Alexander v. Moore

District Court, W.D. Virginia·Decided March 29, 2021·No. 7:19-cv-00784·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION

ANTONARI W. ALEXANDER, ) ) Civil Action No. 7:19cv00784 Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ) K. MOORE-CRAFT, , ) By: Hon. Thomas T. Cullen ) United States District Judge Defendants. ) ________________________________________________________________________

Antonari Alexander, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendant Nurse Craft failed to provide him with medical care.1 Nurse Craft filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Alexander failed to fully exhaust available administrative remedies as to the claim against her. After reviewing the record, the court will grant Nurse Craft’s motion for summary judgment. I. Alexander alleges that Nurse Craft refused to provide him with any medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment after an incident where Red Onion State Prison correctional officers allegedly “slammed” him on his face and fell on top of him. Alexander claims that Nurse Craft saw him on November 3, 2019, but refused to provide him with treatment because she was married to one of the correctional officers involved in the use-of- force incident.

1 Alexander also alleges claims against other defendants and those defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment that the court will address separately. II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a court should grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “As to materiality, . . . [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is inappropriate “if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).

However, if the evidence of a genuine issue of material fact “is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal citations omitted). In considering a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, a court must view the record as a whole and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 255; Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or

conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874–75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315–16 (4th Cir. 1993) (“The summary judgment inquiry thus scrutinizes the plaintiff’s case to determine whether the plaintiff has proffered sufficient proof, in the form of admissible evidence, that could carry the burden of proof of his claim at trial.”);

-2- Sakaria v. Trans World Airlines, 8 F.3d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that the district court properly did not consider inadmissible hearsay in an affidavit filed with motion for summary judgment).

III. A. Nurse Craft argues that Alexander failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing this action, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). For the following reasons, the court will grant the motion for summary judgment. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” § 1997e(a). “[E]xhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and . . . unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (citing Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002)). A prisoner must exhaust all available administrative remedies, whether or not they meet federal standards or are plain,

speedy, or effective, and even if exhaustion would be futile because those remedies would not provide the relief the inmate seeks. Davis v. Stanford, 382 F. Supp. 2d 814, 818 (E.D. Va. 2005). Ordinarily, an inmate must follow the required procedural steps in order to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725, 729 (4th Cir. 2008); see Langford v. Couch, 50 F. Supp. 2d 544, 548 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[T]he second PLRA amendment made clear that exhaustion is now mandatory.”). An inmate’s failure to follow the required procedures of

-3- the prison’s administrative remedy process, including time limits, or to exhaust all levels of administrative review is not “proper exhaustion” and will bar the claim. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). But the court is “obligated to ensure that any defects in administrative

exhaustion were not procured from the action or inaction of prison officials.” Aquilar- Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); see Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, an inmate need only exhaust “available” remedies. § 1997e(a). An administrative remedy is not available “if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself of it.” Moore, 517 F.3d at 725. B.

In support of the Nurse Craft’s motion for summary judgment, Grievance Coordinator Trapp provided an affidavit; Virginia Department of Corrections’ (“VDOC”) Offender Grievance Procedure, Operating Procedure (“OP”) 866.1; and Alexander’s grievance records related to the claim against Nurse Craft. OP 866.1 details the grievance process by which offenders must resolve complaints, appeal administrative decisions, and challenge the substance of procedures. Grievance Coordinator Trapp explains that the grievance process

provides corrections staff a means to evaluate potential problem areas and, if necessary, correct those problems in a timely manner. There is no dispute that the claim against Nurse Craft is grievable under OP 866.1. Prior to submitting a regular grievance, an inmate must demonstrate that he has made a good-faith effort to informally resolve his complaint. According to OP 866.1, this good-faith effort generally must be documented using an informal complaint.

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell
478 F.3d 1223 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Moore v. Bennette
517 F.3d 717 (Fourth Circuit, 2008)
Langford v. Couch
50 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Virginia, 1999)
Davis v. Stanford
382 F. Supp. 2d 814 (E.D. Virginia, 2004)
Sakaria v. Trans World Airlines
8 F.3d 164 (Fourth Circuit, 1993)
Shaw v. Stroud
13 F.3d 791 (Fourth Circuit, 1994)