Aliota, L. v. Millcreek Township School District

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 26, 2025
• Docket: 279 WDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A26033-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

LOUIS ALIOTA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : MILLCREEK TOWNSHIP SCHOOL : No. 279 WDA 2025 DISTRICT AND MILLCREEK : TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT : BOARD OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS :

Appeal from the Order Entered January 30, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Civil Division at No(s): 10343-2024

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY KING, J.: FILED: September 26, 2025

Appellant, Louis Aliota, appeals from the order entered in the Erie

County Court of Common Pleas, sustaining the preliminary objections of

Appellees, Millcreek Township School District and Millcreek Township School

District Board of School Directors, and dismissing Appellant’s amended

complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons, we transfer this appeal

to the Commonwealth Court.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

October 3, 2024, Appellant filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against

Appellees. Appellant alleged that in 2017, in an underlying action commenced

by Appellant, the Millcreek Township School Board had filed two counterclaims

against Appellant for defamation (one on its own behalf and one on behalf of J-A26033-25

the school district’s Superintendent). Appellant alleged that the trial court

ultimately denied relief on the counterclaims. Appellant claimed that under

the Public School Code of 1949, 24 P.S. § 1-101 et seq., it was unlawful for

Appellees to sue Appellant and spend taxpayer money for a lawsuit on behalf

of its employees/public officials. Appellant insisted that Appellees’ conduct

justified imposition of a surcharge against any member of Appellees who

engaged in such unlawful conduct. Appellant sought: (1) a declaration that it

was unlawful for Appellees to expend taxpayer money on the counterclaims;

(2) that the taxpayer money so spent must be refunded to the general ledger

of the Millcreek Township School District; and (3) all legal fees to be

reimbursed to Appellant.

Appellees filed preliminary objections on October 29, 2024. Appellant

filed an amended complaint on November 18, 2024, seeking: (1) a declaration

that it was unlawful for Appellees to expend taxpayer money on the

counterclaims; (2) a declaration that such an expenditure violated 24 P.S. §

6-608 (liability for improper school orders); and (3) all legal fees to be

reimbursed to Appellant. Appellees filed preliminary objections to Appellant’s

amended complaint on December 9, 2024.

On January 30, 2025, the court sustained Appellees’ preliminary

objections and dismissed Appellant’s amended complaint with prejudice.

Specifically, the court found that the sole process by which a taxpayer may

challenge a school district’s expenditures is by an appeal of an audit, pursuant

to 24 P.S. § 24-2451. Thus, the court decided that Appellant’s complaint could

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not establish a valid cause of action.

On February 26, 2025, Appellant filed a notice of appeal in this Court.

On March 5, 2025, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement, and Appellant timely complied. This Court subsequently issued a

rule to show cause why the matter should not be transferred to the

Commonwealth Court. Appellant filed a response on May 23, 2025, stating

only: “The issues involved in this appeal deal with questions of constitutional

law and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 42 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 7531 et

seq. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal.” (Response to

Rule to Show Cause, filed 5/23/25, at 1). On June 26, 2025, this Court

discharged the rule to show cause, and referred the issue to the merits panel.

Preliminarily, we observe that the Commonwealth Court shall have

exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders concerning local government

civil and criminal matters, specifically those “arising under any municipality,

institutional district, public school, planning or zoning code or under which a

municipality or other political subdivision or municipality authority may be

formed or incorporated or where is drawn in question the application,

interpretation or enforcement of any statute regulating the affairs of political

subdivisions, municipality and other local authorities or other public

corporations or of officers, employees or agents thereof, acting in their official

capacity[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a)(4)(i)(A). See also General Equipment

Mfrs. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 592 A.2d 1349, 1350 (Pa.Super. 1991) (stating:

“Because the instant appeal raises an issue involving the interpretation and

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application of statutes which [regulate] the affairs of a political subdivision,

namely the School Board, we find that is it appropriate to transfer this case to

the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court”).

Instantly, Appellant’s claims implicate the interpretation of the Public

School Code of 1949. Thus, appellate jurisdiction more properly lies in the

Commonwealth Court. See id. Appellant’s bald averments in response to

this Court’s rule to show cause do not convince us otherwise, in the absence

of citation to pertinent supporting legal authority. Consequently, we transfer

this appeal to the Commonwealth Court and strike it from the argument list.

See Pa.R.A.P. 751(a) (stating: “If an appeal or other matter is taken to or

brought in a court or magisterial district which does not have jurisdiction of

the appeal or other matter, the court or magisterial district judge

shall…transfer the record thereof to the proper court of this Commonwealth,

where the appeal or other matter shall be treated as if originally filed in

transferee court on the date first filed in a court or magisterial district”).

Appeal transferred. Jurisdiction is relinquished. Case stricken from

argument list.

DATE: 09/26/2025

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