Thompson, Justice.
Following a bench trial on February 13, 1995, Antonio Alford was convicted of DUI and for being a minor in possession of alcohol. Alford was sentenced to 12 months probation. He was not represented by counsel.
Alford filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his DUI and possession convictions on the ground that he was entitled to, and denied, counsel. The habeas court determined that Alford was not entitled to legal representation because he was sentenced only to probation and no term of imprisonment.
We granted a certificate of probable cause to determine whether Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U. S. 654 (122 SC 1764, 152 LE2d 888) (2002) applies retroactively to Alford’s convictions because Alford was unrepresented by counsel. We hold that it does.
In Shelton, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit activation of a suspended sentence “[w]here the State provides no counsel to an indigent defendant.” Id. at 662. The Supreme Court reached that conclusion by reasoning that a defendant with a suspended sentence who violates probation “is incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying offense.” Id. An uncounseled conviction would thus result in imprisonment and “ ‘in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty.’ ” Id. (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 40 (92 SC 2006, 32 LE2d 530) (1972)).
This Court recognized Shelton’s application in Barnes v. State, 275 Ga. 499 (570 SE2d 277) (2002). In Barnes, the defendant [106]*106appeared before a traffic court, without counsel, to answer a charge of driving with a revoked license. Id. Proceeding to a bench trial, the defendant appeared pro se, was found guilty, and sentenced to a one-year probated term of imprisonment and a fine. Id. at 500. Adopting Shelton, we held “that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no indigent person may be imprisoned for any offense, or sentenced to a probated or suspended prison term, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Id. at 502.
To make a knowing and intelligent waiver, “ ‘the trial court must apprise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in representing himself so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing.’ ” State v. Evans, 285 Ga. 67, 68 (673 SE2d 243) (2009) (quoting Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 152 (598 SE2d 488) (2004)). “The State may carry this burden by showing a valid waiver through either a trial transcript or other extrinsic evidence.” Godlewski v. State, 256 Ga. App. 35, 36 (567 SE2d 704) (2002).
Pointing out that the record in this case offers no explanation as to why defendant lacked counsel, the State argues that Alford has not demonstrated he was denied the right to counsel. The State, however, erroneously places the burden on Alford. Jones v. Wharton, 253 Ga. 82 (316 SE2d 749) (1984). It is the State which must show the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Barnes v. State, 261 Ga. App. 112, 113 (581 SE2d 727) (2003). Review of the record shows no voluntary or intelligent waiver of Alford’s right to counsel, nor that he was apprised of the dangers of proceeding without counsel.
We now decide the question posed by this case: whether the rule set forth in Shelton and adopted by this Court in Barnes applies retroactively. In Howard v. United States, 374 F3d 1068, 1077 (11th Cir. 2004), the Eleventh Circuit held that the right recognized in Shelton is retroactively applicable. We find the reasoning utilized by the Eleventh Circuit persuasive. See also Talley v. South Carolina, 371 S.C. 535, 544 (640 SE2d 878) (2007) (giving retroactive application to the rule put forth in Shelton).
Like Howard, this case turns on whether Shelton applies retroactively because it establishes a “new rule” under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 301 (109 SC 1060, 103 LE2d 334) (1989). See Howard, 374 F3d at 1073.
According to the Supreme Court in Teague, “a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 301. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that Shelton established a new rule even though the Court relied on two past precedents in reaching its conclusion. The Court in Shelton said that its decisions in [107]*107Argersinger, supra at 407 U. S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367 (99 SC 1158, 59 LE2d 383) (1979) “controlled” its judgment in the case. Shelton, 535 U. S. at 657. In Argersinger, the Court held that defense counsel must be appointed in any criminal prosecution that actually leads to imprisonment. 407 U. S. at 33. In Scott, the Supreme Court “drew the line at ‘actual imprisonment,’ holding that counsel need not be appointed when the defendant is fined for the charged crime, but is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment.” Shelton, 535 U. S. at 657 (quoting Scott, 440 U. S. at 373-374).
Distinguishing the two “controlling” precedents from the facts in Shelton itself, the Eleventh Circuit has persuasively shown that the rule established in Shelton was not dictated by existing precedent. Howard, 374 F3d at 1074. Before Shelton, a defendant’s right to counsel was required only if a sentence was imposed that actually led to imprisonment. However, the rule in Shelton clearly expands this right by requiring appointed counsel if the sentence “may ‘end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) 535 U. S. at 658.
While a new rule will apply retroactively on direct review, on collateral review, it will only apply retroactively in one of two situations. Teague, supra at 307.
First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (91 SC 1160, 28 LE2d 404) (1971)).
The second exception is the only one at issue here. For a new rule to fall within this exception, it must meet a two-pronged test: (1) it must relate to the accuracy of the conviction; and (2) it must “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” (Punctuation omitted.) Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 418 (127 SC 1173, 167 LE2d 1) (2007) (on remand, habeas denial affirmed on other grounds).
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Thompson, Justice.
Following a bench trial on February 13, 1995, Antonio Alford was convicted of DUI and for being a minor in possession of alcohol. Alford was sentenced to 12 months probation. He was not represented by counsel.
Alford filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his DUI and possession convictions on the ground that he was entitled to, and denied, counsel. The habeas court determined that Alford was not entitled to legal representation because he was sentenced only to probation and no term of imprisonment.
We granted a certificate of probable cause to determine whether Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U. S. 654 (122 SC 1764, 152 LE2d 888) (2002) applies retroactively to Alford’s convictions because Alford was unrepresented by counsel. We hold that it does.
In Shelton, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit activation of a suspended sentence “[w]here the State provides no counsel to an indigent defendant.” Id. at 662. The Supreme Court reached that conclusion by reasoning that a defendant with a suspended sentence who violates probation “is incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying offense.” Id. An uncounseled conviction would thus result in imprisonment and “ ‘in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty.’ ” Id. (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 40 (92 SC 2006, 32 LE2d 530) (1972)).
This Court recognized Shelton’s application in Barnes v. State, 275 Ga. 499 (570 SE2d 277) (2002). In Barnes, the defendant [106]*106appeared before a traffic court, without counsel, to answer a charge of driving with a revoked license. Id. Proceeding to a bench trial, the defendant appeared pro se, was found guilty, and sentenced to a one-year probated term of imprisonment and a fine. Id. at 500. Adopting Shelton, we held “that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no indigent person may be imprisoned for any offense, or sentenced to a probated or suspended prison term, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Id. at 502.
To make a knowing and intelligent waiver, “ ‘the trial court must apprise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in representing himself so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing.’ ” State v. Evans, 285 Ga. 67, 68 (673 SE2d 243) (2009) (quoting Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 152 (598 SE2d 488) (2004)). “The State may carry this burden by showing a valid waiver through either a trial transcript or other extrinsic evidence.” Godlewski v. State, 256 Ga. App. 35, 36 (567 SE2d 704) (2002).
Pointing out that the record in this case offers no explanation as to why defendant lacked counsel, the State argues that Alford has not demonstrated he was denied the right to counsel. The State, however, erroneously places the burden on Alford. Jones v. Wharton, 253 Ga. 82 (316 SE2d 749) (1984). It is the State which must show the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Barnes v. State, 261 Ga. App. 112, 113 (581 SE2d 727) (2003). Review of the record shows no voluntary or intelligent waiver of Alford’s right to counsel, nor that he was apprised of the dangers of proceeding without counsel.
We now decide the question posed by this case: whether the rule set forth in Shelton and adopted by this Court in Barnes applies retroactively. In Howard v. United States, 374 F3d 1068, 1077 (11th Cir. 2004), the Eleventh Circuit held that the right recognized in Shelton is retroactively applicable. We find the reasoning utilized by the Eleventh Circuit persuasive. See also Talley v. South Carolina, 371 S.C. 535, 544 (640 SE2d 878) (2007) (giving retroactive application to the rule put forth in Shelton).
Like Howard, this case turns on whether Shelton applies retroactively because it establishes a “new rule” under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 301 (109 SC 1060, 103 LE2d 334) (1989). See Howard, 374 F3d at 1073.
According to the Supreme Court in Teague, “a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 301. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that Shelton established a new rule even though the Court relied on two past precedents in reaching its conclusion. The Court in Shelton said that its decisions in [107]*107Argersinger, supra at 407 U. S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367 (99 SC 1158, 59 LE2d 383) (1979) “controlled” its judgment in the case. Shelton, 535 U. S. at 657. In Argersinger, the Court held that defense counsel must be appointed in any criminal prosecution that actually leads to imprisonment. 407 U. S. at 33. In Scott, the Supreme Court “drew the line at ‘actual imprisonment,’ holding that counsel need not be appointed when the defendant is fined for the charged crime, but is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment.” Shelton, 535 U. S. at 657 (quoting Scott, 440 U. S. at 373-374).
Distinguishing the two “controlling” precedents from the facts in Shelton itself, the Eleventh Circuit has persuasively shown that the rule established in Shelton was not dictated by existing precedent. Howard, 374 F3d at 1074. Before Shelton, a defendant’s right to counsel was required only if a sentence was imposed that actually led to imprisonment. However, the rule in Shelton clearly expands this right by requiring appointed counsel if the sentence “may ‘end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) 535 U. S. at 658.
While a new rule will apply retroactively on direct review, on collateral review, it will only apply retroactively in one of two situations. Teague, supra at 307.
First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 692 (91 SC 1160, 28 LE2d 404) (1971)).
The second exception is the only one at issue here. For a new rule to fall within this exception, it must meet a two-pronged test: (1) it must relate to the accuracy of the conviction; and (2) it must “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” (Punctuation omitted.) Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 418 (127 SC 1173, 167 LE2d 1) (2007) (on remand, habeas denial affirmed on other grounds). The Supreme Court has made it clear that the right to counsel in all stages of the adjudication process is imperative to the fact-finding process. McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U. S. 2, 3 (89 SC 32, 21 LE2d 2) (1968). Representation by counsel is thus “inevitably tied to the accuracy of a conviction.” Howard, 374 F3d at 1078 (citing McConnell, 389 U. S. at 3). Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit observed, the right to counsel is a bedrock procedural right and the rule in Shelton altered our understanding of that right [108]*108by applying it to defendants who receive only a suspended sentence or probation. Howard, 374 F3d at 1078 (citing Nutter v. White, 39 F3d 1154, 1157 (11th Cir. 1994)). Finally, we note that the right to counsel in criminal proceedings has repeatedly been made retroactive. See, e.g., Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U. S. 847 (91 SC 1089, 28 LE2d 519) (1971) (felony convictions); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U. S. 5, 6 (89 SC 35, 21 LE2d 5) (1968) (the right to counsel in plea hearings is retroactive, “since the ‘denial of the right must almost invariably deny a fair trial’); see also McConnell, 393 U. S. at 3 (“The right to counsel ... relates to ‘the very integrity of the fact-finding process’ ”).
Since the new rule espoused by Shelton relates to the accuracy of a decision and alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding, the rule is to be applied retroactively. It follows that the habeas court erred in denying Alford’s petition.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Carley, P. J., who dissents.