Alice Villegas, and Margaret Villegas Individually and as Next Friend of Kiva Hewson, a Minor v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

10 S.W.3d 380, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 9279, 1999 WL 1204797
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 16, 1999
Docket03-99-00146-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 10 S.W.3d 380 (Alice Villegas, and Margaret Villegas Individually and as Next Friend of Kiva Hewson, a Minor v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alice Villegas, and Margaret Villegas Individually and as Next Friend of Kiva Hewson, a Minor v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 10 S.W.3d 380, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 9279, 1999 WL 1204797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

JAN P. PATTERSON, Justice.

Appellants Alice and Margaret Villegas, individually and as next friend of Kiva Hewson, a minor, sued appellee Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) for breach of contract. The jury found in favor of appellants and awarded substantial monetary damages, but the trial judge set aside the jury’s verdict and rendered judgment that appellants take nothing. 1 We affirm the judgment n.o.v.

BACKGROUND

In 1997, Keith Villegas and his wife Melissa purchased a personal automobile insurance policy from Nationwide to insure their two vehicles, a 1994 Mazda Protégé and a 1993 Ford Ranger truck. The policy took effect on June 13, 1997, and expired on December 13, 1997. The policy provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage whenever a “covered person” sustained bodily injuries in an accident. “Covered person” included the named insureds, Keith and Melissa; persons living in the same household as Keith and Melissa and related to them by blood, marriage, or adoption; and persons occupying the “covered auto.” The policy defined “covered auto” as the Protégé and the Ranger, as well as “[a]ny auto ... you do not own while used ás a temporary substitute for any other vehicle described in this definition which is out of its normal use because of its: (a) breakdown; (b) repair; (c) servicing; (d) loss; or (e) destruction.”

Beginning in May 1997, Keith and Melissa began experiencing engine and brake problems with the Protégé. They did not repair the vehicle; instead, they limited their use of the Protégé to shorts trips near their home in Round Rock and a twenty-mile round trip to and from work approximately once a week.

On July 12, 1997, Keith and Melissa drove their Ford Ranger from Round Rock to Alice Villegas’s home in Austin. Alice is Keith, Sharon, and Margaret Ville-gas’s mother. Margaret and her daughter, Kiva Hewson, were living with Alice at the time. The family planned to travel to New Braunfels for a birthday party. Upon arriving at Alice’s home, Keith learned that Alice’s Oldsmobile Cutlass was inoperable. Alice instructed Keith and his sister Sharon to rent a car to replace the Cutlass. Keith and Sharon went to a nearby Enterprise Rent A Car and rented a Nissan Maxima for three days. Sharon paid with a credit card bearing the name of Alice’s business, A & *382 P Bookkeeping, and listed Keith as an additional driver. Keith drove Melissa, Alice, Margaret, and Kiva to New Braunfels in the rented Maxima.

On the return trip to Austin, Keith collided with a car driven by Nita Crober. It is undisputed that Crober’s negligence caused the accident. Alice, Margaret, and Kiva were rear-seat passengers at the time of the collision and were seriously injured. 2 Crober’s automobile insurance policy was insufficient to fully compensate them for their injuries; thus, appellants sought un-derinsured motorist coverage 3 under Keith and Melissa’s Nationwide policy as persons occupying a “covered auto.” 4 Nationwide refused coverage and appellants sued for breach of contract.

At trial, the jury was asked whether, at the time of the collision, Keith and Melissa’s Mazda Protégé was out of its normal use because of breakdown, repair, servicing, loss, or destruction. The jury answered affirmatively. The jury was then asked whether at the time of the collision, the rental car was being used as a temporary substitute for the Protégé. The jury again answered affirmatively and awarded Alice, Margaret, and Kiva $365,167.40, $511,810.81, and $15,844.00, respectively. Nationwide filed a motion to disregard jury findings and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that there was no evidence to support the jury’s findings that at the time of the accident (1) the Protégé was out of its normal use and (2) the rental car was used as a temporary substitute for the Protégé. The trial court granted the motion and rendered a judgment n.o.v. in favor of Nationwide.

DISCUSSION

A trial court may disregard a jury’s findings and grant a motion for judgment n.o.v. only when there is no evidence to support one or more of the findings on issues necessary to liability. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 301; Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex.1990); Oram v. State Farm Lloyds, 977 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex.App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). In reviewing a “no evidence” question, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury finding, indulging every reasonable inference in favor of the finding. See Associated Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 276, 285-86 (Tex.1998); Transportation Ins. Co. v. Monel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 25 (Tex.1994). If there is more than a scintilla of competent evidence to support the jury finding, the judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be reversed. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.1995). The evidence supporting the finding amounts to more than a scintilla if it supplies a reasonable basis for reasonable minds to reach differing conclusions as to the existence of the crucial fact. See id.; Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 25; Orozco v. Sander, 824 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex.1992).

The parties agree that pursuant to the uninsured/underinsured motorist provision of Keith and Melissa Villegas’s personal auto insurance policy, the Maxima rental car can be considered a “covered auto” *383 only if it was used as a temporary substitute for a “covered auto” that was out of normal use because of breakdown, repair, servicing, loss, or destruction. Trial testimony showed that the Villegas family planned to meet at Alice’s home on July 12, 1997, and travel to New Braunfels in her Oldsmobile Cutlass; however, the day before the trip Alice’s car broke down. Keith testified that he and Melissa drove to Alice’s home in his Ford Ranger truck, and that he never expected to drive the family to the birthday party in his Protégé. Keith also testified that he did not realize a car needed to be rented until he arrived at Alice’s home. Moreover, Keith testified that he did not sign the Enterprise rental agreement nor did he intend to drive the rented Maxima after the trip to New Braunfels. Finally, Keith testified that Alice planned on using the Maxima for the full three-day rental period because her Oldsmobile was inoperable.

The testimony of other Villegas family members bolsters the conclusion that the Maxima was rented to replace Alice’s inoperable Oldsmobile, not Keith’s unreliable Protégé. Sharon testified that when she arrived at Alice’s house on the morning of July 12, Alice told her to rent a car to replace the Oldsmobile.

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10 S.W.3d 380, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 9279, 1999 WL 1204797, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alice-villegas-and-margaret-villegas-individually-and-as-next-friend-of-texapp-1999.