Alexander v. City of Minneapolis

531 F. Supp. 1162, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12030
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedFebruary 19, 1982
DocketCiv. 4-81-337
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 531 F. Supp. 1162 (Alexander v. City of Minneapolis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 531 F. Supp. 1162, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12030 (mnd 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER FOR JUDGMENT

DIANA E. MURPHY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Ferris J. Alexander and Benedict Jochim brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants City of Minneapolis, William A. Nordrum, Jr., and Anthony Bouza, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights: Subsequently, plaintiff Vegas Cinema Corporation of Minneapolis, Inc., dba Avalon Theatre (Avalon), intervened pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24. The case arises from the implementation of Minneapolis Code of Ordinances § 540.410, a zoning ordinance which would prevent the plaintiffs, owners or operators of various “adult” bookstores and motion picture theaters, from continuing most of these operations in the same manner or location. Jurisdiction is alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Plaintiffs assert that their activities are entitled to constitutional protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They contend that Minneapolis Code of Ordinances § 540.410 1 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it is an unlawful prior restraint of free speech and press, denies the plaintiffs equal protection of the law, is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, and is an establishment of religion, all in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Defendants contend that § 540.410 neither denies equal protection nor constitutes an establishment of religion. They claim the ordinance is drafted narrowly and precisely and is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Finally, they assert that the ordinance only has an incidental impact on the exercise of free speech and press that is justified by the exercise of the city’s zoning powers and is permitted under Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976).

Shortly after this action was commenced, a hearing was held on plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order, and an order was issued temporarily preventing defendants from enforcing the challenged ordinance against the plaintiffs. The parties agreed to consolidate the hearing on plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction with trial on the merits.

Prior to trial, defendants requested, and were granted, two continuances so that *1164 their expert could adequately prepare to testify to relocation sites available for the plaintiffs’ businesses under the challenged ordinance. During this time, neither party objecting, the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union was granted leave to file a brief as amicus curiae. The parties also stipulated to the intervention of plaintiff Avalon and the entry of a temporary restraining order protecting Avalon from enforcement of the ordinance until a final decision by the court on the merits.

During the week-long trial, 13 witnesses testified, and 47 exhibits were received into evidence, including a videotape of proposed relocation sites and several maps of the City of Minneapolis depicting the effect of § 540.410 and other zoning ordinances. Upon conclusion of the trial the parties requested, and the court granted, leave to submit post-trial memoranda. The parties also agreed to the extension of the temporary restraining order applying to plaintiffs Alexander and Jochim until a final decision by the court on the merits.

The court having considered all testimony and exhibits presented at trial, having observed the demeanor of the witnesses and weighed their credibility, and having reviewed the arguments and memoranda of counsel for the parties and amicus curiae, now enters this Memorandum Opinion and Order for Judgment as its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

1. BACKGROUND FACTS

A. Parties

Plaintiff Ferris J. Alexander (Alexander) has an ownership interest in six adult bookstores in Minneapolis. They are located at 401 East Hennepin Avenue, 624 Hennepin Avenue, 429 Hennepin Avenue, 327 East Lake Street, 735 East Lake Street, and 2968 Lyndale Avenue South. He also has an interest in four adult motion picture theaters in Minneapolis: a two-screen theater located at 735 East Lake Street, known as the Rialto, a three-screen theater at 1021 Franklin Avenue East called the Franklin, and the American and Empress theaters with a total of six screens, located at 614-16 Hennepin Avenue. Plaintiff Benedict Jochim (Jochim) is the manager of these theaters. Plaintiff Vegas Cinema Corporation (Avalon) owns the Avalon theater, located at 1500 East Lake Street, which also features adult films.

Defendant William A. Nordrum, Jr. (Nordrum) is the zoning administrator for defendant City of Minneapolis. Defendant Anthony Bouza is the police chief for the City of Minneapolis.

B. Minneapolis Code of Ordinances § 540.410

Section 540.410 was enacted in May of 1977 after public hearings 2 before the Minneapolis City Council and the City Planning Commission and the preparation of a planning commission staff report on the experience of various other cities, including Detroit, in the zoning regulation of adult businesses.

The purpose of the ordinance is stated at § 540.410(a):

[I]t is recognized that there are some uses which, because of their very nature, are recognized as having serious objectionable operational characteristics, particularly when several of them are concentrated under certain circumstances thereby having a deleterious effect upon the use and enjoyment of adjacent areas. Special regulation of these uses is necessary to insure that these adverse effects will not contribute to the blighting or downgrading of the surrounding neighborhood.... The primary control or regulation is for the purpose of preventing a concentration of these uses in any one area.

The quoted purpose clause is identical to that found in the Detroit ordinance upheld *1165 in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 54, n. 6, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2444, n. 6, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976).

The ordinance identifies the following uses with such serious objectionable operational characteristics: adults-only bookstores, adults-only motion picture theaters, massage parlors, rap parlors, and saunas (hereinafter “adult uses” when referred to collectively).

An adults-only bookstore is:

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Related

Alexander v. City of Minneapolis
713 F. Supp. 1296 (D. Minnesota, 1989)
Patel and Patel v. City of South San Francisco
606 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. California, 1985)
City of Whittier v. Walnut Properties, Inc.
149 Cal. App. 3d 633 (California Court of Appeal, 1983)
Strand Property Corp. v. Municipal Court
148 Cal. App. 3d 882 (California Court of Appeal, 1983)
Alexander v. City of Minneapolis
698 F.2d 936 (Eighth Circuit, 1983)

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Bluebook (online)
531 F. Supp. 1162, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12030, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alexander-v-city-of-minneapolis-mnd-1982.