Alejandro Sanchez-Alvarez v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 14, 2025
• Docket: 20-72979
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALEJANDRO SANCHEZ-ALVAREZ, No. 20-72979

Petitioner, Agency No. A094-945-164

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 9, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and KOH, Circuit Judges, and CHEN,*** District Judge.

Alejandro Sanchez-Alvarez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of an order from an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) affirming an asylum officer’s

negative reasonable fear determination. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Edward M. Chen, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 1252. We review for substantial evidence the affirmance of a negative reasonable

fear determination. Orozco-Lopez v. Garland, 11 F.4th 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2021).

We grant the petition in part and deny the petition in part.

1. As to Sanchez-Alvarez’s claim for withholding of removal, substantial

evidence supports the agency’s determination that Sanchez-Alvarez failed to

demonstrate the requisite nexus between his fear of persecution and a protected

ground. See Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 814 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding no

basis for withholding of removal when petitioner did not show a nexus to a

protected ground). Although “persons taking concrete steps to oppose gang

membership and gang authority” may constitute a particular social group (“PSG”),

Sanchez-Alvarez did not identify that PSG before the IJ and provided no testimony

or evidence in support of that PSG. See Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084

(9th Cir. 2014) (remanding to the BIA for reconsideration of whether the petitioner

presented sufficient evidence that the “society recognizes [the] proposed social

group” when petitioner argued that he “allied himself with a particular social group

of persons directly in opposition to gang activities”).

Likewise, although Sanchez-Alvarez recounted his uncle’s murder and

identified “family” as a PSG, Sanchez-Alvarez testified that his uncle was targeted

for financial reasons unrelated to their familial relationship. See Santos-Ponce v.

Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2021) (denying petition where petitioner

2 failed to establish a nexus between his uncle’s familial membership and his uncle’s

murder). Thus, because Sanchez-Alvarez failed to establish a nexus between the

alleged persecution and his proposed PSGs, “the record does not compel us to

reverse” the agency. Id. at 891.

2. As to Sanchez-Alvarez’s request for relief under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”), we grant the petition and remand to the agency for further

explanation. “In order for the court to exercise our limited authority, there must be

a reasoned explanation by the [agency] of the basis for its decision.” Franco–

Rosendo v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Movsisian v.

Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005)). In affirming the asylum officer’s

negative reasonable fear determination, the IJ failed to address Sanchez-Alvarez’s

fear of torture. Rather, the IJ only addressed Sanchez-Alvarez’s failure to establish

a reasonable fear “on account of protected ground.” But “[a]n applicant for CAT

relief need not show that she will be tortured on account of any particular ground.”

Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020). Thus, the IJ failed to

articulate any reason for upholding the negative reasonable fear determination as to

Sanchez-Alvarez’s CAT claim. We therefore remand to the agency for

reconsideration of Sanchez-Alvarez’s fear of torture.

3. We reject Sanchez-Alvarez’s additional claims. To the extent Sanchez-

Alvarez now challenges the notice-to-appear underlying his 2007 removal order,

3 Sanchez-Alvarez did not petition for review of his final removal order before the

deadline set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).1 Likewise, because Sanchez-Alvarez

was in reinstatement proceedings and therefore was ineligible for asylum relief,

Sanchez-Alvarez is not eligible to be a member of the class of asylum seekers

identified in Rojas v. Johnson, 305 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2018).

See Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1082 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming the

agency’s conclusion that it could not consider a petitioner’s application for asylum

relief in light of a reinstated removal order).

PETITION GRANTED IN PART; DENIED IN PART.

1 Sanchez-Alvarez’s brief could also be read as challenging the Form I-863 issued in 2013, noting that the date and time of his hearing was “to be set.” However, Sanchez-Alvarez ultimately had his hearing and was ordered removed before he accrued ten years of presence in the United States, so even if the I-863 didn’t trigger the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (“INA”) stop-time rule such that Sanchez-Alvarez could have applied for cancellation at the time of his immigration hearing, he would have been ineligible for cancellation in any event. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).