Alexander v. Jameson

5 Binn. 238, 1812 Pa. LEXIS 59
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 5, 1812
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 5 Binn. 238 (Alexander v. Jameson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alexander v. Jameson, 5 Binn. 238, 1812 Pa. LEXIS 59 (Pa. 1812).

Opinion

Tilghman C. J.

This was an issue directed by the Orphan’s Court of Franklin county, to try who were the heirs of a certain John Alexander deceased. The defendants gave in evidence a manuscript book found in the trunk of the said Alexander after his death. When the jury were about to retire, the counsel for the plaintiffs objected to their being permitted to carry this book out with them; but the court were of opinion that the jury should have it, to which opinion an exception was taken, on which we are now to decide. It is no longer a question whether the book was legal evidence, but the naked point is, whether, having been given in evidence, the Court might permit the jury to take it out with them. It [241]*241is undoubtedly laid down as a principle in some of the English cases, that the jury are to take’ no papers not under seal, with-' out the consent of both parties; yet the same cases say, that if the Court permit them to be taken, it shall be no cause for setting aside the verdict. We are sdmewhat in the dark as to the reason of this distinction between sealed and unsealed writings, but it is certain that it originated under circumstances not applicable to the present times. The best account of it is to be found in the writings of Lord Hale and and Lord Gilbert. They say that in ancient times, men of rank and property had seals by which their families were distinguished. Those were not numerous; and as causes were tried by men in the neighbourhood, it was supposed that the seals were so notorious as to be well known to the jury. Papers under seal therefore, carried their own evidence along with them; and indeed it is probable that in many instances it was thought sufficient to affix a seal without any subscribing witness, so that the instrument was authenticated by the seal alone. But the notoriety of seals has long ceased. Every man now takes what seal he pleases. They are no longer a family distinction, and so far has it been carried in this and some other states, that a flourish with the pen in the place of a seal has been held equivalent to a seal. It is to be observed, that although the rule is laid down as I have mentioned in the English books, yet it does not appear that the point has been brought before any court for the last half century, during which period the commerce of the world has been prodigiously enlarged, and commercial people make very little use of seals in their transactions. I have never known this question expressly decided in Pennsylvania; but I take it, that in practice, the English rule has not been extended here. It has been our custom to deliver to the jury all written papers except depositions taken under rule of court. These have been withheld, because it has been thought unequal, that while the jury were not permitted to call the witnesses before them who had been examined in court, they should take with them the depositions of other witnesses not examined in court. After the uniform practice which has prevailed in this state, I cannot consent to the establishment of a rule which in many cases would produce confusion and injustice. I have [242]*242witnessed, the trial of many causes, particularly of the mercantile hind, in which the jury could not decide without the aid of unsealed papers; causes which required the minute and laborious investigation of a variety of books and papers, in which long calculations were necessary, founded on accounts and entries. To tell the jury that they must form their verdict on the recollection of what had passed at the bar, would be imposing on them a most unreasonable duty. Under such circumstances, they could do no more than make a vague guess at the truth, and their verdict might be an abuse., instead of a satisfactory administration of justice. I am of opinion therefore that the Court of Common Pleas had a right to permit the jury to take out with them the book which had been given in evidence, and that the judgment should be affirmed.

Yeates J.

I would not agree to remove an unbroken pillar of the common law, which might serve in any degree to support the general system, or to change the grounds upon which property has rested permanently. for ages, merely because we cannot at this day discern the correctness of its principles. But I profess no veneration for the rubbish of antiquity, resting on foundations inapplicable" to the present state of society.

The cases cited during the argument", shew that unsealed writings given in evidence in the course of a trial, cannot regularly be taken out by the ;urv, unless by consent; but that this will not avoid the verdict. The ancient law paid great respect to seals, as it is said by Lord Chief Baron Gilbert, that jurors might ascertain thereby on their own view, whether the instruments were genuine or not. In modem times, impressions on wax cease to give us any useful information, and of the few persons who have their family arms on their seals, fewer still are tenacious of affixing those seals to their bonds or conveyances. But seals on wax or wafers, which no longer distinguish the parties who have used them, have given way in many instances in the country to circles of ink, which have been adopted as substitutes. In this state-of things there can be no utility in preserving the old distinction, that sealed instruments may to be taken out by the jury, to be inspected in their chamber, but not unsealed [243]*243ones. Whether a paper proved to be genuine and shewn in evidence to the jury has a seal or not, the facts imparted by its contents must produce the same effects on considerate minds. The reason for the distinction has long ceased, and with it the law has also chariged.

Hence it is, that the practice for many years has been in Pennsylvania, that all papers which have been read to the jury, have been delivered to them on their retiring from the bar, and such has been the direction of the court when they have been appealed to. The single exception is the case of depositions; which rests on the ground, that it would not be fair and .equal, that the oaths of witnesses reduced to writing on one side, should be permitted to go out, and witnesses examined viva voce on the other side,- should be-prohibited from accompanying the jury. I frankly own, that I know of no instance in the course of my experience, wherein the court have directed unsealed papers to go out, where the adverse party has absolutely opposed it; and this is the first instance which I can recollect of such opposition,, after the sentiments of the court have been declared. But I am abundantly, satisfied, that the court possess this inherent power for the purposes of justice, whether the adverse counsel assent or refuse their' assent thereto. Can it be competent to one of the litigant parties to withdraw from the jurors the only means of settling the matters in dispute fairly? How can complicated accounts between merchants be adjusted? How is a question of loss on a policy of insurance, or those arising on the many commercial transactions which occupy our attention, to be justly terminated, unless the jurors in their chambers are permitted to-have inspection of original entries, invoices, bills of lading, letters of correspondence, receipts, &c.? Upon full consideration thereof, a true verdict must necessarily depend, and by denying a jury the means of information, they are prevented from doing equal justice between the parties.

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Bluebook (online)
5 Binn. 238, 1812 Pa. LEXIS 59, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alexander-v-jameson-pa-1812.