Alexander v. Blackman

26 App. D.C. 541, 1906 U.S. App. LEXIS 5119
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit·Decided January 12, 1906·No. No. 259·Published·Cited by 7 cases

Opinion

Hr. Justice Duell

delivered the opinion of the Court:

A petition for rehearing was filed herein and a rehearing '¡granted by a majority of the court, sitting at the original hear[543] ing of the case. Such rehearing was heard by the court, as now constituted, and we have, after a careful examination and consideration of the too voluminous record, come to the conclusion, that the former decision awarding priority to Alexander, and reversing the Commissioner of Patents, should be set aside for the reasons, among others, hereinafter set forth.*

There are no new or difficult questions of law to be determined, for the question to be passed upon is that of originality of invention, and not one of priority of invention. Its solution depends upon the facts disclosed by the record, and it turns upon the credibiity of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, and especially to Alexander and to his testimony. It will be unnecessary to restate the issue, for there is no dispute as to its meaning, its patentability, or to the right of the true inventor to make it. It is only necessary to say that the invention relates to the art of carpentry, and is for a wood flooring made up of blocks composed of two sections interlocked by sliding one upon the other.

The Examiner of Interferences and the Commissioner of Patents found for Blackman; the Examiners-in-Chief for Alexander.

Each party claims to have disclosed the invention to the other at Alexander’s clothing store in Meriden, Connecticut, on September 24, 1900.

Blackman makes no claim to have had even a conception of the invention before that day. Alexander, on the contrary, asserts a conception of the invention on September 12th; disclosure to others on the 15th; that a drawing was made on the 16th; that he made a block on the 16th and 17th; and that wood blocks were made by Currier on the 17th,—all these dates being prior to his conversation with Blackman. Blackman’s case is a simple one,, and is clearly set forth; conception and disclosure on the 24th of September; further disclosures to others a few days thereafter; and a reduction to practice October 27, 1900. His application was filed January 14, 1901. Provided he disclosed the [544] invention to Alexander as claimed, and that Alexander up to that time had not disclosed the invention to anyone, he is cleariy «entitled to a favorable judgment. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the case presented by Alexander, and -to determine whether or not he was in possession of the invention prior to September 24, 1900, and on that day disclosed it to Blackman. In doing this we shall follow the rule laid down by this court in Beals v. Finkenbiner, 12 App. D. C. 23, 29 : “In weighing testimony we are not bound to believe a particular fact, testified to by one or more witnesses, simply because they may not have been directly contradicted therein, or impeached generally by evidence tending to show a want of reputation for veracity. The inherent probability or improbability of such a fact is to be tested by the unquestioned circumstances that surround the main transaction or occurrence, as well as ‘by the ordinary laws that govern human conduct.’ Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U. S. 192, 203, 27 L. ed. 438, 442, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225; Telephone Cases, 126 U. S. 567, 31 L. ed. 1000, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 778.”

The “main occurrence” in the present ease is that of the alleged disclosure of the invention by one to the other. That the conversation relative to the invention took place at the stated time and place is admitted by both.

The invention was in the woodworking art. Blackman was a carpenter, Alexander a clothier, and, as he says, knew very little about carpentry. Blackman says he had difficulty in making Alexander understand what he meant by a “dovetail joint,” and it was quite natural that Alexander should have asked what it was. Even when testifying in this proceeding, his practical knowledge of a dovetail does not seem to have gieatly increased, as his definition that it means “a joint that spreads like a dove’s tail” is not one that a man having practical knowledge would give. The strong probability is that a man having practical knowledge of an art to which an invention belongs is the one who makes the disclosure to the one unskilled in that art. The one asserting the contrary has to overcome the burden. We think that Alexander has failed to overcome the presumption existing against him. True, Alexander says .he [545] had lost some money in backing his son-in-law in what he terms the “Mansfield block flooring,” but there was nothing in that which would have suggested to a layman the invention in dispute. But to a carpenter it would be the most natural thing in the world to cure the defects in a floor block composed of parts glued together, by providing the parts of the block with interlocking devices.

A careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances connected with the meeting of the two men, of their previous training and occupations, leads to but one conclusion and that is that Blackman was the one who naturally would have made the invention and disclosed it to Alexander. This presumption is strengthened by the fact that then and there it was arranged that Blackman should make fourteen or sixteen of the blocks, and that when made Alexander should test them. Alexander did not give Blackman the block he claims to have made a week or so previous for a guide, nor the two blocks that he claims he had had made on September 11 by Currier. It would seem that if he had three blocks already in hand, two made by a practical cabinetmaker, he would have said something to Blackman about them and given him one of them as a guide. Ilis silence is suggestive. Alexander offers a corroborating witness in the person of one Hagner, a clerk in his employ. Hagner testifies that he was waiting on a customer and while doing so he overheard part of the conversation between the two men. Nothing to our minds proves more clearly the untruthfulness of Alexander’s version of the conversation than the almost word-for-word correspondence between the evidence of the two men on this subject. Hagner was waiting upon a customer at the time, and his attention must have been directed mainly to her. He says that during the conversation he went to the bundle counter to do up the packing of clothing the customer had purchased, and on his return heard more of the conversation. It is a curious fact that he takes up the conversation as testified to by Alexander so there is no break in it. Compare the testimony of these men:

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Alexander v. Blackman, 26 App. D.C. 541, 1906 U.S. App. LEXIS 5119 (D.C. Cir. 1906).

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