Ali Warisuzzaman v. City of Phoenix, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 10, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-01115
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Ali Warisuzzaman, No. CV-26-01115-PHX-MTL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 City of Phoenix, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff Ali Warisuzzaman brings this suit against the City of Phoenix, Phoenix 16 Police Department, Officer E. Gustafon, American Airlines, and Captain Doe. (Doc. 1 17 at 2-4.) He alleges that his constitutional rights were violated while traveling from 18 Philadelphia to Phoenix on an American Airlines flight. (Id. at 2, 6.) Pending before the 19 Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455. (Doc. 47.) The Court will 20 deny the Motion. 21 I. 22 “[A] judge has as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse.” 23 Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005) 24 (citation modified). “Since a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, the party seeking 25 disqualification bears a substantial burden to show that the judge is biased.” Torres v. 26 Chrysler Fin. Co., No. C-07-00915-JW, 2007 WL 3165665, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 27 2007); see also Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 924 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We presume that 28 Judge Newhouse was impartial because he was a judicial officer.”). 1 A motion for judicial recusal under § 455 “is directed to the judge, rather than the 2 parties, and is self-enforcing on the part of the judge.” United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 3 867-68 (9th Cir. 1980). Section 455(a) requires that a “judge of the United States shall 4 disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 5 questioned.” It is well established in this Circuit that the test for recusal of a judicial officer 6 is whether “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the 7 judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Carey, 929 F.3d 8 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 9 1993)). A reasonable person “in this context means a well-informed, thoughtful observer, 10 as opposed to a hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.” United States v. Holland, 519 11 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1178). “Disqualification under 12 § 455(a) is necessarily fact-driven and may turn on subtleties in the particular case.” Carey, 13 929 F.3d at 1104 (quoting Holland, 519 F.3d at 913). 14 Section 455(b)(1) separately requires recusal where a judge has a “personal bias or 15 prejudice.” But “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or 16 partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Absent evidence of 17 an extrajudicial source, recusal is warranted only where judicial conduct displays 18 “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. 19 II. 20 Plaintiff argues that recusal is warranted based on a purported pattern of “procedural 21 irregularities,” “selective enforcement of Local Rules,” and rulings allegedly favoring 22 Defendants. (Doc. 47 at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff challenges: (1) the timing of the Court’s 23 rulings; (2) the Court’s management of default procedures; (3) the Court’s handling of 24 discovery and extensions; and (4) the enforcement of Local Rules. 25 These arguments do not support recusal. Plaintiff identifies no facts suggesting the 26 Court has any personal or financial interest in this case, nor any extrajudicial source of 27 bias. See Johnson v. Barr, 79 F.4th 996, 1007 (9th Cir. 2023). Instead, the Motion rests 28 entirely on disagreement with the Court’s rulings and case management decisions. l The Court’s rulings on administrative motions, scheduling, extensions, and procedural matters are part of its inherent authority to manage the orderly progress of 3|| litigation. See United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 508-09 (9th Cir. 2008). District 4|| courts have broad discretion in these areas, including ruling on motions, managing || discovery, and granting or denying extensions of time. See F.T.C. v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 6|| 957 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing that district courts have broad discretion in controlling their 7|| dockets); Barone v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 2:21-CV-4200-SSS-PD, 2023 8 || WL 8042740, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2023) (“[T]he district court has broad discretion to || control its docket, including ruling on requests for extensions of time.”). 10 Nor does Plaintiff's invocation of Liteky alter the analysis. (See Doc. 47 at 5-6.) The 11 || conduct Plaintiff identifies consists entirely of rulings and case management decisions made during this proceeding. Under Liteky, such actions “do not constitute a basis for a 13 || bias or partiality motion” unless they reveal a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.” 510 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff's Motion, however, merely reflects dissatisfaction with the Court’s 15} decisions. But “[a] judge’s prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause for recusal.” Sib/a, 16|| 624 F.2d at 868. Because Plaintiff has not shown that a reasonable, well-informed observer 17 || would question the Court’s impartiality, recusal is not warranted under § 455(a). Nor has 18 || Plaintiff demonstrated personal bias under § 455(b)(1). 19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse (Doc. 47) is DENIED. 21 Dated this 10th day of April, 2026. 22 Wichal T. Hburde Michael T. Liburdi 25 United States District Judge 26 27 28

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