IN 'I`HE SUI’ERI()`R COURT OF THE STATE OF I)ELAWARE
ALICIA F. SCA"I`ASTI, AppelIant-Def`endant B@]OW, Case I`D: ]5()3016466
\."_
STATE OF DELAWA_RE,
\_/\_/\_/\-_/\_/\-_/‘-_/\-_/’\-_/
Appellee~f’iailltiffBelc)w.
Date Submitted: january ]2, 2016 Date Decided: March 28, 2016
()PINION. U;)On Appeal_j?”om the Cozzrt Q]”Corrlm.oiz Pleas. AFFIRM`E]).
john S. Malik, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorruey for Appellaxut, Aiicia Scatasti.
Alnanda ,¥. DiLlberto, Esquire, Wihnington, Delaware. Attorn@y for Appellee, the State of Delaware.
BU'I`LER, J`.
FACTS
On l\/larch 25, 2015, Alicia Scatasti ("Appellant") collided with the rear end of a car driven by l\/Is. C0lleen Arnold at the l\/larsh Road entrance rainp to interstate 95 South. Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with I)riving Under the influence of Alcohol ("DUl"), Following Too Closely, and Driving Without Proof of insurance Appellant entered pleas of not guilty to all three charges and the case proceeded to a bench trial in the Court of Coinmon Pleas.] The following facts are gathered from the trial testimony and record.
Aftei' the accident, Ms. Arnold called the police and both drivers pulled their cars to the side of the road to wait for the police to arrive. l\/ls. Arnold testified that Appeilant was "really upset, a little bit rainbling" when they spoke on the side of the road.z
Trooper i\/lcBean of the Delaware State Police arrived on the scene. He observed a Chevrolet Cruz and a Ford }Escort on the side of the road and noticed damage to both vehicles. Trooper McBean first made contact with Appellant, the driver of the I?`ord Escort. When Trooper McBean asked Appellant for her license, registration, and insurance, Appeliant began to cry because she could not find her
insurance card. Troopei' l\/lcBean advised Appellant to reinain in her car while he
l "l`lie Statc entered a nolle pr'r).s'eqzrz` on the Driving Without Proof of insurance charge prior to trial.
2 'l`rial Fl`r. at 9.
gathered l\/ls. Arnoid’s information. About a niinute later, Appellant exited her vehicle notwithstanding Trooper l\/icBean’s instruction, and in doing so, stumbled around the front of the car. Trooper l\/lcBean testified that she appeared dazed and he grabbed onto Appellant to prevent her fronn failing
While speaking with Appellant face~to~face, Trooper l\/lcBean_ observed that Appellant’s eyes were red and glassy and he detected "a strong odor of alcoholic beverage."$ 'ij`roopei‘ l\/lcBeaa also noticed that Appellant’s speech was siurred. As a result, Trooper l\/lcBean conducted National l~iigliway Traffic Safety
Adniinistration ("NHTSA") standardized field sobriety tests.
First, Trooper l\/lcBean administered the H_orizontal Gaze Nystagmus ("l~iGN") test to Appellant, during which Appellant exhibited six "clues" of impairment.“l Trooper l\/lcBean testified that there was a 70% probability that Appellant’s blood alcohol content ("BAC") was .10% or higher based on her
performance on the HGN test.
Next, ’I"roopei' l\/lcBean administered the Walk~aiid-'i`urn test, during which Appellant exhibited four out of eight clues of impairirieiit. Specifically, Appellant
raised her arms from her body more than six inches, stepped off the iine, did not
»‘ra.aizi.
4 'l`roopei‘ i\/lcBean testified that police ofiicers look for a total ofsix "clues" of impairment when atlmiiiisteriiig the l~-IGN test, but only four °‘clues" must be present to indicate a likelihood of impairment Id. 21126.
touch heal-to-toe, and at one point stopped waiking. Trooper l\/lcBean testified that there was a 68% probability that Appellant’s BAC was .]O% or higher based on
her perl"orniaiice on the Walk-and~Turn test.
l*`iiially, Troopei' l\/lcBean performed the One~Leg Stand test, during which "l`roopei' i\/IcBeaii looked for four clues: (l_) counting out loud; (2) swaying of the arrns; (3) putting the foot down; and (4) ceasing to count out ioud. Trooper l\/IcBean testified that Appellant exhibited all four elues, which correlated to a 68%
probability that her BA_C was .10% or liiglier.
Based on Appellant’s performance on the standardized field sobriety tests and her admitting to having consumed one drink at dinner, Trooper l\/IcBean took Appellaiit into custody to administer an lntoxilyzer test. The trial judge ultimately suppressed the results of the Intoxilyzer test as being unreiiable because Trooper i\/lcBean did not follow proper procedure in administering the test.
Appellant also testified at trial. She admitted telling Trooper l\/lcBean that she had a "double shot of tequila, seltzer, three liines, like 1 always order."$ Appeliant further testified that she had one mixed drink after eating dinner and
then waited about 30 ininutes before driving home. She aiso stated that she was
upset and confused as a result of her airbags deploying when the cars collided
5 Id. 21188.
At the conclusion of evidence, the trial judge found Appellant guilty of DUI and Following Too Closely. After "gathering and considering all that[ was] put into the record in the case from the initial accident to everything later on and then the evidence that came as to things that happened before the accident," the trial judge found that the State carried its burden beyond a reasonable doubt.é
On Appeal_, Appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence produced by the State was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident Appellant does not challenge her conviction for Following Too Closely and the Court has not considered it here
STANI)ARD OF REVIEW
"l`ltis Court reviews appeals from the Court of Cominon Pleas in the same manner as the Supreine Court would consider an appeal.? "I`he Court’s function is lin'iited to correcting legal error and determining whether the factual findings made by the trial judge are "sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of
. . . . ( an orderly and logical deductive process."g Errors of law are reviewed de novo.)
" 1a m 141. ? Lcryne v. .S'lc.'fe, 2006 Wl, 3026236, at ""l (Del. Stiper. Sept. 26, 2006). 8 Src:fe v. Airc.)’e:".s'r)ri, 2010 WL 4513029, at *4 (Del. Stiper. Nov. l, 2010).
" israr@ v. oaav.»iii, 2007 \\11_12122142, a r2 (n@i. sup@i-. my 24, 2007).
Fiiidings of fact are reviewed only to verify that they are supported by substantial evidence.m
When the issue on appeal is the sufliciency of evidence to convict, the Court must discern "whetlier, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, any rational trier of fact could liave found the essential eleinents of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."]' The Court does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial
evidence.'z Factual findings will be overturned only where the record below
indicates the trial court’s findings are ‘°clearly wron_g."w
DISCUSSION In order for a defendant to be found guilty of DUI, the State must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was (l) driving a vehicle (2) while
impaired by alcohol.l lt is not necessary to prove that the defendant was
"drunl<."'§ Rather, the State is only required to produce enough evidence to allow
E()
ll (_1`)'1111"€}1 v_ Slcife, Z()l() Wl`_, 5342963, at ’i’l (Del. Dec. 22, 2010) (citing Dixr)rz v. Sn:rfe, 567 A.Zd 854, 857(1)@1. l989)).
'2 Ia'. ” Aii.:i@i~.i-(_m i». .svar@, 21 A.:sd 52, 57(1)@:_ 2001). "* .st»@ ii i)ei.
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IN 'I`HE SUI’ERI()`R COURT OF THE STATE OF I)ELAWARE
ALICIA F. SCA"I`ASTI, AppelIant-Def`endant B@]OW, Case I`D: ]5()3016466
\."_
STATE OF DELAWA_RE,
\_/\_/\_/\-_/\_/\-_/‘-_/\-_/’\-_/
Appellee~f’iailltiffBelc)w.
Date Submitted: january ]2, 2016 Date Decided: March 28, 2016
()PINION. U;)On Appeal_j?”om the Cozzrt Q]”Corrlm.oiz Pleas. AFFIRM`E]).
john S. Malik, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorruey for Appellaxut, Aiicia Scatasti.
Alnanda ,¥. DiLlberto, Esquire, Wihnington, Delaware. Attorn@y for Appellee, the State of Delaware.
BU'I`LER, J`.
FACTS
On l\/larch 25, 2015, Alicia Scatasti ("Appellant") collided with the rear end of a car driven by l\/Is. C0lleen Arnold at the l\/larsh Road entrance rainp to interstate 95 South. Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with I)riving Under the influence of Alcohol ("DUl"), Following Too Closely, and Driving Without Proof of insurance Appellant entered pleas of not guilty to all three charges and the case proceeded to a bench trial in the Court of Coinmon Pleas.] The following facts are gathered from the trial testimony and record.
Aftei' the accident, Ms. Arnold called the police and both drivers pulled their cars to the side of the road to wait for the police to arrive. l\/ls. Arnold testified that Appeilant was "really upset, a little bit rainbling" when they spoke on the side of the road.z
Trooper i\/lcBean of the Delaware State Police arrived on the scene. He observed a Chevrolet Cruz and a Ford }Escort on the side of the road and noticed damage to both vehicles. Trooper McBean first made contact with Appellant, the driver of the I?`ord Escort. When Trooper McBean asked Appellant for her license, registration, and insurance, Appeliant began to cry because she could not find her
insurance card. Troopei' l\/lcBean advised Appellant to reinain in her car while he
l "l`lie Statc entered a nolle pr'r).s'eqzrz` on the Driving Without Proof of insurance charge prior to trial.
2 'l`rial Fl`r. at 9.
gathered l\/ls. Arnoid’s information. About a niinute later, Appellant exited her vehicle notwithstanding Trooper l\/icBean’s instruction, and in doing so, stumbled around the front of the car. Trooper l\/lcBean testified that she appeared dazed and he grabbed onto Appellant to prevent her fronn failing
While speaking with Appellant face~to~face, Trooper l\/lcBean_ observed that Appellant’s eyes were red and glassy and he detected "a strong odor of alcoholic beverage."$ 'ij`roopei‘ l\/lcBeaa also noticed that Appellant’s speech was siurred. As a result, Trooper l\/lcBean conducted National l~iigliway Traffic Safety
Adniinistration ("NHTSA") standardized field sobriety tests.
First, Trooper l\/lcBean administered the H_orizontal Gaze Nystagmus ("l~iGN") test to Appellant, during which Appellant exhibited six "clues" of impairment.“l Trooper l\/lcBean testified that there was a 70% probability that Appellant’s blood alcohol content ("BAC") was .10% or higher based on her
performance on the HGN test.
Next, ’I"roopei' l\/lcBean administered the Walk~aiid-'i`urn test, during which Appellant exhibited four out of eight clues of impairirieiit. Specifically, Appellant
raised her arms from her body more than six inches, stepped off the iine, did not
»‘ra.aizi.
4 'l`roopei‘ i\/lcBean testified that police ofiicers look for a total ofsix "clues" of impairment when atlmiiiisteriiig the l~-IGN test, but only four °‘clues" must be present to indicate a likelihood of impairment Id. 21126.
touch heal-to-toe, and at one point stopped waiking. Trooper l\/lcBean testified that there was a 68% probability that Appellant’s BAC was .]O% or higher based on
her perl"orniaiice on the Walk-and~Turn test.
l*`iiially, Troopei' l\/lcBean performed the One~Leg Stand test, during which "l`roopei' i\/IcBeaii looked for four clues: (l_) counting out loud; (2) swaying of the arrns; (3) putting the foot down; and (4) ceasing to count out ioud. Trooper l\/IcBean testified that Appellant exhibited all four elues, which correlated to a 68%
probability that her BA_C was .10% or liiglier.
Based on Appellant’s performance on the standardized field sobriety tests and her admitting to having consumed one drink at dinner, Trooper l\/IcBean took Appellaiit into custody to administer an lntoxilyzer test. The trial judge ultimately suppressed the results of the Intoxilyzer test as being unreiiable because Trooper i\/lcBean did not follow proper procedure in administering the test.
Appellant also testified at trial. She admitted telling Trooper l\/lcBean that she had a "double shot of tequila, seltzer, three liines, like 1 always order."$ Appeliant further testified that she had one mixed drink after eating dinner and
then waited about 30 ininutes before driving home. She aiso stated that she was
upset and confused as a result of her airbags deploying when the cars collided
5 Id. 21188.
At the conclusion of evidence, the trial judge found Appellant guilty of DUI and Following Too Closely. After "gathering and considering all that[ was] put into the record in the case from the initial accident to everything later on and then the evidence that came as to things that happened before the accident," the trial judge found that the State carried its burden beyond a reasonable doubt.é
On Appeal_, Appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence produced by the State was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident Appellant does not challenge her conviction for Following Too Closely and the Court has not considered it here
STANI)ARD OF REVIEW
"l`ltis Court reviews appeals from the Court of Cominon Pleas in the same manner as the Supreine Court would consider an appeal.? "I`he Court’s function is lin'iited to correcting legal error and determining whether the factual findings made by the trial judge are "sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of
. . . . ( an orderly and logical deductive process."g Errors of law are reviewed de novo.)
" 1a m 141. ? Lcryne v. .S'lc.'fe, 2006 Wl, 3026236, at ""l (Del. Stiper. Sept. 26, 2006). 8 Src:fe v. Airc.)’e:".s'r)ri, 2010 WL 4513029, at *4 (Del. Stiper. Nov. l, 2010).
" israr@ v. oaav.»iii, 2007 \\11_12122142, a r2 (n@i. sup@i-. my 24, 2007).
Fiiidings of fact are reviewed only to verify that they are supported by substantial evidence.m
When the issue on appeal is the sufliciency of evidence to convict, the Court must discern "whetlier, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, any rational trier of fact could liave found the essential eleinents of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."]' The Court does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial
evidence.'z Factual findings will be overturned only where the record below
indicates the trial court’s findings are ‘°clearly wron_g."w
DISCUSSION In order for a defendant to be found guilty of DUI, the State must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was (l) driving a vehicle (2) while
impaired by alcohol.l lt is not necessary to prove that the defendant was
"drunl<."'§ Rather, the State is only required to produce enough evidence to allow
E()
ll (_1`)'1111"€}1 v_ Slcife, Z()l() Wl`_, 5342963, at ’i’l (Del. Dec. 22, 2010) (citing Dixr)rz v. Sn:rfe, 567 A.Zd 854, 857(1)@1. l989)).
'2 Ia'. ” Aii.:i@i~.i-(_m i». .svar@, 21 A.:sd 52, 57(1)@:_ 2001). "* .st»@ ii i)ei. c § 4177(;1);1,@»»:.<,-1». lsi-aia 626 A.za 1350, 1355 (1)@1. 1993).
'~‘1;@»1,=:.»-, 626 /-\.za at 1355.
a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant’s ability to drive safely was impaired by alcohol.l° The Delaware Supreine Court has held that determining whether a person is intoxicated is "within the realm of connmoii l
Here, there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find Appellant guilty of DUI beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and was described as "rarnbling" and "dazed" shortly at`ter. She began crying when asked for her vehicle registration and iiisuraiice in forination, and stumbled when she exited her car (after being instructed to remain inside). Trooper l\/lcBean noticed that Appellant’s speech was slurred, her eyes were glassy, and red, and he smelled an odor of alcohol on Appellant’s breath.
l\/loreover, the trial record contained testimony about Appellant’s performance on
three different field sobriety tests, the results of which suggested that Appellant
'_6 ]d. " church 2010 wi_. 5342<)@3, ai *2. 18 ld-
m .S`lever),s‘ i>. .S'rrrie, l 10 /-\.Sd 1264_. 127} (Del. Super. 2015).
was under the influence of alcohol. Finally, Appellant acknowledged consuming a double shot of tequila and one mixed drink before driving.
As the Court sees it, the question here is not whether a new fact finder inight find otherwise or whether the Court believes the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. Rather, we are constrained to consider only whether there was sufficient evidence from which a rational fact finder 1night draw that conclusion. The absence of an objective, scientific test certainly gave Appellant some leeway to argue otherwise in this case, but we cannot conclude the fact finder was irrational simply because the State did not have its usual objective, and frequently outcome determinative, evidence in this case. The parties both put on their evidence, it was a fair case for both sides, the fact finder found Appellant guilty, and we see nothing in this record to warrant second guessing that conclusion upon appellate review.zo
Accordingly, Appellant’s [)Ul conviction is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_,Ȣ
Jiudge Charles E. Butl
20 See, e.g._, Sleven.s‘ v. Sfc.'le, 129 A.3d 2()6, 210-ll (Del. 2015) (holding that odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath, slurred speech, glassy eyes, and stumbling are "actions and characteristics [that] have long been associated with someone who is under the influence.").