Alice Bossart & Raymond Berry v. County of King

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: November 14, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00975
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 ALICE BOSSART & RAYMOND CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00975-JNW 8 BERRY, in pro per, ORDER 9 Plaintiffs, 10 v. 11 COUNTY OF KING, a subdivision of the state of Washington, 12 Defendant. 13

14 1. INTRODUCTION 15 Plaintiffs seek sanctions against King County under Federal Rule of Civil 16 Procedure 11 and the Court’s inherent authority. They also ask the Court to 17 disqualify the County’s attorneys. The Court denies both requests. Plaintiffs have 18 not complied with Rule 11’s procedural requirements, and the County’s 19 arguments—despite some mistakes—were grounded in law and fact. The Court 20 finds no bad-faith conduct warranting sanctions under its inherent authority, and 21 Plaintiffs identify no basis for disqualification. This is all the more true given that 22 23 1 the case has already been closed. The Court DENIES the motion for the reasons 2 below. Dkt. No. 28.

3 2. DISCUSSION 4 2.1 Rule 11 sanctions are not warranted. Plaintiffs request sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the 5 Court’s inherent power.1 Under Rule 11 an attorney or unrepresented party must 6 ensure that their legal contentions are “warranted by existing law or by a 7 nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 8 establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). Similarly, their factual contentions 9 “must have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have 10 evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 11 discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3). The rule further prohibits attorneys and 12 unrepresented parties from presenting any filing for “any improper purpose, such as 13 to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). 15 Rule 11 places strict notice and filing requirements on parties seeking 16 sanctions. Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2005). “When Rule 11 17 sanctions are initiated by motion of a party, that motion must be separate ‘from 18 other motions or requests’ and must ‘describe the specific conduct alleged to violate’ 19 20

21 1 Plaintiffs also seem to argue that the County’s attorneys owe them additional duties in this litigation under a public trust theory. But they cite no precedent to 22 support their position that attorneys representing government entities owe duties to adversaries in litigation apart from those imposed by the Rules of Professional 23 Conduct. Accordingly, the argument is unpersuasive, and the Court rejects it. 1 Rule 11(b).” Id. at 677–78 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A)). “In addition, the 2 Rule’s safe harbor provision requires parties filing such motions to give the

3 opposing party 21 days first to ‘withdraw or otherwise correct’ the offending paper. 4 Id. at 678. 5 Here, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs abided by Rule 11’s safe harbor 6 provision. That is reason enough to deny the motion for sanctions. Sanctions are 7 also inappropriate because King County’s arguments were grounded in fact and 8 law. Indeed, the Court ruled in the County’s favor and dismissed Plaintiffs’ case.

9 Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions primarily asserts that the County relied on 10 inapposite cases and stated the governing law incorrectly—in effect, Plaintiffs use 11 their motion for sanctions as another opportunity to oppose the County’s motion to 12 dismiss. The fact that Plaintiffs disagree with the County’s arguments and the 13 Court’s order dismissing their case is not a basis for sanctions. 14 Notably, the County acknowledges that it made a mistake in its briefing 15 when it described Plaintiffs’ prior case as having been resolved on the merits. See

16 Dkt. No. 31 at 9. But the County is correct—that mistake did not influence the 17 resolution of this matter. Similarly, that the County failed to acknowledge one 18 alleged basis for jurisdiction is not a reason to sanction them under Rule 11 here. 19 Indeed, despite this flaw in the County’s motion—which the Court acknowledged— 20 the motion was successful. 21 Plaintiffs also assert that the County improperly labeled them as sovereign

22 citizens. Regardless of whether Plaintiffs are sovereign citizens, the arguments they 23 advanced were those typically advanced by sovereign citizens. This fact was 1 relevant to the County’s arguments, which cited precedent on sovereign citizen legal 2 theories. Thus, the Court finds that the County did not refer to Plaintiffs as

3 sovereign citizens for an improper purpose, but rather to make a legal argument. 4 Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the County’s attorneys violated several rules of 5 professional conduct and should be sanctioned on that basis. On review, however, 6 the Court finds that the County’s attorneys did not violate any of the cited rules. 7 Accordingly, Rule 11 sanctions are not warranted. 8 2.2 There is no basis to sanction King County under the Court’s inherent authority. 9 District courts have the inherent power “to manage their own affairs so as to 10 achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Ready Transp., Inc. v. 11 AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir.2010). A district court may sanction a 12 party under its inherent authority if it “specifically finds bad faith or conduct 13 tantamount to bad faith.” Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir.2001). 14 “Sanctions are available for a variety of types of willful actions, including 15 recklessness when combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, 16 harassment, or an improper purpose.” Id. 17 While the County may have made a couple of mistakes in its briefing, 18 certainly none rise to the level of bad-faith conduct. Nor do the County’s 19 representations constitute “fraud on the Court,” as Plaintiffs argue. Dkt. No. 28 at 20 5. For the reasons discussed above, neither King County nor its attorneys engaged 21 in bad-faith conduct or conduct tantamount to bad faith. Thus, the Court denies 22 Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions under the Court’s inherent authority. 23 1 2.38. Disqualification is inappropriate. 9 Motions to disqualify are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Optyl Eyewear

3 Fashion Int'l Corp. v. Style Cos., Ltd., 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985). Courts

4 generally look to the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct to decide whether

5 disqualification is appropriate. Sierra v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 630 F. Supp. 3d

G 1199, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2022). Typically, attorneys are disqualified due to conflicts of

7 interest, or when they are necessary witnesses in the underlying case. See, e.g., id.;

8 Optyl Eyewear Fashion Intl Corp., 760 F.2d at 1048; Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of

9 Klickitat Cnty. v. Intl Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 1020, 1033 (Wash. 1994). Plaintiffs present

19 reason to disqualify the County’s attorneys here. Thus, the motion is denied.

1 3. CONCLUSION

12 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions is DENIED. Dkt. No. 28.

13 14 Dated this 14th day of November, 2025.

15 16 amal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23