Alexander v. Donohoe

22 N.Y.S. 652, 68 Hun 131, 75 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 131, 52 N.Y. St. Rep. 21
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 17, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 22 N.Y.S. 652 (Alexander v. Donohoe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alexander v. Donohoe, 22 N.Y.S. 652, 68 Hun 131, 75 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 131, 52 N.Y. St. Rep. 21 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1893).

Opinion

VAN BRUNT, P. J.

It will be impossible within the reasonable limits of an opinion to rehearse all the evidence, conclusions of fact, and conclusions of law set out in the 154 pages of the complaint herein. A dismissal of such complaint having been had before the taking of testimony, the only question presented is whether, upon all the allegations contained in the complaint, the plaintiff shows any right of recovery. Upon the trial tire plaintiff, having desired to amend his complaint, as a condition of such amendment was obliged to and did include therein a judgment roll in an action in the courts of California, and it appears to have been held by the court below that this judgment was a bar to the plaintiff’s recovery. It will be necessary, therefore, only to advert to so much of this voluminous complaint as will serve to illustrate the position of the plaintiff in respect to the defendants in the action in California, in order that it may be determined whether or not the ruling in the court below should be upheld. The plaintiff herein brings this action, as he states in his complaint, on behalf of himself and all others who, as stockholders of the defendant herein the Mariposa Land & Mining Company of California, are assignees of and successors to the original holders of the Mariposa trust certificates and first preferred stock, and other stocks of the defendant the Mariposa Company, under a trust deed dated April 25,1868, and holders of the stock of the defendant the Mariposa Land & Mining Company of New York, and of and to all right, title, and interest of the said original holders in and to the Mariposa estate in said complaint described, and who have accepted stock of the defendants the Mariposa Land & 'Mining Company of New York and the Mariposa Land & Mining Company of California, under the circumstances thereinafter described, who are similarly situated with the said plaintiff, and who should come in and take part in and contribute to the expenses of this action. Upon the argument of the appeal it was admitted by the counsel for the appellant that the issues litigated in the California action were substantially the same as those presented herein. But it is claimed that the plaintiff, having been the owner of certain Mariposa trust certificates, which he had exchanged for certain stocks of other corporations in ignorance of the frauds alleged in the complaint perpetrated upon him, is by reason of such fraud entitled to a return of these certificates, and is in equity entitled to maintain this action as such certificate holder; and that the plaintiff and those similarly situated [654]*654are to be regarded, not as stockholders of the new companies, which will be hereinafter mentioned, but simply as holders of the original Mariposa trust certificates. It seems somewhat doubtful whether this action was commenced upon any such theory, in view of the allegation contained in the complaint that "the plaintiff did not apply to the defendant corporations (viz. the Mariposa Land & Mining Company of New York and the Mariposa Land & Mining Company of California) nor to the said trustees (being the trustees •of such corporations) to induce them to bring actions to set aside the aforesaid fraudulent contracts and conveyances, nor to remove the cloud on the title to the Mariposa estate, caused thereby, etc., for the reason that the trustees, directors, and officers of said corporations, and a majority of the trustees, have either been parties to the said fraudulent acts, etc., or have been fraudulently and improvidently consenting thereto; and it would be a useless form to request them to take action for the protection and. enforcement of the rights •of this plaintiff and of those similarly situated, and this plaintiff and those similarly situated with him are afraid and unwilling to entrust the conduct of this suit, or of any similar suit, to them, or to any of them, whose acts are sought to be impeached, and should not in equity be compelled to do so.” This allegation is only consistent with the theory that at the time, at least, of the filing of this bill the plaintiff was seeking to enforce, as a stockholder of these two companies, rights of these corporations against those who had been fraudulently conspiring against such rights.

But it would appear that it is now sought to maintain this action upon a different ground. It must be conceded that if plaintiff, as a stockholder of- the Mariposa Land & Mining Company of California, is seeking to obtain any relief as against the alleged fraudulent acts of some of these defendants, the judgment in California is a bar to the action now before this court. That action in California was brought by one of the defendants in this action for the foreclosure of a mortgage, the validity of which is assailed in this action. The Mariposa Land & Mining Company of California and a subsequent incumbrancer were made parties to that action, and by answer and cross bill substantially the same allegations were made against the validity of that instrument as are contained in the complaint in this action. The result of the trial of the issues in California was a defeat of the claim of the invalidity of the mortgage, and the establishment of the rights which are assailed in this action. There is no pretense or allegation contained in this complaint that such judgment was collusive or fraudulent; but it is alleged that certain facts were not presented to the court in California which might have been established; and that certain parties were not made defendants in that action, and that certain rights were not cut off therein; all of which depend upon the question, which has heretofore been suggested, as to whether the plaintiff can maintain this action as the equitable holder of the original Mariposa trust certificates. It will be necessary in order to determine this proposition to examine briefly the general allegations of the complaint. It is alleged that •the defendant the Mariposa Company was a corporation duly or[655]*655ganized in the year 1868 under the laws of the state of Hew York for the purpose of holding and operating mining property in the state of California, referred to as the “Mariposa Estate.” That the defendants Eugene Kelly and Joseph A. Donohoe were copartners in business in the city of Hew York under the firm name and style of Kelly & Co., having also a place of business in the city of San Francisco, Cal., under the firm name of Donohoe, Kelly & Co., Kelly residing in Hew York and Donohoe residing in San Francisco. That prior to the 25th of April, 1868, the defendant the Mariposa Company was the equitable owner and in possession of a certain tract of land in the county of Mariposa, and state of California, known9 as “Las Mariposas Estate,” containing 70 square miles of land, upon which there were extensive and valuable mines of gold and other minerals. Coupon bonds of the said Mariposa Company, payable to bearer, and bearing interest at 7 per cent, per annum, upon which it was in default, were then outstanding, secured by the company’s mortgage upon the estate, and the company had the usual accompaniment of a floating debt and preferred and common stock. The defendant John W. Brumagim held the legal title to the estate, which legal title had been acquired for account of his brother, the defendant Mark Brumagim, at a cost to said Mark Brumagim of the sum of $300,000 or thereabouts, and was then owned by said Mark Brumagim, though in the name of John.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
22 N.Y.S. 652, 68 Hun 131, 75 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 131, 52 N.Y. St. Rep. 21, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alexander-v-donohoe-nysupct-1893.