Alice T. Kiernan v. Agency Rent a Car, Inc.

940 F.2d 917, 1991 WL 101813
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJune 14, 1991
Docket90-2370
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 940 F.2d 917 (Alice T. Kiernan v. Agency Rent a Car, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alice T. Kiernan v. Agency Rent a Car, Inc., 940 F.2d 917, 1991 WL 101813 (4th Cir. 1991).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Alice Kiernan brought this diversity action against Agency Rent-A-Car seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to recover from Agency as a duly certified self-insurer for injuries she suffered when *918 the rental car in which she was a passenger collided with another car. The district court held that under Virginia insurance law, the law applicable to this case, Kier-nan could recover no more than $25,000, and that consequently she failed to allege an amount in controversy exceeding $50,-000, as required by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West Supp.1990). Accordingly, the district court dismissed the action for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Finding no error, we affirm.

I

Kiernan was a passenger in a rental car driven by Jennifer Maillet, who had leased the car from Agency. It is not disputed that the accident in which she suffered injuries was due to the negligence of the driver of the other car and that this driver was underinsured. Kiernan filed this declaratory judgment action against Agency after having obtained a $300,000 consent judgment in Maryland state court against the driver of the other car, Velma Adams. Adams’ carrier paid the full extent of her liability coverage, $38,500; the uninsured coverage carried by Maillet, the driver of the rental car, paid Kiernan another $10,-000. That left Kiernan with a $251,500 balance that she sought in this action to collect from Agency as a self-insurer under relevant provisions of Virginia insurance law.

Under that law, entities such as Agency, which rent for hire (without driver) more than twenty cars, are required to rent only “insured motor vehicles.” Va.Code Ann. § 46.1-14(d) (Michie 1980 Repl.Vol.). 1 “Insured motor vehicle” is defined as one subject to an insurance policy, or, as is relevant here, one in which the owner has been certified as a self-insurer. Id. § 46.1-167.2. It is agreed that Agency is a certified self-insurer, pursuant to § 46.1-395. That section provides:

Certificate of self-insurance exempts from chapter.—

(b) The Commissioner [of Department of Transportation] may, in his discretion and upon the application of such a person [who operates more than twenty vehicles], issue a certificate of self-insurance when he is reasonably satisfied that (1) such person is possessed and will continue to be possessed of financial ability to respond to a judgment as hereinbefore described, obtained against such person, arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or operation of any such person’s motor vehicles and (2) that such certificate provides for protection against the uninsured motorist to the extent required by § 38.1-381 of this Code_

Id. § 46.1-395.

It is undisputed that the rental agreement here in issue provided liability coverage in the minimum amount allowed by Virginia law, $25,000 per person and $50,-000 per occurrence. Id. § 46.1-1(8) (Michie 1985 Cum.Supp.).

Agency moved under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It contended that as a matter of law the jurisdictional amount of $50,000 was not recoverable because under Virginia law Agency had no liability to Kiernan as a self-insurer, or, alternatively, that if it had any liability it was limited by terms of the rental agreement to $25,000.

The district court granted the motion on the basis that, as Agency contended, if it had any liability for underinsurance protection, it was limited under the rental agreement’s terms to $25,000.

This appeal followed.

II

A

At the outset, we reject two of Agency’s arguments that it had no liability to Kier-nan under relevant provisions of Virginia insurance law.

The first is that the basic self-insurance provision, § 46.1-395, simply defines *919 obligations of the Commissioner of the Department of Transportation to issue certificates of self insurance under certain conditions, and does not purport directly to impose self-insurance liability on any entity such as Agency. This is a specious argument. Though the statute may be awkwardly phrased, its unmistakable intent is to make of any entity to whom a certificate is issued a self-insurer in accordance with other provisions relevant to that status.

The second is that if this provision imposes any obligation on self-insureds, the obligation runs only to providing uninsured, not underinsured, motorist coverage. This is at odds with controlling Virginia law, which in line with the general trend, treats the two as one. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scott, 234 Va. 573, 363 S.E.2d 703, 704-05 (1988) (“uninsured motorist” includes “underinsured” as well).

Neither of these arguments against any coverage succeeds.

B

We turn then to Kiernan’s contentions that Agency’s potential liability under relevant Virginia insurance law is in an amount exceeding $50,000, so that subject matter jurisdiction exists.

Two statutory sections are invoked.

Section 46.1-167 provides that each certified selfinsurer must be “possessed and will continue to be possessed of financial ability to respond to a judgment, as hereinbefore described, obtained against such person....” Kiernan tries to stretch the definition of judgment — “any judgment ... arising out of a motor vehicle accident,” id. — to reach the present case. This effort fails, however, because the expansive language in this definition is fenced in by § 46.1-395(b)(l), which only calls for financial accountability for “any judgment [as defined above] obtained against [a certified self-insurer].” Here it is undisputed that Kiernan has no judgment against Agency. She does have an unsatisfied judgment arising out of an auto accident involving an Agency car, but no judgment was entered against Agency, since they either were dropped by summary judgment or were never named in the Maryland suit. Thus, lacking a judgment “against Agency,” Kiernan cannot avail herself of the provisions of § 46.1-395(b)(l).

The second provision on which plaintiff relies for coverage is § 46.1-395(b)(2). That provision does not include a requirement of a judgment but stipulates that each certificate of self-insurance must “provide[ ] for protection against the uninsured motorist to the extent required by § 38.1-381 of this Code_” Id. (emphasis supplied). Kier-nan contends that this provision imposes on Agency a self-insurer obligation to provide coverage against uninsured/underinsured motorists to the maximum extent required by law — and the maximum extent, Kiernan asserts, is without limit.

We disagree. The relevant provisions indicate that the self-insurer’s obligation can be limited, and that in this case the limit is $25,000. 2

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Nelson v. Artley
2014 IL App (1st) 121681 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 2014)
Trigo v. Travelers Commercial Insurance
755 F. Supp. 2d 749 (W.D. Virginia, 2010)
Lloyd v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance
727 F. Supp. 2d 452 (E.D. Virginia, 2010)
Fellhauer v. Alhorn
838 N.E.2d 133 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 2005)
Huff v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., Midwest
718 N.E.2d 235 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1999)
Palmer v. Fairfax County
36 Va. Cir. 101 (Fairfax County Circuit Court, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
940 F.2d 917, 1991 WL 101813, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alice-t-kiernan-v-agency-rent-a-car-inc-ca4-1991.