Aleksandrov v. Chevrolet Motor Division

116 F.3d 482, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 20177, 1997 WL 303257
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 4, 1997
Docket96-55276
StatusUnpublished

This text of 116 F.3d 482 (Aleksandrov v. Chevrolet Motor Division) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aleksandrov v. Chevrolet Motor Division, 116 F.3d 482, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 20177, 1997 WL 303257 (9th Cir. 1997).

Opinion

116 F.3d 482

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Yelena ALEKSANDROV, Individually and as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Sergey V. Aleksandrov; Ilona
Aleksandrov by her Guardian Ad Litem Yelena Aleksandrov;
Edwin Aleksandrov by his Guardian Ad Litem Yelena
Aleksandrov; and Vazgen Asriyants, an Individual,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION; Chevrolet Motor Division dba Geo
Metro; Geo Metro; General Motors Corporation, A
Delaware Corporation; Does 1-1000
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-55276.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 8, 1997
Decided June 4, 1997.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, No. CV 94-8657-TJH; Terry J. Hatter, Jr., District Judge, Presiding.

Before: RYMER and THOMAS, C.J.; PANNER, D.J.*

MEMORANDUM**

Plaintiffs Yelena Aleksandrov, administrator of the estate of her deceased husband Sergey Aleksandrov, her two minor children, and her father, (collectively "Aleksandrov") bring this action against the Chevrolet Motor Division, dba Geo Metro, of General Motors Corporation, and Does 1-1000 (collectively "GM"), alleging California state claims of products liability (strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty), wrongful death, and loss of consortium. The deceased died in a single vehicle accident while driving a 1990 Geo Metro ("the Metro") manufactured by GM. Aleksandrov contends that a design defect in the Metro's hood latch, causing the hood to fly open, and a failure to warn of this defect, proximately caused decedent's death. The district court granted GM's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Decedent, driving the Metro alone, at night, and with a blood alcohol content of 0.21%, was killed almost instantly when his car wandered into the median and crashed into a concrete planter box. There were no witnesses. The Metro was totaled and was not preserved for inspection or testing.

Three months later, GM issued a notice of recall, received by vehicle owner Asriyants, indicating that a defect existed in "certain 1989-93 Geo Metro model vehicles." The notice continued:

Mislocated hood striker assembly attachment spot welds on some of these vehicles cause cracks to initiate on the hood inner panel. If a crack occurs, upon closing the hood, the hood striker assembly may not properly engage the hood latch. This could result in a hood fly-up while the vehicle is in motion, and could cause a vehicle crash without prior warning.

In November 1992, approximately eleven months before the accident, David Boga, the owner of a 1989 Geo Metro who lives in Mississippi, filed a report with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's Auto Safety Hotline. There, he complained that since the purchase of his vehicle, he had observed the hood raising and falling slightly and vibrating at speeds higher than twenty-five miles per hour. He also commented on what he considered a defective hood latch. He indicated that he had notified GM about this in February 1992. Boga's report to GM complains about a bending hood latch causing the hood to flap up and down. Although Boga repaired that problem himself, he later experienced an incident in which the hood on his Metro flew open while driving.

In opposing GM's motion for summary judgment, Aleksandrov relied on the recall notice, Boga's complaint to GM, and Boga's notice to the Auto Safety Hotline to show that a defect existed and that it was the proximate cause of decedent's death. Aleksandrov also relied on photographs of the accident scene, photographs of decedent and his family, Boga's declaration, partially blacked out copies of Japanese engineering studies, a statement by Aleksandrov's counsel noting the existence of other hood-related complaints, and the police and coroner reports.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Ribitzki v. Canmar Reading & Bates. Ltd. Partnership, 111 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir.1997). Summary judgment is not warranted if a material issue of fact exists for trial. Id. at 661-62. We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir.1996).

DISCUSSION

Each cause of action in this case requires Aleksandrov to prove that either a design defect or a failure to warn proximately caused decedent's death. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 1070, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1988)(generally, in breach of express or implied warranty actions, plaintiff must show that defendant caused the damages suffered); Torres v. Xomox Corp., 49 Cal.App. 4th 1, 15, 16, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 455 (1996)(in strict liability design defect or failure to warn claims, plaintiff must show that defective design or failure to warn was legal cause of injury)(citing Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal.4th 548, 882 P.2d 298, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 (1994); Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal.3d 112, 119, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal.Rptr. 891 (1982)(plaintiff must establish prima facie case of causation)).

Before the district court, GM maintained that there was insufficient evidence to create material issues of fact on the questions of design defect and causation. The district court agreed with GM and so do we.

A. Recall Notice

Recall notices can be relevant evidence in design defect cases. Longenecker V. General Motors Corp., 594 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1979); Fed.R.Evid. 403. However, the recall notice in Longenecker directly advised the car's owner of the need for repair in that particular car. Here, in contrast, the notice states only that some Metros may have a hood latch defect. Thus, the notice creates no material issues of fact as to whether there was a defect in this particular Metro. It also provides no evidence as to whether a defect, if there was one, proximately caused decedent's death.

B. Boga's Declaration and Complaints

Boga's declaration and his complaints to GM and the Auto Safety Hotline relate only to his 1989 Metro.

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Related

Soule v. General Motors Corp.
882 P.2d 298 (California Supreme Court, 1994)
Campbell v. General Motors Corp.
649 P.2d 224 (California Supreme Court, 1982)
Brown v. Superior Court
751 P.2d 470 (California Supreme Court, 1988)
Torres v. Xomox Corp.
49 Cal. App. 4th 1 (California Court of Appeal, 1996)
Bagdadi v. Nazar
84 F.3d 1194 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)

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116 F.3d 482, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 20177, 1997 WL 303257, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aleksandrov-v-chevrolet-motor-division-ca9-1997.