and WHEREAS here, Plaintiff’s IFP application shows that her income far exceeds her total monthly expenses, rendering her ineligible for IFP status. (Compare D.E. 1-2 at 1–2 (total monthly income exceeding $16,000), with D.E. 1-2 at 4–5 (monthly expenses totaling $1,357)); and WHEREAS pursuant to Rule 8(a), “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The complaint must apprise the defendant with “fair notice of what

the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” containing “more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Pro se complaints, although “[held] to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), must still “state a plausible claim for relief,” Yoder v. Wells Fargo Bank, 566 F. App’x 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013)); and WHEREAS “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts “are obliged to notice jurisdictional issues and raise them on their own initiative.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17, 20 (2017) (citing

Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011)). “Although courts hold pleadings drafted by pro se litigants to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, pro se litigants still bear ‘the burden of showing that the case is properly before the court at all stages of the litigation.’” Ingris v. Borough of Caldwell, No. 14-6388, 2015 WL 758680, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2015) (quoting Phillip v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 861 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466 (D.N.J. 2012)); and WHEREAS under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments.” Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010). For the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply, the following four requirements must be met: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Id. at 166 (alterations in original) (quoting

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)); and WHEREAS Plaintiff complains of conduct related to or involving August 2012 foreclosure proceedings before the New Jersey Superior Court of Essex County involving her home. This Court has previously encountered—and dismissed—the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s Complaint. (See Docket No. 15-cv-2961, D.E. 3 (dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim where her time to appeal “any decision that issued in 2012” had expired, among other grounds); see also Docket No. 16-cv-3360, D.E. 6 (dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint because they had been resolved in state court in or around 2012 and alternatively, for lack of jurisdiction and because the statute of limitations had run)); and WHEREAS in this instance, Plaintiff specifically takes issue with the state court’s May

11, 2026 decision denying Plaintiff’s motion to reopen the state court matter. (D.E. 1-4 at 1.) Plaintiff goes as far as characterizing this matter as an appeal of the state court’s May 11, 2026 decision. (Id.) This Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as seeking recourse from the state court proceeding; this, however, is not the appropriate forum to raise these claims. See Nest v. Nationstar Mortg., No. 16-4282, 2016 WL 4541871, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2016) (“The Third Circuit has specifically held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from providing relief that would invalidate a state court foreclosure decision.”). Finding that the elements of the Rooker- Feldman doctrine apply, this Court concludes it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the instant matter; therefore IT IS, on this 10th day of June 2026, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED; and it is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

SO ORDERED.

___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton_____ SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk cc: Parties Andre M. Espinosa, U.S.M.J.