IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS CENTRAL DIVISION ALI ALI-BEY PLAINTIFF v. CASE NO. 4:24-CV-00180-BSM STALEY ELECTRIC DEFENDANT ORDER Staley Electric Services, LLC’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 90] is granted and Ali-Bey’s motion for leave to respond [Doc. No. 106] is granted. I. BACKGROUND Ali Ali-Bey was hired as a probationary employee by Staley Electric as a warehouse
associate on June 13, 2023. Resp. Def.’s Statement Undisputed Material Facts (SUMF) ¶ 2, Doc. No. 100. Staley has a ninety day probationary period for all new employees. Id. ¶ 3. Lynn Denton-Jones, who is responsible for reviewing employee performance, met with Ali- Bey at the end of his probationary period, on September 19, 2023, to discuss his
performance. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. Although Ali-Bey disputes the accuracy of the performance review, Denton-Jones noted that Ali-Bey performed well at the start of his employment but his performance began to decline in August. Id. ¶ 7; Mot. Summ. J. (MSJ), Doc. No. 90, Ex. 1, Decl. Lynn Denton-Jones ¶¶ 7–8. Denton-Jones, therefore, extended Ali-Bey’s probationary period for thirty days. Decl. Denton ¶ 12; see also SUMF, Decl. Ali Ali-Bey
¶ 6. Later that evening, Ali-Bey sent an email to Denton-Jones and Brent Staley complaining that he witnessed several discriminatory comments from various managers and coworkers. SUMF ¶ 13; See MSJ, Ex. B. Although Ali-Bey believes that his supervisors, Shawn Ratliff and Kyle Lewis, saw a draft of the email on his computer before he met with Denton-Jones, MSJ, Ex. 2, Dep. Ali Ali-Bey 94:2–5, Ratliff and Denton-Jones deny this
assertion. Denton Decl. ¶ 41, MSJ, Ex. 4. Decl. Shawn Ratliff ¶ 8. It is, however, undisputed that Denton-Jones and Staley investigated Ali-Bay’s allegations but found no evidence of discriminatory animus or intentional harassment. SUMF ¶ 19, Decl. Denton ¶ 20. Staley Electric terminated Ali-Bey, following the thirty day extension of his probationary period, for failing to improve his performance. SUMF ¶¶ 24 & 27; Decl. Denton ¶ 24.
Ali-Bey is suing Staley Electric for retaliation and Staley is moving for summary judgment. II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). Once the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleadings. Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 2011). Instead, the non-moving party must produce admissible evidence demonstrating a genuine factual dispute requiring a trial. Id. All reasonable inferences must
be drawn in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Holland v. Sam’s Club, 487 2 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007). The evidence is not weighed, and no credibility determinations are made. Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2008). III. DISCUSSION Summary judgment is granted on Ali-Bey’s retaliation claim because he has failed to establish a prima facie case.
Although Ali-Bey does not specifically state whether he is suing under Title VII or 42 U.S.C. section 1981, the statutes have the same legal standard. Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1059 (8th Cir. 1997) (Title VII and section 1981 retaliation elements are identical). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Ali-Bey must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and
(3) there was a causal connection between elements one and two. Id. As to the first element, Ali-Bey engaged in protected activity when he sent Denton- Jones and Staley the email on the evening of September 19, 2023, complaining about discriminatory comments made by managers and coworkers. See Gagnon v. Sprint Corp., 284 F.3d 839, 854 n.4 (8th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by, Desert Palace v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (internal or informal complaints to superiors are protected under Title VII); SUMF ¶ 48. As to the second element, Ali-Bey suffered an adverse employment action when he was terminated. Although Ali-Bey argues that he also suffered an adverse employment action when his probationary period was extended, Br. Opp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 2 (Ali-
Bey Br.), Doc. No. 104, having his probationary period extended is akin to placement on a 3 performance improvement plan, which is not an adverse employment action. Fiero v. CSG Sys., Inc., 759 F.3d 874 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2014). For this reason, Ali-Bey’s termination is the only viable adverse action. As to the third element, to establish a causal connection between his email and his termination, Ali-Bey must show that Staley Electric would not have fired him if he had not
sent the email. See Wright v. St. Vincent Health Sys., 730 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2013). It is not enough for Ali-Bey to prove that his email was a substantial or motivating factor in his termination; rather, he must show that it was the determining factor. See Carrington v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 481 F.3d 1046, 1053 (8th Cir. 2007). Ali-Bey argues that the temporal proximity between his email and termination create a genuine factual dispute for the jury to
decide. Ali-Bey Br. at 2. Ali-Bey also argues that recorded conversations and documented performance criticism support a casual connection. Id. at 3. Although temporal proximity alone is typically not enough to establish causation, it may be an indicator of causation. Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999). Moreover, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ali-Bey, I would probably
lean in favor of finding that he has made out a prima facie case of retaliation if he provided evidence, other than his speculation, that his supervisors read his draft email before he met with Denton-Jones for his performance review. If Staley Electric was aware of Ali-Bey’s complaints before it extended his probation and fired him, he could make a plausible argument that his email set his termination in motion. But, his deposition testimony
regarding his supervisors reading his draft email before the meeting with Denton-Jones is 4 based on speculation. MSJ, Ex. 2 Ali-Bey Dep. 94:2–95:25, 97, 117:20–118:24. And the record clearly shows that Staley Electric received Ali-Bey’s email after his meeting with Denton-Jones. SUMF ¶ 13. Finally, although Ali-Bey has submitted recorded conversations that he claims support his arguments, those recordings do not show that he was terminated for engaging in protected activity. See Recordings, Doc. No. 109.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS CENTRAL DIVISION ALI ALI-BEY PLAINTIFF v. CASE NO. 4:24-CV-00180-BSM STALEY ELECTRIC DEFENDANT ORDER Staley Electric Services, LLC’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 90] is granted and Ali-Bey’s motion for leave to respond [Doc. No. 106] is granted. I. BACKGROUND Ali Ali-Bey was hired as a probationary employee by Staley Electric as a warehouse
associate on June 13, 2023. Resp. Def.’s Statement Undisputed Material Facts (SUMF) ¶ 2, Doc. No. 100. Staley has a ninety day probationary period for all new employees. Id. ¶ 3. Lynn Denton-Jones, who is responsible for reviewing employee performance, met with Ali- Bey at the end of his probationary period, on September 19, 2023, to discuss his
performance. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. Although Ali-Bey disputes the accuracy of the performance review, Denton-Jones noted that Ali-Bey performed well at the start of his employment but his performance began to decline in August. Id. ¶ 7; Mot. Summ. J. (MSJ), Doc. No. 90, Ex. 1, Decl. Lynn Denton-Jones ¶¶ 7–8. Denton-Jones, therefore, extended Ali-Bey’s probationary period for thirty days. Decl. Denton ¶ 12; see also SUMF, Decl. Ali Ali-Bey
¶ 6. Later that evening, Ali-Bey sent an email to Denton-Jones and Brent Staley complaining that he witnessed several discriminatory comments from various managers and coworkers. SUMF ¶ 13; See MSJ, Ex. B. Although Ali-Bey believes that his supervisors, Shawn Ratliff and Kyle Lewis, saw a draft of the email on his computer before he met with Denton-Jones, MSJ, Ex. 2, Dep. Ali Ali-Bey 94:2–5, Ratliff and Denton-Jones deny this
assertion. Denton Decl. ¶ 41, MSJ, Ex. 4. Decl. Shawn Ratliff ¶ 8. It is, however, undisputed that Denton-Jones and Staley investigated Ali-Bay’s allegations but found no evidence of discriminatory animus or intentional harassment. SUMF ¶ 19, Decl. Denton ¶ 20. Staley Electric terminated Ali-Bey, following the thirty day extension of his probationary period, for failing to improve his performance. SUMF ¶¶ 24 & 27; Decl. Denton ¶ 24.
Ali-Bey is suing Staley Electric for retaliation and Staley is moving for summary judgment. II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). Once the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleadings. Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 2011). Instead, the non-moving party must produce admissible evidence demonstrating a genuine factual dispute requiring a trial. Id. All reasonable inferences must
be drawn in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Holland v. Sam’s Club, 487 2 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007). The evidence is not weighed, and no credibility determinations are made. Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2008). III. DISCUSSION Summary judgment is granted on Ali-Bey’s retaliation claim because he has failed to establish a prima facie case.
Although Ali-Bey does not specifically state whether he is suing under Title VII or 42 U.S.C. section 1981, the statutes have the same legal standard. Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1059 (8th Cir. 1997) (Title VII and section 1981 retaliation elements are identical). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Ali-Bey must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and
(3) there was a causal connection between elements one and two. Id. As to the first element, Ali-Bey engaged in protected activity when he sent Denton- Jones and Staley the email on the evening of September 19, 2023, complaining about discriminatory comments made by managers and coworkers. See Gagnon v. Sprint Corp., 284 F.3d 839, 854 n.4 (8th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by, Desert Palace v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (internal or informal complaints to superiors are protected under Title VII); SUMF ¶ 48. As to the second element, Ali-Bey suffered an adverse employment action when he was terminated. Although Ali-Bey argues that he also suffered an adverse employment action when his probationary period was extended, Br. Opp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 2 (Ali-
Bey Br.), Doc. No. 104, having his probationary period extended is akin to placement on a 3 performance improvement plan, which is not an adverse employment action. Fiero v. CSG Sys., Inc., 759 F.3d 874 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2014). For this reason, Ali-Bey’s termination is the only viable adverse action. As to the third element, to establish a causal connection between his email and his termination, Ali-Bey must show that Staley Electric would not have fired him if he had not
sent the email. See Wright v. St. Vincent Health Sys., 730 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2013). It is not enough for Ali-Bey to prove that his email was a substantial or motivating factor in his termination; rather, he must show that it was the determining factor. See Carrington v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 481 F.3d 1046, 1053 (8th Cir. 2007). Ali-Bey argues that the temporal proximity between his email and termination create a genuine factual dispute for the jury to
decide. Ali-Bey Br. at 2. Ali-Bey also argues that recorded conversations and documented performance criticism support a casual connection. Id. at 3. Although temporal proximity alone is typically not enough to establish causation, it may be an indicator of causation. Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999). Moreover, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ali-Bey, I would probably
lean in favor of finding that he has made out a prima facie case of retaliation if he provided evidence, other than his speculation, that his supervisors read his draft email before he met with Denton-Jones for his performance review. If Staley Electric was aware of Ali-Bey’s complaints before it extended his probation and fired him, he could make a plausible argument that his email set his termination in motion. But, his deposition testimony
regarding his supervisors reading his draft email before the meeting with Denton-Jones is 4 based on speculation. MSJ, Ex. 2 Ali-Bey Dep. 94:2–95:25, 97, 117:20–118:24. And the record clearly shows that Staley Electric received Ali-Bey’s email after his meeting with Denton-Jones. SUMF ¶ 13. Finally, although Ali-Bey has submitted recorded conversations that he claims support his arguments, those recordings do not show that he was terminated for engaging in protected activity. See Recordings, Doc. No. 109.
Even if Ali-Bey made out a prima facie case of retaliation, Staley has provided a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating him: poor performance. MSJ, Ex. C, October 25, 2023 Employee Action Form. Ali-Bey argues that this is pretext based on (1) lack of documentation of performance deficiencies before he sent the email; (2) disparate treatment of similarly situated white employees; (3) timing of performance criticism
following the email; and (4) recorded statements reflecting management’s awareness of his concerns. Ali-Bey Br. at 3. First, it appears that Ali-Bey believes that Staley Electric should have given him performance feedback during his ninety day probationary period rather than waiting until the end to discuss it with him. See MSJ Ex. 2 147:23–148:3. When to provide performance
feedback is a business decision which courts typically do not scrutinize. See Worley v. Alltel Corp. Servs., Inc., No. 4:05CV001774, 2008 WL 90026 at *3 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2008). Also, in a September 25, 2023, recorded conversation, Denton-Jones told Ali-Bey that Staley Electric had documented his performance issues before September 19, 2023, but that Staley Electric does not always give notice of performance issues during an employee’s
probationary period. See September 25, 2023 recording at 17:30–25:16. 5 Second, Ali-Bey argues that when Austin Shelton had performance issues and made mistakes, he was coached and was not terminated. Ali-Bey Br. at 4. The record, however, does not show that Ali-Bey and Shelton were similarly situated. Indeed, Shelton worked for Staley Electric as part of an apprenticeship program and Ali-Bey did not. Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1994) (similarly situated test at pretext stage is
rigorous). Third, Ali-Bey argues that pretext can be inferred by the timing between his email and the criticism of his performance. Ali-Bey Br. at 3 & 5. Ali-Bey argues that his performance issues were only formalized after he sent the email. Id. This, however is undermined by the written performance issues prior to Ali-Bey’s probation extension. MSJ, Ex. A DEF 114,
116, 118, 127–131. It is also undisputed that Ali-Bey sent the email at 9:07 p.m., which was after his probationary period was extended. SUMF ¶ 13. And, as discussed above, Ali-Bey’s unsupported assertion that his supervisors saw a draft of his meeting with Denton-Jones is not enough to create a factual dispute. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (for an issue of fact to be genuine, the non-moving party
must show more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”); Viewpoint Neutrality Now! v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minnesota, 109 F.4th 1033, 1038 (8th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom., Viewpoint Neutrality Now v. Bd. of Regents Univ. MN, No. 24-655, 2025 WL 1151234 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2025) (a plaintiff may not merely rely on unsupported self-serving allegations, but must have sufficient probative evidence that would
permit a finding in plaintiff’s favor; the purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and 6 dispose of factually unsupported claims). Fourth, nothing in the recorded statements provided by Ali-Bey supports his arguments that Staley Electric retaliated against him. To the extent that Ali-Bey asserts retaliation under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act summary judgment is granted for the same reason discussed above. See James v. George's, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 238, 243 (Ark. Ct. App. 2022) (elements of an ACRA retaliation claim). IV. CONCLUSION For these reasons, Staley’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and Ali-Bey’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of June, 2026.
Bren 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE