Alfonso Rangel Velazquez v. Christopher J. LaROSE, et al.

Opinion

Alfonso RANGEL VELAZQUEZ, Case No.: 25-cv-3474-AGS-DEB Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE v. Christopher J. LaROSE, et al., Respondents. Petitioner challenges his immigration detention and seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. At the initial screening stage, petitioner Alfonso Rangel Velazquez need only make out a claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting use of those Rules to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. Rangel Velazquez, a “Mexican national,” “entered the United States on or about February 1, 1999.” (ECF 1, at 2.) He has since “lived continuously in Southern California” and “is employed full-time in construction.” (Id. at 9.) Late last year, Rangel Velazquez received a “Form I-131” “travel document” and “visit[ed] [] family” in “Mexico City, Mexico,” returning on “January 5, 2025.” (Id. at 10.) Upon returning, “he was provided a Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record, authorizing his parole in the United States through January 3, 2026.” (Id.) On “September 8, 2025,” Rangel Velazquez “received a ‘Call-In’ notice instructing him to appear for an interview.” (Id. at 11.) At the appointment, Rangel Velazquez was “taken into ICE custody” and “charged” under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)G); 1182(a)(7)(A)G)(D. Ud. at 11-12.) “Rangel Velazquez was not provided any notice of his change in custody status or provided an opportunity to provide evidence as to why he should not be detained.” (/d. at 12.) This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. Similar cases involving revocation of parole have been found to have a “likelihood of success on the merits” or have resulted in the writ being issued. See, e.g., Salazar v. Casey, No. 3:25-cv- 2784-JLS-VET, 2025 WL 3063629, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (granting habeas relief for a “national of Venezuela” who, when “responding to a ‘call-in letter’ from ICE” “was arrested” and “re-detained”’); Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1089, 1091, 1096 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (granting habeas petition and preliminary injunction for “noncitizen” who had been paroled and was then “taken into custody during a standard check-in at [an] ICE office”); Federico Navarro Perez v. Christopher LaRose, et al., No. 3:25-cv-02620-RBM- JLB, 2025 WL 3171742, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025) (granting habeas relief for ““Guatemalan national” who received “a mass email ... stating that his parole would be /terminated,” attended a “required immigration court hearing,” and was “detained by ... ICE”). By December 17, 2025, respondents must answer the petition. Any reply by petitioner must be filed by December 24, 2025. The Court will hold oral arguments on the petition on January 8, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. Dated: December 10, 2025

Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge