Alford v. NFTA-Metro

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: May 17, 2024
• Docket: 23-197
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23-197 Alford v. NFTA-Metro

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17th day of May, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT:

DENNIS JACOBS, ROBERT D. SACK, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

RUTHETTA L. ALFORD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 23-197

NFTA-METRO, ROBERT W. GUISE,

Defendants-Appellees. _____________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: RUTHETTA L. ALFORD, pro se, Cheektowaga, NY.

For Defendants-Appellees: Wayne R. Gradl, Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, Buffalo, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western

District of New York (John L. Sinatra, Jr., Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the December 13, 2022 judgment of the

district court is VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

Ruthetta L. Alford appeals from a judgment of the district court granting

summary judgment in favor of her former employer, NFTA-Metro, and her former

supervisor, Robert Guise, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. We

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and

issues on appeal.

On June 15, 2021, Alford filed a form pro se complaint against NFTA-Metro

and Guise (together, “Defendants”) asserting claims for employment

discrimination based on race and color in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law. Instead of filing an

answer, Defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule

2 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant

to Rule 56. Along with the motion, Defendants attached various exhibits relevant

to the summary judgment motion. Defendants mailed a copy of these materials

to Alford, along with a one-page “notice,” taken from the district court’s website,

that is designed to provide guidance to pro se litigants on the receiving end of a

summary judgment motion. Alford App’x at 20. The notice made no reference

to Rule 12(d). 1 The district court thereafter referred the motion to a magistrate

judge (Foschio, M.J.), who ultimately issued a report recommending that the

district court grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The district court

subsequently adopted the magistrate judge’s report in its entirety and entered

judgment against Alford. Alford appealed.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Hellstrom

v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 201 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment

is appropriate if, after considering all evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, no genuine issue of material fact remains. Samuels v. Mockry,

1 Rule 12(d) provides that “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . , matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion can be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). It also provides that “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id.

3 77 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 1996). But even before addressing a district court’s

summary judgment ruling, we must first be assured that a pro se litigant has been

afforded appropriate process and notice. See Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303,

308–09 (2d Cir. 2009). We have reversed a district court’s judgment where “it is

not clear from the record that [the pro se plaintiff] had been informed or otherwise

understood the nature and consequences of a motion for summary judgment.”

Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 620 (2d Cir. 1999); see also McPherson v.

Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 282 (2d Cir. 1999). We have also made clear that a pro se

plaintiff facing a motion for summary judgment is “entitled to . . . an opportunity

to take relevant discovery and to submit any evidence relevant to the issues raised

by the motion.” Hernandez, 582 F.3d at 309. That did not happen here.

At the time Defendants filed their pre-answer motion, Alford had been

given no information regarding her ability to request discovery. While it is true

that Defendants’ brief attached a one-page notice from the district court’s website

summarizing what is required when a plaintiff wishes to oppose a motion for

summary judgment, that notice provided no description of how discovery might

aid a plaintiff’s response to a pre-answer motion or how a plaintiff might request

such discovery.

4 Defendants assert that Alford “made no effort to advise the District Court

of specific discovery she needed to unearth identified facts that would support her

case.” Defs. Br. at 14. But there is nothing in the record to reflect that Alford

even knew that she could ask for discovery, much less how she would go about

requesting it. As our case law makes clear, that much, at least, is required. See

Hernandez, 582 F.3d at 309 (“[A] plaintiff [i]s entitled to (i) an opportunity to take

relevant discovery and to submit any evidence relevant to the issues raised by the

motion, and (ii) . . . an explanation of the consequence of a grant of summary

judgment, as well as of what [s]he could do to defeat the motion.”).

Defendants alternatively argue that discovery would not have mattered in

this case, given that Alford’s pleadings were woefully deficient and unable to

survive even the pleading stage. This may well be true. See, e.g., Faragher v. City

of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (explaining that offhand comments and

isolated incidents are insufficient to create a hostile work environment “unless

extremely serious”); see also Burlington N. & Sante Fe. Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,

68 (2006) (recognizing that Title VII is not “a general civility code for the American

workplace” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sealy v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony

Brook, 834 F. App’x 611, 615–16 (2d Cir. 2020) (concluding that pro se plaintiff’s

5 allegations that supervisor tore down plaintiff’s poster of President Obama and

launched into a “racially hostile rant” were insufficient to state a hostile work

environment claim (internal quotation marks omitted)). But having accepted

Defendants’ invitation to forgo the motion to dismiss and proceed straight to

summary judgment based on Defendants’ attachments, the district court was

obliged to make sure that Alford received the information required to intelligently

respond to that motion. On remand, the district court should consider

Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12. But the failure of the court –

and Defendants – to provide Alford with the notice required by Hernandez leads

us to conclude that remand is warranted.

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND

for further proceedings consistent with this order.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court