Alexsis, Inc. v. Bryk
This text of 471 So. 2d 545 (Alexsis, Inc. v. Bryk) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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This is an appeal from a trial court’s order allowing for payment and proration of attorneys’ fees and costs between a workers’ compensation carrier and an injured employee out of the proceeds of a third party tort claim and before any payment of the carrier’s compensation lien is made. We affirm the decision of the trial court upon the authority of Division of Risk Management v. McDonald, 436 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
We recognize that it is difficult to reconcile the precise language of the statute in question, section 440.39(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981),1 with the provision in National Ben Franklin Insurance Co. v. Hall, 340 So.2d 1269 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), permitting the proration of expenses and attorney's fees. A literal reading of the statute appears to require the injured employee to bear all the costs and attorneys’ fees involved in the tort recovery even though the carrier directly benefits from the recovery obtained. Under the statute, the carrier is entitled to recover the compensation benefits paid to the employee out of the employee’s tort recovery. Because National Ben Franklin pre-existed the drafting of the version of the statute in question here, we believe the legislature contemplated that the judicial gloss requiring proration adopted in National Ben Franklin would also apply to this statute. Neither version of the statute expressly provided for pro-ration.2 In addition, we believe the subse[547]*547quent action of the legislature in expressly providing for proration of fees and costs by an amendment to section 440.39(3)(a) effective June 30, 1983 is actually a clarification of legislative intent, originally properly detected in National Ben Franklin.
To hold otherwise would require us to conclude that the legislature intended that the injured employee bear the complete expense of enforcing the carrier’s right to recover its compensation payments from the third party tortfeasor. We do not believe the legislature intended such an unfair and unreasonable result. The net result in this case, and others like it, would be that the prosecution of the tort claim would primarily benefit the compensation carrier and the employee’s lawyers. There would be little left over for the injured employee. Despite frequent accusations that some laws passed by the legislature are merely “lawyer relief bills,” we believe the legislature would be taking a bum rap if we interpreted the statute to permit such a result here. We recognize, however, that other district courts have ruled to the contrary. See Aetna Insurance Co. v. Norman, 444 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Hewitt, Coleman and Associates v. Grattan, 432 So.2d 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Risk Management Service, Inc. v. Scott, 414 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
471 So. 2d 545, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1106, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 13782, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alexsis-inc-v-bryk-fladistctapp-1985.