IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ALEXANDRIA A. AVONA, No. 86866-7-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION MIKE LEONG,
Respondent.
DÍAZ, J. — Alexandria Alethea Avona appeals the court commissioner’s
denial of her petition for an antiharassment protection order against Mike Leong.
Because Avona does not establish that the commissioner abused their discretion
in denying the petition, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We take the following facts from the sworn testimony before the
commissioner. Avona was an employee at a Sea Mar Community Health Center,
where Leong served as vice president of corporate and legal affairs and was in her
chain of command. In the fall of 2023, Avona claimed a third party, who was also
under Leong’s supervision, harassed her. Leong instructed Avona to report any
claims to her own direct supervisor. Avona refused and told Leong to stop
communicating with her, which in turn prompted Leong to find her insubordinate No. 86866-7-I/2
and ultimately terminate her from employment.
In December 2023, Avona then filed a petition for a protection order against
Leong, which the commissioner denied. Avona appealed the denial of that order
to this court, which we eventually dismissed as abandoned for her failure to
prosecute the matter.
Before we dismissed that appeal, Leong emailed the clerk of this court,
stating, “[p]lease note that I have not been served with any filings by [Avona] in this
matter.” Leong copied Avona on that email.
Avona then filed a second petition for a protection order, which is the subject
of the present appeal. At the hearing on her petition, she contended that there
was “no legal purpose” for, and Leong had “no right” to send, that email to the court
as it violated her “continual[]” request that he not contact her. She testified that the
“psychological impact” of the email contact was “humongous” and that she had
suffered “extreme economic abuse” because of Leong’s actions. Avona
referenced only RCW 9A.46.110, the statute defining stalking.
At the end of the hearing, the commissioner ruled that Avona had not proven
that either stalking or harassment had occurred by a preponderance of the
evidence and denied Avona’s petition. Avona timely appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
Avona argues that the commissioner abused their discretion by denying the
protection order. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, we note that both Avona and Leong are pro se.
“Courts hold pro se litigants to the same standards as attorneys.” In re Vulnerable
2 No. 86866-7-I/3
Adult Pet. of Winter, 12 Wn. App. 2d 815, 844, 460 P.3d 667 (2020). That is, courts
are “under no obligation to grant special favors to . . . a pro se litigant.” In re
Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993).
Also preliminarily, it is important to identify which petition for protection order
and which order of denial is before us. Avona’s original protection order against
Leong—for any actions he took, up to and including termination, in responding to
her claim of harassment against the third-party coworker—and the commissioner’s
denial thereof is not before us. Moreover, the commissioner’s denial in April 2024
of her petition for a temporary order prohibiting stalking is not before us. The only
order before us is the order denying the full petition for a protection order following
the hearing in June 2024, and the only allegation of harassment before us is the
singular email Leong sent in March 2024. 1 Avona’s filing in this court identifying
the denial order on appeal and our rules make that clear. RAP 2.4(a)-(b). We will
not consider any allegations unrelated to this narrow claim.
Finally, still preliminarily, Avona did not file a motion for revision of the
commissioner’s decision by the superior court, instead appealing directly to this
court. When the superior court has not revised a commissioner’s decision, we
review the commissioner’s rulings by the same standard as a superior court’s
rulings. Cf. Grieco v. Wilson, 144 Wn. App. 865, 877, 184 P.3d 668 (2008)
1 Avona does not provide this court with a copy of the email. “The appellant bears the burden of perfecting the record on appeal so as to ensure that the reviewing court is apprised of all necessary evidence to decide the issues presented.” Tacoma S. Hosp., LLC v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 19 Wn. App. 2d 210, 220, 494 P.3d 450 (2021); RAP 9.6. Nonetheless, the content of the email is not disputed, and we exercise our discretion to review the merits of this matter. RAP 9.10. 3 No. 86866-7-I/4
(holding, in an analogous context, that if the superior court denies revision on de
novo review, it adopts the commissioner’s ruling).
We review a court’s decision whether to grant a protection order for abuse
of discretion. See Trummel v. Mitchell, 156 Wn.2d 653, 669-70, 131 P.3d 305
(2006) (reviewing modifications to an antiharassment order for abuse of
discretion). The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
unreasonable, or when it exercises its discretion on untenable grounds or for
untenable reasons. In re Parentage of T.W.J., 193 Wn. App. 1, 6, 367 P.3d 607
(2016).
“The court shall issue a protection order if it finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the petitioner has proved . . . that the petitioner has been subjected
to unlawful harassment by the respondent.” RCW 7.105.225(1)(f). “‘Unlawful
harassment’ means . . . [a] knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such
person, and that serves no legitimate or lawful purpose.” RCW 7.105.010(37)(a)
(emphasis added).
Here, the commissioner ruled that Leong’s decision to copy Avona on his
email to the clerk had “a lawful purpose and arguably was required to keep her
informed of his contact with the court.” Avona once again avers that Leong was
not required to copy her on his email to the court, and that he should not have
emailed her since she had told him to stop contacting her. The commissioner did
not abuse their discretion in rejecting this argument.
The Washington Rules: Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC)—which apply
4 No. 86866-7-I/5
to Leong who is a licensed Washington attorney, although he proceeded pro se
here—bar ex parte communication “during the proceeding unless authorized to do
so by court order.” RPC 3.5; see In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Haley, 156
Wn.2d 324, 338, 126 P.3d 1262 (2006) (reprimanding a licensed attorney acting
pro se for violating an RPC). Similarly, canon two of the Code of Judicial Conduct
(CJC) states that “ex parte communications . . . or . . . other communications made
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ALEXANDRIA A. AVONA, No. 86866-7-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION MIKE LEONG,
Respondent.
DÍAZ, J. — Alexandria Alethea Avona appeals the court commissioner’s
denial of her petition for an antiharassment protection order against Mike Leong.
Because Avona does not establish that the commissioner abused their discretion
in denying the petition, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We take the following facts from the sworn testimony before the
commissioner. Avona was an employee at a Sea Mar Community Health Center,
where Leong served as vice president of corporate and legal affairs and was in her
chain of command. In the fall of 2023, Avona claimed a third party, who was also
under Leong’s supervision, harassed her. Leong instructed Avona to report any
claims to her own direct supervisor. Avona refused and told Leong to stop
communicating with her, which in turn prompted Leong to find her insubordinate No. 86866-7-I/2
and ultimately terminate her from employment.
In December 2023, Avona then filed a petition for a protection order against
Leong, which the commissioner denied. Avona appealed the denial of that order
to this court, which we eventually dismissed as abandoned for her failure to
prosecute the matter.
Before we dismissed that appeal, Leong emailed the clerk of this court,
stating, “[p]lease note that I have not been served with any filings by [Avona] in this
matter.” Leong copied Avona on that email.
Avona then filed a second petition for a protection order, which is the subject
of the present appeal. At the hearing on her petition, she contended that there
was “no legal purpose” for, and Leong had “no right” to send, that email to the court
as it violated her “continual[]” request that he not contact her. She testified that the
“psychological impact” of the email contact was “humongous” and that she had
suffered “extreme economic abuse” because of Leong’s actions. Avona
referenced only RCW 9A.46.110, the statute defining stalking.
At the end of the hearing, the commissioner ruled that Avona had not proven
that either stalking or harassment had occurred by a preponderance of the
evidence and denied Avona’s petition. Avona timely appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
Avona argues that the commissioner abused their discretion by denying the
protection order. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, we note that both Avona and Leong are pro se.
“Courts hold pro se litigants to the same standards as attorneys.” In re Vulnerable
2 No. 86866-7-I/3
Adult Pet. of Winter, 12 Wn. App. 2d 815, 844, 460 P.3d 667 (2020). That is, courts
are “under no obligation to grant special favors to . . . a pro se litigant.” In re
Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993).
Also preliminarily, it is important to identify which petition for protection order
and which order of denial is before us. Avona’s original protection order against
Leong—for any actions he took, up to and including termination, in responding to
her claim of harassment against the third-party coworker—and the commissioner’s
denial thereof is not before us. Moreover, the commissioner’s denial in April 2024
of her petition for a temporary order prohibiting stalking is not before us. The only
order before us is the order denying the full petition for a protection order following
the hearing in June 2024, and the only allegation of harassment before us is the
singular email Leong sent in March 2024. 1 Avona’s filing in this court identifying
the denial order on appeal and our rules make that clear. RAP 2.4(a)-(b). We will
not consider any allegations unrelated to this narrow claim.
Finally, still preliminarily, Avona did not file a motion for revision of the
commissioner’s decision by the superior court, instead appealing directly to this
court. When the superior court has not revised a commissioner’s decision, we
review the commissioner’s rulings by the same standard as a superior court’s
rulings. Cf. Grieco v. Wilson, 144 Wn. App. 865, 877, 184 P.3d 668 (2008)
1 Avona does not provide this court with a copy of the email. “The appellant bears the burden of perfecting the record on appeal so as to ensure that the reviewing court is apprised of all necessary evidence to decide the issues presented.” Tacoma S. Hosp., LLC v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 19 Wn. App. 2d 210, 220, 494 P.3d 450 (2021); RAP 9.6. Nonetheless, the content of the email is not disputed, and we exercise our discretion to review the merits of this matter. RAP 9.10. 3 No. 86866-7-I/4
(holding, in an analogous context, that if the superior court denies revision on de
novo review, it adopts the commissioner’s ruling).
We review a court’s decision whether to grant a protection order for abuse
of discretion. See Trummel v. Mitchell, 156 Wn.2d 653, 669-70, 131 P.3d 305
(2006) (reviewing modifications to an antiharassment order for abuse of
discretion). The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
unreasonable, or when it exercises its discretion on untenable grounds or for
untenable reasons. In re Parentage of T.W.J., 193 Wn. App. 1, 6, 367 P.3d 607
(2016).
“The court shall issue a protection order if it finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the petitioner has proved . . . that the petitioner has been subjected
to unlawful harassment by the respondent.” RCW 7.105.225(1)(f). “‘Unlawful
harassment’ means . . . [a] knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such
person, and that serves no legitimate or lawful purpose.” RCW 7.105.010(37)(a)
(emphasis added).
Here, the commissioner ruled that Leong’s decision to copy Avona on his
email to the clerk had “a lawful purpose and arguably was required to keep her
informed of his contact with the court.” Avona once again avers that Leong was
not required to copy her on his email to the court, and that he should not have
emailed her since she had told him to stop contacting her. The commissioner did
not abuse their discretion in rejecting this argument.
The Washington Rules: Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC)—which apply
4 No. 86866-7-I/5
to Leong who is a licensed Washington attorney, although he proceeded pro se
here—bar ex parte communication “during the proceeding unless authorized to do
so by court order.” RPC 3.5; see In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Haley, 156
Wn.2d 324, 338, 126 P.3d 1262 (2006) (reprimanding a licensed attorney acting
pro se for violating an RPC). Similarly, canon two of the Code of Judicial Conduct
(CJC) states that “ex parte communications . . . or . . . other communications made
to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers” are not permitted.
CJC 2.9(A). The commissioner did not abuse their discretion in finding that
Leong’s email was a legitimate and lawful attempt to comply with these rules, and
thus not harassment.
In response, Avona contends that the commissioner erred because they did
not consider her job loss, housing situation, and previous threats from Leong that
occurred during her employment. Avona appears to be referencing that portion of
RCW 7.105.010(37)(a), which states that “[t]he course of conduct must be such as
would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and
must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” We need not
address whether Avona met that element of her request as she has not first shown
that the commissioner abused their discretion in finding Leong had a lawful
purpose for his email, even if it may have caused her emotional distress. 2
2 Moreover, the commissioner did not consider any evidence of threats or harassment which Avona had alleged in her first petition for a protection order because they found the doctrine of res judicata prohibited it. The doctrine of res judicata bars “the relitigation of claims that were litigated or could have been litigated in a prior action.” Cowan v. Cowan, 29 Wn. App. 2d 355, 370, 540 P.3d 158 (2023), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1020, 542 P.3d 578 (2024). Because Avona abandoned her prior appeal, these principles may provide an alternate basis to 5 No. 86866-7-I/6
Finally, Avona raises multiple additional challenges to the commissioner’s
denial of her petition. 3 But, arguments which are not supported by references to
the record, meaningful analysis, or citation to pertinent authority need not be
considered. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828
P.2d 549 (1992). Even more, her failure to “identify any specific legal issues”
precludes our review. State v. Marintorres, 93 Wn. App. 442, 452, 969 P.2d 501
(1999).
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the commissioner’s order.
WE CONCUR:
conclude that the commissioner did not abuse their discretion in refusing to consider those previous allegations. But we do not reach that issue. 3 Namely, Avona makes several passing claims that Leong violated the
Washington Criminal Code, ch. 9A RCW; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (42 U.S.C. 12101); the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (42 U.S.C. 2000a), but makes no further argument and cites to no authority. 6