Alexandra R. v. Brookline School

2007 DNH 107

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: September 6, 2007
• Docket: 06-CV-215-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Alexandra R. v. Brookline School 06-CV-215-SM 09/06/07 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Alexandra R., by and through her Parents and Next Best Friends, Catherine Burke and Mikael Rolfhamre, Plaintiffs

v. Civil No. 06-CV-215-SM Opinion No. 2007 DNH 107 Brookline School District. Defendant

O R D E R

Alexandra R. ("Sasha"), through her parents, brings this

civil action against the Brookline School District, pursuant to

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20

U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. According to the complaint, in October of

2005, Sasha's parents requested an administrative due process

hearing and sought an order declaring that the School District

failed to provide Sasha with a free and appropriate public

education ("FAPE") for the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 academic

years. See Complaint, Exhibit 1, "Parents' Pre-Hearing

Conference Statement" at 33. They appeal an administrative

decision by the New Hampshire Department of Education dismissing

that request for a hearing. Pending before the court are two

motions to dismiss filed by the School District. Those motions

are denied. In its first motion to dismiss, the School District asserts

that Sasha's parents, neither of whom is an attorney, cannot

represent her interests in this proceeding or advance any legal

claims that belong exclusively to her. Although both the Court

of Appeals for the First Circuit and the Supreme Court have been

presented with this issue (i.e., whether pro se parents can

represent their minor children in IDEA proceedings), neither has

resolved it. See Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S.Ct.

1994 (2007); Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg'l Sch. Dist.. 346 F.3d 247

(1st Cir. 2003). Nor need this court.

As the Supreme Court has made clear, the rights and

interests of parents and their children under the IDEA are co­

extensive. Winkelman. 127 S.Ct. at 2004 ("IDEA does not

differentiate . . . between the rights accorded to children and

the rights accorded to parents."). Consequently, even if Sasha's

parents cannot, strictly speaking, represent her in pursuing her

IDEA claims against the School District, they may pursue their

own identical claims, in their own right. The fair and equitable

resolution to the problem pointed out by the School District's

motion to dismiss is, then, simply to recognize that Sasha's

parents are effectively proceeding on their own behalf and

pursuing their own co-extensive rights under the IDEA.

2 Accordingly, they will be substituted as plaintiffs in this case.

See, e.g.. Maroni, 346 F.3d at 259 (remanding the case and

directing the district court to afford the child's parents an

opportunity to amend the complaint to name themselves as

plaintiffs).

In its second motion to dismiss, the School District asserts

that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Interestingly, however, the School District does not suggest that

the pending action is untimely. Instead, invoking the provision

of the IDEA requiring parents to request a due process hearing

"within 2 years of the date the parent . . . knew or should have

known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the

complaint," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C), the School District says

plaintiffs were precluded from pursuing any claims (at the due

process hearing) that arose before October of 2003. In other

words, the School District asserts that some of the claims

plaintiffs allegedly sought to advance at the due process hearing

- claims they were not able to present - were untimely.

Given that the School District's pending motion is one to

dismiss, and in light of the governing standard of review, it is

impossible to say with any degree of confidence whether the

3 School District is correct. For example, there might well be a

factual question as to when Sasha's parents "knew or should have

known" that the School District (allegedly) failed to provide

Sasha with a FAPE. To the extent the School District is

implicitly asserting that the administrative hearings officer

properly dismissed plaintiffs' request for a due process hearing

on statute of limitations grounds, that issue is plainly at the

core of this case and cannot be resolved absent a thorough

examination of the record.

In short, the assertion upon which the School District moves

to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint is one that cannot be assessed

in the context of a motion to dismiss. The same is true with

regard to the School District's assertions regarding waiver and

res judicata. If the School District thinks that plaintiffs'

claims are precluded for one or more of those reasons, a properly

supported motion for summary judgment or, since this an appeal

from an administrative decision under IDEA, a decision

memorandum, see Local Rule 9.3(e), would better frame and present

the issue.

4 Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motions to dismiss

(documents no. 14 and 15) are denied. Because Sasha's parents

are actual parties in interest (and might well be barred from

representing Sasha in this proceeding), and because their rights

under the IDEA are co-extensive with Sasha's, the court shall

substitute them as plaintiffs in this case, without the need for

further motions practice.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J / M c Auliffe “Chief Judge

September 6, 2007

cc: Catherine E. Burke, pro se Mikael L. Rolfhamre, pro se Dean B. Eggert, Esq.