Alexandra K. Conrad v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedMarch 12, 2026
Docket1:25-cv-00601
StatusUnknown

This text of Alexandra K. Conrad v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. (Alexandra K. Conrad v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alexandra K. Conrad v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., (N.D. Ohio 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

ALEXANDRA K. CONRAD, ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-00601 ) Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DAVID A. RUIZ ) v. ) ) COMMISSIONER OF SOC. SEC., ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Defendant. ) )

Plaintiff Alexandra K. Conrad’s Complaint challenges the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for Social Security Disability Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. (R. 1). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.2, the case was referred to a Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision. (R. 13). Plaintiff filed objections within the fourteen-day deadline. (R. 14). The Commissioner filed a response. (R. 15). For the reasons below, Plaintiff’s objections (R. 14) are overruled, and the Report and Recommendation (R. 13) is adopted. I. Standard of Review When a magistrate judge submits a Report and Recommendation, the Court is required to conduct a de novo review of those portions of the Report to which an objection has been made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Rule 72.3(b). “A general objection to the en tirety of the magistrate’s report has the same effects as would a failure to object.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991); accord Austin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 1540389, at *4 (N.D. Ohio, Apr. 19, 2021) (finding that a general objection that merely restates an argument previously presented or simply voices a disagreement with a magistrate judge’s suggested resolution “has the same effects as would a failure to object.”) (citations omitted). The Commissioner’s conclusions must be affirmed absent a determination that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards or made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). A decision supported by substantial evidence will not be overturned even though substantial evidence supports the opposite conclusion. Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir.

2010); see also Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). “The substantial-evidence standard ... presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). Therefore, if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, a court must defer to that finding “even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.” Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997). II. Analysis Plaintiff’s Brief on the Merits raised two assignments of error: (1) the ALJ failed to ev aluate the persuasiveness of Plaintiff’s symptoms; and (2) the ALJ failed to identify substantial evidence supporting the RFC finding and failed to evaluate the medical opinions pursuant the regulations. (R. 9). Plaintiff’s objections only take issue with the Magistrate Judge’s recommended disposition of the first assignment of error. (R. 14). Plaintiff’s objection generally reiterates the arguments she made in her brief on the merits and disagrees with the ALJ’s resolution of the issue. As noted above, a general objection to the magistrate’s report has the same effects as a failure to object, and an objection that merely restates a previous argument or disagrees with a magistrate judge’s suggested resolution also has the same effects as would a failure to object. Plaintiff’s objections veer perilously close to a general objection that merely voices disagreement with the Magistrate Judge’s resolution. She fails to identify any legal error in the recommended disposition. Nevertheless, the Court proceeds to address her argument. The Social Security Administration has stated “[i]n evaluating an individual’s symptoms, it is not sufficient for our adjudicators to make a single, conclusory statement that ‘the

individual’s statements about his or her symptoms have been considered’ or that 'the statements about the individual’s symptoms are (or are not) supported or consistent.’” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, 2017 WL 5180304 at *10 (Oct. 25, 2017). Rather, an ALJ’s “decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual's symptoms.” 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, [WL] at *10. A reviewing court should not disturb an ALJ’s credibility determination “absent [a] compelling reason,” Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001), and “in practice ALJ credibility findings have become essentially ‘unchallengeable.’” H ernandez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 644 Fed. App'x 468, 476 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Payne v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 Fed. App'x 109, 113 (6th Cir. 2010)). According to SSR 16-3p, evaluating an individual’s alleged symptoms entails a two-step process that involves first deciding whether a claimant has an “underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce an individual's symptoms, such as pain.”1 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, 2017 WL 5180304 at *2-3. The ALJ’s decision found the first step was satisfied and states that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments “could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms....” (R. 7, PageID# 86, Tr. 23). After step one is satisfied, an ALJ should consider the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an individual’s symptoms. The ALJ concluded as follows: [T]he claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision. As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, they are inconsistent with her activities of daily living including two part-time jobs, one performed at the medium exertional level and one at the light level, the objective findings on exam, testing, and imaging, her reports to providers, her activities of daily living, and her treatment history.

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Alexandra K. Conrad v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alexandra-k-conrad-v-commissioner-of-soc-sec-ohnd-2026.