Alfalfa County Nat. Bank of Cherokee v. Curtis

1943 OK 152, 136 P.2d 937, 192 Okla. 351, 1943 Okla. LEXIS 165
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedApril 27, 1943
DocketNo. 30941.
StatusPublished

This text of 1943 OK 152 (Alfalfa County Nat. Bank of Cherokee v. Curtis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alfalfa County Nat. Bank of Cherokee v. Curtis, 1943 OK 152, 136 P.2d 937, 192 Okla. 351, 1943 Okla. LEXIS 165 (Okla. 1943).

Opinion

CORN, C. J.

The parties appear in this court in the same order as they appeared in the trial court and will be referred to herein as plaintiff and defendants.

The original action was instituted in the district court of Alfalfa county by the Alfalfa County National Bank of Cherokee, Okla., against W. W. Curtis and R. J. Curtis, his wife, for the purpose of foreclosing a purported lien upon a preference right lease issued by .the Commissioners of the Land Office of the State of Oklahoma to W. W. Curtis, which lease was assigned by said lessee to said bank as collateral security for the note of .$2,500 executed by W. W. Curtis and R. J- Curtis to said bank on November 10, 1930, which said note was also secured by chattel mortgage on wheat crop and other personal property. Thereafter payments of interest and upon the principal debt were made from time to time, and short time renewal notes were given, the last of which was dated May 17, 1938, extending the time of payment to June 30, 1939, at which time there was a balance of $1,009.38 due. .

Subsequent to the filing of the petition, W. W. Curtis died, and on April 2, 1940, his widow, R. J. Curtis, was appointed executrix of his estate, and the action was revived in the name of the executrix and heirs at law of said deceased.

The action was in rem and sought only the sale of the leasehold rights and the improvements thereon, and the application of the proceeds from the sale to the payment of the debt.

Among other defenses, the defendant alleged that the lease in question expired by its own terms on December 31, 1930, and that it ceased to be of any force and value after its expiration as security for said indebtedness. A jury was ordered empaneled to advise the court upon questions of fact, but after hearing the arguments of counsel upon the question of law as to the effect of the assignment of the expired lease upon subsequent leases and particularly upon the present lease which was issued to R. J. Curtis after the death of W. W. Curtis, the court discharged the jury and proceeded to determine the question of law in favor of the defendants, finding that the lease assigned had become extinct by expiration, and that by reason thereof the lien conveyed by the assignment terminated upon the expiration of the lease, and that there remained no property right against which a lien could be adjudged and enforced. The court further found that the assignment of the lease and lease right did not create a lien upon the improvements. Judgment was also entered for the defendants and *353 against the plaintiff for the costs of the action and attorney’s fee in the sum of $100.

The only question presented here for determination is whether or not the assignment of the preference right lease created a continuing lien against subsequent leases, or whether the lien became extinct upon the expiration of the term of the lease assigned.

The plaintiff, in support of its contention that the assignment created a continuing lien, cites two sections of the statute, as follows:

Title 16, sec. 17, O. S. 1941:

“All rights of a mortgagor or grantor in and to the premises described in the instrument and existing at the time or subsequently accruing, shall accrue to the benefit of the mortgagee or grantee, and be covered by his mortgage or conveyed by his deed as the case may be.”

Title 42, sec. 8, O. S. 1941:

“An agreement may be made to create a lien upon property not yet acquired by the party agreeing to give the lien, or not yet in existence. In such case the lien agreed for attaches from the time when the party agreeing to give it acquires an interest in the thing to the extent of such interest.”

The plaintiff also cites 32 Am. Jur. 990, stating the rule contended for in this case, as follows:

“Although as between landlord and tenant, the tenant has, independent of contract or the custom of the country, no legal or equitable right to a renewal, since it depends upon the mere volition of his landlord, yet, in regard to third persons, he has an interest which a court of equity recognizes as a valuable interest, and which it will protect. * * * Where a leasehold interest is mortgaged, pledged, or charged as security for a debt, a renewal obtained by the lessee, or a new lease obtained by him on a surrender of the old, is held to inure to the benefit of the creditor; . . .”

The footnote of the text cites McCourt v. Singers-Bigger (C.C.A. 8th) 145 F. 103, 7 Ann. Cas. 287; Phyfe v. Wardell, 5 Paige (N.Y.) 268, 28 Am. Dec. 430; Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N.Y. 123, 19 Am. Rep. 252, and other cases.

The rights of the plaintiff, however, do not rest entirely upon the statutory provisions or general principles of law above set forth, but the provisions of the lease and the assignment indicate that it was the intention of the parties that the continuing rights of the lessees in the leasehold and the improvements thereon were given as security for the debt, and that the lien created by the assignment should attach to these rights and improvements upon the premises as long as the same were held by the lessees or until the debt secured thereby should be paid and discharged.

The lease contains the provisions giving the lessees the preference right to re-lease the premises at the expiration of the lease, subject to certain conditions imposed by other provisions of the lease. The right of the lessees to release the land was conditional and not absolute. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Price, 86 Okla. 105, 206 P. 1033; Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. McBride, 188 Okla. 384, 109 P. 2d 221. But the fact that said lessees did re-lease, the land after the expiration of the lease in force at the time of pledging the leasehold rights, and the fact that Mrs. Curtis, comaker of the notes and cosigner of the assignment of the lease with her husband for security for the debt, is now the lessee under the preference right, sustain and give subsistence to the leasehold rights pledged.

Let us examine the pertinent provisions of the lease and of the assignment. The pertinent provision of the lease is as follows:

“And it is hereby agreed that the party of the second part shall have the preference right to release said land as provided by the laws of said state.”

The assignment is upon the printed form prescribed by the Commissioners of the Land Office of the State of Oklahoma, and is as follows:

*354 “Assignment of Lease for Security
“I, W. W. Curtis of Carmen, Oklahoma, lessee of the SW 14 of Sec. 16, Twp. 25, R.

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Related

Mitchell v. . Reed
19 Am. Rep. 252 (New York Court of Appeals, 1874)
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Price
1922 OK 99 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1922)
Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. McBride
1940 OK 439 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1940)
McCourt v. Singers-Bigger
145 F. 103 (Eighth Circuit, 1906)

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Bluebook (online)
1943 OK 152, 136 P.2d 937, 192 Okla. 351, 1943 Okla. LEXIS 165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alfalfa-county-nat-bank-of-cherokee-v-curtis-okla-1943.