Alfredo Parada Calderon v. Drew Bostock, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 14, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01619
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 ALFREDO PARADA CALDERON, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-01619-MJP-GJL 11 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR FEES 12 v. 13 DREW BOSTOCK, et al., 14 Respondents. 15 16 INTRODUCTION 17 This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion for Fees and Costs. (Dkt. No. 18 21.) Having reviewed the Motion, Respondents’ Opposition (Dkt. No. 25), the Reply (Dkt. No. 19 27), and all supporting materials, the Court GRANTS the Motion. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner Alfredo Parada Calderon is a native and citizen of El Salvador who became a 22 lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1990. (Declaration of George Chavez (Dkt. No. 23 9) ¶ 3.) Petitioner initiated his habeas action on October 7, 2024, while he was detained at 24 1 NWIPC. (Dkt. No. 1.) On October 28, 2024, Magistrate Judge Leupold entered an order 2 directing Respondents to show cause why the court should not grant habeas relief. (Dkt. No. 7.) 3 Respondents filed their Return combined with a motion seeking dismissal of the petition, or, in 4 the alternative, seeking transfer of the matter to the Eastern District of California due to

5 Petitioner’s ongoing detention at GSA. (Dkt. No. 8.) 6 On January 1, 2025, Magistrate Judge Leupold issued a Report and Recommendation 7 (“R&R”) recommending the Court (1) deny Respondents’ motion to dismiss; and (2) grant 8 Petitioner’s request for a bond hearing. (Dkt. No. 14.) Both Petitioner and Respondents filed 9 timely Objections to the R&R. (See Respondents’ Objections (Dkt. No. 15); Petitioner’s 10 Objections (Dkt. No. 16).) The Court then issued an Order Adopting the R&R. (Dkt. No. 17.) 11 The Court overruled both of Respondents’ objections, finding instead: (1) that the R&R correctly 12 weighed Petitioner’s criminal history and criminal sentence in determining that Petitioner’s 13 prolonged detention violated the Due Process Clause; (2) Respondents shall bear the burden of 14 proof to show that Petitioner is a danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. The

15 Court also overruled Petitioner’s objections as to the relevant test, but agreed with his objections 16 as to the fifth Martinez factor. The Court found that Petitioner presented sufficient evidence to 17 show that the conditions of detention at GSA weighed in favor of a bond hearing, and that the 18 bond hearing had to occur within 30 days of the GSA Facility Administrator as a respondent in 19 this action, Petitioner shall be given an individualized bond hearing. 20 Petitioner now seeks approval of fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). 21 Respondents challenge only the propriety of the award under the EAJA, not the specific sum 22 requested. 23

24 1 ANALYSIS 2 A. Petitioner is Entitled to Fees 3 The EAJA allows an award of attorneys’ fees only if the court finds that the government 4 was not “substantially justified,” or if “special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C.

5 § 2412(d)(1)(A). “The government bears the burden of demonstrating substantial justification.” 6 Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1230 (9th Cir. 1990). “Substantial 7 justification” in this context means “justification to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable 8 person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). For the government’s position to be 9 substantially justified, it “must have a ‘reasonable basis both in law and fact.’” Meier v. Colvin, 10 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565). “In making a determination 11 of substantial justification, the court must consider the reasonableness of both ‘the underlying 12 government action at issue’ and the position asserted by the government in ‘defending the 13 validity of the action in court.’” Bay Area Peace, 914 F.2d at 1230. “Further, when we decide 14 whether the government’s litigation position is substantially justified, “the EAJA . . . favors

15 treating a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line items.” Al-Harbi v. I.N.S., 284 16 F.3d 1080, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Rubin, 97 F.3d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 17 1996)). 18 The Court here finds that an award of fees is appropriate. Petitioner prevailed on his 19 claim that Respondents had violated his Due Process right to a bond hearing, thus achieving 20 success through this litigation. The Court is aware that the bond hearing did not result in 21 Petitioner’s release, but that fact does not undercut Petitioner’s vindication of his constitutional 22 rights not to suffer prolonged detention without a bond hearing. The Court also finds little merit 23 in Respondents’ argument that its position was substantially justified. Petitioner here challenged

24 1 his prolonged detention without an individualized custody determination. As Respondents 2 acknowledge, “all district courts have agreed that prolonged mandatory detention pending 3 removal orders without a bond hearing ‘will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’” 4 (Resp. Opp. at 4 (quoting R&R and Martinez v. Clark, No. C18-1669, 2019 WL 5968089 (W.D.

5 Wash. May 23, 2019)).) While there is no bright line when detention pending removal is 6 impermissible, the Court here found that Petitioner’s detention was more than double the 7 presumptively reasonable six-month period discussed in [Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 8 (2003)].” (Order on R&R at 7 (Dkt. No. 14).) The length of detention here was thus so far afield 9 of what might be defensible as to make Respondent’s position unjustifiable. Nor have 10 Respondents shown that any of the positions taken during the litigation were substantially 11 justified. This includes Respondents’ errant and unsupported argument that the Court lacked 12 jurisdiction or that the Martinez factors here supported their position. Accordingly, the Court 13 finds that an award of fees is proper under the EAJA. Respondents do not challenge the amount 14 of fees requested. The Court has separately reviewed the fee request and finds the modest sum

15 requested to be reasonable and appropriate, particularly in light of the results achieved. 16 CONCLUSION 17 The Court therefore finds that Petitioner is entitled to fees under the EAJA and that his 18 unchallenged request for $18,466.19 is appropriate. The Court GRANTS the Motion and 19 AWARDS Petitioner $18,466.19 in fees. 20 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel. 21 Dated October 14, 2025. A 22 23 Marsha J. Pechman United States Senior District Judge 24