Alicia Andrew v. Richard Adorno

• Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 2024-0269-Appeal.
• Status: Published

Opinion

Supreme Court

No. 2024-269-Appeal. (KD 24-229)

Alicia Andrew :

v. :

Richard Adorno. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Long, for the Court. The plaintiff, Alicia Andrew (Ms. Andrew or

plaintiff), appeals from a final judgment of the Superior Court reversing a District

Court judgment that granted her an order of protection against the defendant,

Richard Adorno (Mr. Adorno or defendant). This case came before the Supreme

Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the

issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the

parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that

cause has not been shown and that we may decide this case without further briefing

or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the

Superior Court and remand for a new hearing.

-1- Facts and Procedural History

On February 16, 2024, Ms. Andrew filed a domestic-abuse complaint in

District Court alleging that Mr. Adorno had “caused [her] to engage involuntarily in

sexual relations by force, threat of force, or duress.” The District Court entered an

ex parte temporary order of protection the same day, which prohibited Mr. Adorno

from contacting Ms. Andrew and ordered him to surrender any firearms he

possessed. After a hearing, the District Court entered judgment for Ms. Andrew and

granted her a final order of protection on March 6, 2024. Pursuant to the final order,

the court prohibited Mr. Adorno from contacting or interacting with Ms. Andrew for

three years and required him to “surrender physical possession of all firearms in [his]

possession, care, custody, or control * * * while this protective order is in effect”

pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 11-47-5 (possession of firearms by certain persons

prohibited). Mr. Adorno timely appealed the final order of protection to the Superior

Court.

The Superior Court held a de novo bench trial on April 26, 2024, at which Mr.

Adorno represented himself. At the outset of the trial, the trial justice stated that he

would apply a standard of clear and convincing evidence in evaluating whether Ms.

-2- Andrew met her burden of proof due to the implications on Mr. Adorno’s rights

under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Before the end of proceedings, Ms. Andrew’s counsel asked the trial justice

to clarify why he intended to apply a clear and convincing evidence standard,

“[because in his] experience with restraining orders it’s always been a

preponderance of the evidence [standard].” The trial justice responded that

“domestic abuse, like the extreme risk [statute], has the exact penalty, giving up

guns, not being able to own a gun and being * * * able to transfer them to a dealer.

Those are different penalties. So that’s why I use clear and convincing for these

restraining orders.” Ms. Andrew’s counsel responded that he had only ever seen a

preponderance standard, even in cases involving firearms, to which the trial justice

replied that the extreme risk statute was relatively new. The trial justice then

reserved his decision and adjourned the proceedings.

On June 11, 2024, the trial justice announced his decision from the bench. He

began by observing that this case could be evaluated under either G.L. 1956 chapter

8.1 of title 8 (Domestic Assault) or G.L. 1956 chapter 37.2 of title 11 (Sexual Assault

Protective Orders), because the protective order was authorized under both

provisions, but he said that he would be evaluating it under the latter since the parties

do not meet the criteria for a substantive dating relationship as required under the

former. He reiterated that because chapter 37.2 of title 11 has the same effect on

-3- firearm rights (i.e., temporary restrictions on firearm possession) as the extreme risk

cases, it is appropriate to use the clear and convincing evidence standard from the

extreme-risk statute to evaluate whether to grant the protective order.

The trial justice called the case “a classic he said, she said” and observed that

there were no witnesses at the time of the alleged sexual assault. He determined that

the case therefore would have to come down to witness credibility and corroborating

evidence. He announced that he found Mr. Adorno’s evidence more credible than

Ms. Andrew’s. He concluded that Ms. Andrew did not prove by clear and

convincing evidence that Mr. Adorno sexually assaulted her. The trial justice

entered judgment for Mr. Adorno, dismissing the complaint and dissolving the

protective order. Ms. Andrew filed a timely appeal to this Court.

Standard of Review

This Court applies a de novo standard when reviewing an appeal based on an

alleged error of law. Warwick Sewer Authority v. Carlone, 45 A.3d 493, 498 (R.I.

2012). De novo review is appropriate in such a case because “this Court is in the

best position to decide the merits of a given question of law.” Lett v. Providence

Journal Company, 798 A.2d 355, 363 (R.I. 2002) (quoting Votolato v. Merandi, 747

A.2d 455, 460 (R.I. 2000)). We also review questions of statutory interpretation de

novo. Beagan v. Rhode Island Department of Labor & Training, 253 A.3d 858, 861

(R.I. 2021). “When this Court engages in statutory construction, our ultimate goal

-4- is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.” Id. at 861-62

(quoting Powers v. Warwick Public Schools, 204 A.3d 1078, 1085 (R.I. 2019)).

Analysis

We consider here whether a preponderance of the evidence, the typical

standard in civil cases, is appropriate in protective-order proceedings, or whether a

higher standard of proof is required when a defendant’s rights under the Second

Amendment to the United States Constitution would be temporarily restricted.

Although the question of how temporary restrictions on a defendant’s Second

Amendment rights should factor into evaluations of civil protective orders has not

been directly addressed by this Court in the past, the answer is clear. We conclude

that the trial justice erred by elevating the standard of proof required in this case.

We vacate the Superior Court judgment and remand for a new hearing applying a

preponderance of the evidence standard.

Mr. Adorno, who continues to represent himself, argued on appeal that this

Court should affirm the dismissal of the District Court judgment against him

because: (1) he and Ms. Andrew have never been in a domestic or romantic

relationship; (2) the incident occurred over a year ago; and (3) they have not had any

interaction since then. He also submitted that “there is no evidence of harassment

or danger that warrants the imposition of a restraining order.” However, the question

of whether this particular protective order should be reinstated is not before this

-5- Court. The sole question that we have been tasked with answering is what the proper

burden of proof is for civil protective orders. Thus, we confine our review to that

question of law.

Although chapter 37.2 of title 11, the statute the trial justice applied, does not

make direct reference to the deprivation of firearms, it is understood to be implicated

in § 11-47-5(b), which restricts firearm rights if a person “is subject to [a civil

protective] order issued pursuant to [G.L. 1956] chapter 15 of title 15, chapter 8.1 of

title 8, or an equivalent order in this state or elsewhere, which order was issued after

the person restrained has received notice of the proceedings and had an opportunity

to be heard.” (Emphasis added.) Unlike chapter 15 of title 15 and chapter 8.1 of title

8, chapter 37.2 of title 11 does not explicitly list surrendering firearms as a form of

relief that can be granted. Contrast § 11-37.2-2, with G.L. 1956 § 15-15-3(a)(4), and

G.L. 1956 § 8-8.1-3(a)(4). However, chapter 37.2 includes language that a

complainant may seek any relief “which will protect him or her from the future

abuse, including, but not limited to, the following * * *.” Section 11-37.2-2(a)

(emphasis added). We conclude that § 11-37.2-2(a) implicates § 11-47-5(b)’s

firearm deprivation provision.

This Court has once considered the question of the proper standard of proof

in protective order proceedings in Thibaudeau v. Thibaudeau, 947 A.2d 243 (R.I.

2008), and tacitly approved of a preponderance of the evidence standard: “[T]he

-6- hearing justice concluded that plaintiff had demonstrated that a restraining order

would be proper; he stated, ‘I find by a fair preponderance of the evidence that

defendant has in fact committed domestic violence upon the Plaintiff.’ We perceive

no clear error in that conclusion.” Thibaudeau, 947 A.2d at 247 (brackets omitted).

However, Thibaudeau preceded the passage of the Protect Rhode Island Families

Act, P.L. 2017, chs. 374, 385 (PRIFA), which gave the District and Family Courts

the power to compel defendants to give up their guns for the duration of protective

orders against them. The PRIFA, however, did nothing to alter the standard to be

applied.

We have found no evidence that the General Assembly intended for courts to

apply an elevated standard in civil protective order proceedings following the

passage of the PRIFA. When engaging in statutory interpretation, this Court takes

notice of where language is included or omitted; we have observed that if the

legislature includes language in one part of a statute but not in another, we must

assume that it acted deliberately. See In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham

Project, 25 A.3d 482, 525 (R.I. 2011) (“Where the Legislature includes particular

language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same act, it

is generally presumed that the Legislature acts intentionally and purposely in the

disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (brackets omitted) (quoting Kucana v. Holder, 558

U.S. 233, 249 (2010))). Indeed, “[t]his Court * * * is not ‘entitled to write into the

-7- statute certain provisions of policy which the legislature might have provided but

has seen fit to omit. If a change in that respect is desirable, it is for the legislature

and not for the [C]ourt.’” Simeone v. Charron, 762 A.2d 442, 448 (R.I. 2000)

(deletions omitted) (quoting Elder v. Elder, 84 R.I. 13, 22, 120 A.2d 815, 820

(1956)). Here, there is no evidence that the legislature wanted courts to apply a

higher standard of proof for civil protective orders. There are other places in the

PRIFA where the General Assembly did specify a higher burden of proof, including

what a person whose firearm rights have been taken away must demonstrate in order

to have those rights restored. See § 15-15-3(j) (“At the hearing, the person restrained

under this section shall have the burden of showing, by clear and convincing

evidence, that, if his or her firearm rights were restored, he or she would not pose a

danger to the person suffering from domestic abuse or to any other person.”);

§ 8-8.1-3(j) (same). We are satisfied that the statutory language, particularly when

combined with this Court’s statement in Thibaudeau, compels the conclusion that

the legislature did not intend to require a higher standard of proof.

Either through explicit statutory language or judicial interpretation, other

states uniformly apply a preponderance standard when evaluating whether to grant

a protective order in domestic violence and abuse cases. 1 See Cruz-Foster v. Foster,

1 Before Maryland amended its statute in 2014 to lower the standard to a preponderance, it was the only state that explicitly required a showing of domestic violence by clear and convincing evidence in order to obtain a protective order. See -8- 597 A.2d 927, 930 & n.3 (D.C. 1991); Steckler v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 76, 80 (N.D.

1992); Frizado v. Frizado, 651 N.E.2d 1206, 1210 (Mass. 1995), overruled on other

grounds by Zullo v. Goguen, 672 N.E.2d 502, 503-04 (Mass. 1996); Felton v. Felton,

679 N.E.2d 672, 678 (Ohio 1997). While it is true that courts apply a clear and

convincing evidence standard in civil cases to protect important rights such as those

involving “a significant deprivation of liberty” or “stigma,” Santosky v. Kramer, 455

U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 426 (1979)),

such an application is not automatic. See People v. Jason K., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443,

452 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he fact that a proceeding may result in a loss of an

important constitutional right does not necessarily mean that the preponderance of

the evidence standard violates due process.”). A key consideration in these cases,

and in protective order cases across the country implicating a deprivation of firearm

rights, is the duration of the restrictions. In Rhode Island, as elsewhere, the

deprivation is temporary, lasting only as long as the protective order stays in place,

which here is a maximum of three years. See § 11-37.2-2(d). Moreover, individuals

whose rights are restricted by the issuance of a protective order have the opportunity

to be heard by a court on the issue of whether their rights should be reinstated while

Press Release: Lt. Governor Brown Highlights New Domestic Violence Laws Taking Effect October 1st, State of Maryland (Oct. 1, 2014), https://regulations.maryland.gov/press-releases/new-domestic-violence-laws- october-1/. -9- the protective order is still active. See § 8-8.1-3(c) (“[A]ny person who has

surrendered their firearms [pursuant to § 11-47-5] shall be afforded a hearing within

fifteen (15) days of surrendering their firearms.”). Thus, these temporary restrictions

can be challenged and reversed, affording defendants an opportunity to regain their

firearm rights before the protective order expires.

The two state appellate courts that have directly addressed the Second

Amendment implications on the proper standard of proof in protective order

proceedings have also concluded that a preponderance standard is appropriate. See

Turner v. Turner, 317 P.3d 716, 720, 722 (Idaho 2023); Roper v. Jolliffe, 493 S.W.3d

624, 638 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015). In both cases, the courts found the temporary nature

of the restriction and the absence of statutory language to the contrary compelling,

while emphasizing the potentially grave consequences to the safety of the individual

seeking the protective order if one is not granted. Turner, 317 P.3d at 720, 722;

Roper, 493 S.W.3d at 638 n.16.

In the absence of an indication by the General Assembly that the temporary

loss of the right to possess firearms amounts to a significant deprivation of liberty

requiring a higher standard, we are confident that a preponderance is the proper

standard to apply when considering whether to grant a domestic assault or sexual

assault protective order to an individual seeking a reprieve from danger.

- 10 - Conclusion

Because we hold that the Superior Court erred in applying a clear and

convincing standard to determine whether Ms. Andrew had been assaulted by Mr.

Adorno, she is entitled to a new hearing in the Superior Court using the

preponderance of the evidence standard. We therefore vacate the Superior Court’s

reversal of the District Court judgment and order of protection and remand the case

to the Superior Court for further proceedings.

- 11 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Alicia Andrew v. Richard Adorno.

No. 2024-269-Appeal. Case Number (KD 24-229)

Date Opinion Filed January 15, 2026

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long

Source of Appeal Kent County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Kevin F. McHugh

For the Plaintiff:

Alan E. Schoenfeld, Esq., Pro Hac Vice Attorney(s) on Appeal Frank A. Ribezzo, Esq. For the Defendant:

Richard Adorno, pro se