UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ALFREDO SOSA, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-03094-SEM ) GEORGE DUNCAN, ) Defendant. )
ORDER SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge: Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and a Motion for Counsel (Doc. 3) filed by Plaintiff Alfredo Sosa, an inmate at Taylorville Correctional Center (“Taylorville”). Plaintiff’s account states an Eighth Amendment claim, but the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel. I. COMPLAINT A. Screening Standard The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Upon reviewing the complaint, the
court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, construing them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are
insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
B. Factual Allegations Plaintiff asserts that Defendant George Duncan, a physician at Taylorville, unnecessarily prescribed Plaintiff medication for
asthma. Plaintiff complained about his diagnosis and medication to no avail. As a result of sickness Plaintiff experienced because of the medication, Plaintiff was transported to a local hospital for
treatment, where a physician confirmed that Plaintiff did not have asthma. Plaintiff asserts that the medication prescribed by Duncan had a detrimental effect on his health. C. Analysis
“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an objective and
subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Under the objective component, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that his medical condition is sufficiently severe. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective component, the prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of
mind.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by showing that a defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645,
653 (7th Cir. 2005). “A medical professional acting in his professional capacity may be held to have displayed deliberate indifference only if the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 895 (7th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs claim against Defendant Duncan. II. COUNSEL Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court
cannot require an attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel, a district court may, in its discretion, request counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in certain circumstances).
In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear
competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 3) is denied because he has not satisfied his threshold burden of demonstrating that he has
attempted to hire counsel, which typically requires writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 3) is DENIED.
2) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Defendant Duncan. Plaintiff’s claim against Duncan proceeds in an individual capacity only. Additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
4) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing Defendant a waiver of service. Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After Defendant has been served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines. 5) If Defendant no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ALFREDO SOSA, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-03094-SEM ) GEORGE DUNCAN, ) Defendant. )
ORDER SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge: Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and a Motion for Counsel (Doc. 3) filed by Plaintiff Alfredo Sosa, an inmate at Taylorville Correctional Center (“Taylorville”). Plaintiff’s account states an Eighth Amendment claim, but the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel. I. COMPLAINT A. Screening Standard The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Upon reviewing the complaint, the
court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, construing them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are
insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
B. Factual Allegations Plaintiff asserts that Defendant George Duncan, a physician at Taylorville, unnecessarily prescribed Plaintiff medication for
asthma. Plaintiff complained about his diagnosis and medication to no avail. As a result of sickness Plaintiff experienced because of the medication, Plaintiff was transported to a local hospital for
treatment, where a physician confirmed that Plaintiff did not have asthma. Plaintiff asserts that the medication prescribed by Duncan had a detrimental effect on his health. C. Analysis
“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an objective and
subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Under the objective component, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that his medical condition is sufficiently severe. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective component, the prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of
mind.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by showing that a defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645,
653 (7th Cir. 2005). “A medical professional acting in his professional capacity may be held to have displayed deliberate indifference only if the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 895 (7th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs claim against Defendant Duncan. II. COUNSEL Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court
cannot require an attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel, a district court may, in its discretion, request counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in certain circumstances).
In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear
competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 3) is denied because he has not satisfied his threshold burden of demonstrating that he has
attempted to hire counsel, which typically requires writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 3) is DENIED.
2) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Defendant Duncan. Plaintiff’s claim against Duncan proceeds in an individual capacity only. Additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
4) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing Defendant a waiver of service. Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After Defendant has been served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines. 5) If Defendant no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
6) Defendant shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered.
7) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendant’s counsel copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance, and the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in more detail. 8) The Court grants Defendant’s counsel leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Defendant’s counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.
9) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.
10) If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
11) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective Order under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
12) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendant under the standard procedures.
ENTERED November 19, 2025.
s/ Sue E. Myerscough _______________________________________ SUE E. MYERSCOUGH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE