Aliff v. Vervent, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJanuary 11, 2023
Docket3:20-cv-00697
StatusUnknown

This text of Aliff v. Vervent, Inc. (Aliff v. Vervent, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aliff v. Vervent, Inc., (S.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 HEATHER TURREY, OLIVER FIATY, Case No.: 20-CV-0697 DMS (AHG) JORDAN HERNANDEZ, and JEFFREY 11 SAZON, individually, and on behalf of all ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 12 others similarly situated, DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS 13 Plaintiffs, CERTIFICATION 14 v. 15 VERVENT, INC. fka FIRST ASSOCIATES LOAN SERVICING, 16 LLC; ACTIVATE FINANCIAL, LLC; 17 DAVID JOHNSON; and LAWRENCE CHIAVARO, 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a consumer class 22 action. (ECF No. 143.) The matter is fully briefed and submitted. For the following 23 reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. 24 I. 25 BACKGROUND AND FACTS 26 The full background of this case is summarized in prior orders. (See ECF Nos. 128, 27 140). To address the instant motion, a summary suffices along with additional material 28 facts as discussed below. 1 Plaintiffs Heather Turrey, Jeffrey Sazon, Jordan Hernandez, and Oliver Fiaty bring 2 this consumer class action as alleged victims of a racketeering student loan scheme against 3 companies and persons that collected millions of dollars in loan payments from them. 4 (ECF No. 141 at ¶ 1; Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”).) Plaintiffs allege ITT 5 Education Services, Inc. (“ITT”), now bankrupt, and one the nation’s largest and most 6 notorious for-profit school chains, offered high-cost programs that left students with large 7 debt and inferior credentials. (Id. at ¶ 2.) The present case involves one aspect of ITT’s 8 alleged fraud: it’s creation and exploitation of a sham private student loan program called 9 “PEAKS,” an acronym for “Program for Education Access and Knowledge.” (Id.) 10 Plaintiffs allege Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas (“DBTCA”) designed the 11 PEAKS loan program and was complicit with ITT. (Id. at ¶ 29.) The original complaint, 12 filed on April 10, 2020, named DBTCA and Defendants Vervent, Inc., the loan servicer 13 for the PEAKS loan program (formerly known as First Associates Loan Servicing or 14 “FALS”); Activate Financial, LLC (“Activate Financial” or “AFL”), an “in-house” 15 collection agency owned by Vervent; and David Johnson (owner and CEO of Vervent and 16 Activate Financial) and Lawrence Chiavaro (former owner and executive of Vervent) 17 (collectively “Defendants”). (ECF No. 1.) Thereafter, DBTCA was dismissed by 18 Plaintiffs, for reasons discussed below. (ECF No. 51.) Plaintiffs now seek class 19 certification of five claims against Defendants under (1) the Racketeer Influenced and 20 Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”); (2) the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 21 (“FDCPA”); (3) California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (“RFDCPA”); 22 (4) California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”); and (5) common law negligent 23 misrepresentation. (ECF No. 141.) 24 The original complaint included three PEAKS borrowers as proposed class 25 representatives: Jody Aliff, Marie Smith, and Heather Turrey. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants 26 settled with Plaintiffs Aliff and Smith, and both were voluntarily dismissed from the case. 27 (ECF Nos. 89, 90.) The Court granted leave to amend new named plaintiffs. (ECF No. 28 97.) Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) adding Tara Chambers and Philip 1 Fernandez. (ECF No. 84-4.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the FAC on December 2 3, 2021 (ECF No. 100), but then withdrew the motion on January 7, 2022 (ECF No. 104), 3 and instead filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 105.) Defendants settled 4 with Plaintiffs Chambers and Fernandez, and both were voluntarily dismissed. (ECF Nos. 5 113, 114.) This left Heather Turrey as the sole Plaintiff to defend the summary judgment 6 motion. The Court ultimately denied in part and deferred in part Defendants’ motion for 7 summary judgment, (ECF No. 128, “Summary Judgment Order”), and permitted Plaintiff 8 Turrey to file a SAC, in which she added three new Plaintiffs: Jeffrey Sazon, Jordan 9 Hernandez, and Oliver Fiaty. 10 As with the original complaint, Plaintiffs’ SAC alleges Defendants joined and 11 facilitated the fraudulent loan scheme initiated by ITT and DBTCA. (See ECF No. 141.) 12 Plaintiffs allege Defendant Vervent collected approximately $80 million in PEAKS loan 13 payments from borrowers from January 2012, when it took over from loan originator 14 Access Group, Inc. (“Access Group”) until all PEAKS loan balances were cancelled in 15 2020, following investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and 16 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 77-94 (SEC characterizing 17 the PEAKS program as a “fraudulent scheme[;]” CFPB describing ITT as “sacrific[ing] its 18 students’ futures by saddling them with debt on which it knew they would likely default.”).) 19 Defendant Vervent earned approximately $14 million in servicing and collection fees from 20 the PEAKS portfolio during that time. (Id.) PEAKS loans were available only to ITT 21 students, and owing an existing tuition debt to ITT was enough for students to qualify. (Id. 22 at ¶¶ 49-50.) All loan applications were processed electronically on the website of Access 23 Group, the origination agent, and thus could be completed from ITT’s financial aid offices 24 with little to no underwriting. (Id.) ITT students were already likely to be heavily indebted 25 and the loan terms were unfavorable, including high interest rates and daily accrued 26 interest. (Id. at ¶¶ 49-50; 83 (ITT itself projected “likely default rates of more than 60%.”).) 27 By the time all PEAKS loan balances were canceled in 2020, more than 41,000 student 28 loans (or 79% of the PEAKS loans) “had defaulted.” (ECF No. 143-1 at 12, n.11.) 1 ITT falsely represented PEAKS to shareholders and the U.S. Department of 2 Education as a source of non-federal, outside funding for student tuition payments, (ECF 3 No. 141 at ¶ 3), when in fact, ITT controlled who got loans and serviced the loans, and ITT 4 itself was the primary funder of the loan program. (Id.) Through this “subterfuge,” ITT 5 was able to maintain its principal source of revenue—federal financial aid—for several 6 years until it collapsed into bankruptcy. (Id.) ITT was the ultimate guarantor to the PEAKS 7 Trust, which was created by DBTCA and used to purchase the PEAKS loans; PEAKS Trust 8 was the creditor to whom the loans were owed. (Id.) Representing PEAKS as 9 “unaffiliated” private loans helped ITT comply with its 90/10 obligations, the Department 10 of Education’s requirement that at least 10% of an educational institution’s revenue come 11 from outside the Department of Education. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-43.) The PEAKS Trust sold senior 12 notes to institutional investors, who became the Senior Creditors in the Trust with the right 13 to be paid first. (Id. at ¶ 48.) ITT guaranteed the PEAKS Trust that it would maintain a 14 105% “Parity Ratio” between the non-defaulted loans in repayment and the outstanding 15 amount due to the Senior Creditors. (Id. at ¶ 54.) If it could not, ITT would be required to 16 make payments directly to the Senior Creditors. (Id.) Defaulted loans would be removed 17 from the Trust portfolio, thus impacting the Parity Ratio and eventually triggering ITT to 18 make the mandatory guarantor payments. (Id. at ¶ 55.) 19 By October 2012, ITT was required to make its first such guarantor payment. (Id. 20 at ¶¶ 61-66.) ITT also, for the first time, wired nearly $1 million directly to Defendant 21 Vervent to make payments on loans which were nearing default. (Id.) This would forestall 22 these loans from being removed from the Trust portfolio and avoid corresponding changes 23 to the Parity Ratio that would require ITT to make more guarantor payments. (Id.) 24 Payments by ITT on loans nearing default, which were processed by Vervent, continued 25 through January 2014 and totaled approximately $16 million. (Id.

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