Alex Derval v. Xaler,et al

District Court, C.D. California·Decided January 28, 2020·No. 2:19-cv-01881·Unknown

Opinion

O

United States District Court Central District of California

ALEX DERVAL et al., Case № 2:19-CV-01881-ODW (JEMx)

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ v. MOTION FOR CLASS

XALER et al., CERTIFICATION [15]

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Alex Derval and Morgan Simmons (“Plaintiffs”) move to certify the class in this action seeking relief for Defendant Xaler’s alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) (“Motion”). (Mot. for Class Certification (“Mot.”), ECF No. 15.) Plaintiffs allege that Xaler caused automated text messages to be sent to their cellular phones without their express consent. (Compl. ¶ 1; Mot. 5.) Xaler opposes. (Opp’n to Mot. (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 32.) For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion.1 (ECF No. 15.)

1 After considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Xaler is a cannabis delivery company operating in Los Angeles County, in Santa Monica, Venice, West Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, Culver City, and Marina Del Rey. (Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 1; Decl. of Richard Nguyen (“Nguyen Decl.”) ¶¶ 1–2, ECF No. 32-1.) Plaintiffs contend that Xaler has a “uniform policy of causing text messages to be sent to consumers’ cellular telephones on Xaler’s behalf without prior express consent.” (Mot. 1, 5.) Plaintiffs assert they and the class they seek to represent have received numerous such unwanted messages despite requests that the messages stop and that these automated text messages violate the TCPA. (Mot. 1, 5.) Xaler responds that it sends its text message advertisements only to customers who have consented to receive messages from Xaler. (Opp’n 1; Nguyen Decl. ¶ 4.) The messages include the option to text “STOP” and stop receiving the messages. (Opp’n 1; Nguyen Decl. ¶ 4.) However, an issue unique to AT&T customers prevents a “STOP” request from processing and requires AT&T users to manually opt-out through an online web portal. (Opp’n 1, 4; Nguyen Decl. ¶¶ 4–5.) AT&T users continue to receive the text messages until they opt-out through the web portal. (Opp’n 1; Nguyen Decl. ¶ 5.) In March 2019, Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action asserting two causes of action against Xaler for negligent and willful violation of the TCPA. (Compl. ¶¶ 78–97.) Plaintiffs seek statutory damages and injunctive relief. (Compl. ¶¶ 99– 104.) Plaintiffs seek to certify the following class: All persons within the United States who had or have a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one text message using an [automatic telephone dialing system] from [Xaler] between the date of filing this action and the four years preceding, where such text messages were sent and placed for the purpose of marketing where the recipient did not give their express consent to be contacted by [Xaler]. (Mot. 8.) The Motion is fully briefed. (See Opp’n; Reply, ECF No. 36.)2

2 Plaintiffs object to Xaler’s opposition and request that the Court strike it on the basis that the opposition is untimely and thus prejudicial to Plaintiffs’ opportunity to reply. (Obj. 2–3, ECF Whether to grant class certification is within the discretion of the court. Bateman v. Am. Multi–Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2010). A cause of action may proceed as a class action if a plaintiff meets the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012). In addition, a party seeking class certification must meet one of the three criteria listed in Rule 23(b). Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011). “Failure to prove any one of Rule 23’s requirements destroys the alleged class action.” Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 183 F.R.D. 672, 675 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Rutledge v. Elec. Hose & Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1975)). Courts should certify a class only if they are “satisfied, after a rigorous analysis,” that Rule 23 prerequisites have been met. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350–51 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). A court may not conditionally certify a class “on the basis of a speculative possibility that it may later meet the requirements.” Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975). Nor may a party rest on mere allegations, but must instead provide facts to satisfy Rule 23’s requirements. Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1977). This showing is not onerous: “a district court need only consider ‘material sufficient to form a reasonable judgment on each Rule 23(a) requirement.’” Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr., 909 F.3d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Blackie, 524 F.2d at 901).

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