Alejandro Garcia v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided November 10, 2016·No. 06-15-00187-CR·Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-15-00187-CR

ALEJANDRO GARCIA, Appellant V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 124th District Court Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 43527-B

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In the early morning hours of December 23, 2013, Andres Chavez was brutally murdered

on the grounds of a mobile home park in Longview. A Gregg County jury convicted Alejandro Garcia of murdering Chavez and assessed his punishment at thirty years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Correctional Institutions Division. In addition, Garcia was assessed court costs of $269.00. In this appeal, Garcia asserts that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s assessment of court costs. We find that there was legally sufficient evidence to support Garcia’s conviction and to support the assessment of court costs. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jury Verdict In his first point of error, Garcia asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He points to three elements of the offense he believes were insufficiently proven: (1) that he intentionally caused the death of Chavez by striking him in the head, (2) that he intended to cause serious bodily injury to Chavez, and (3) that the crime was committed in Gregg County. In his second point of error, Garcia argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction based on these same three elements.

A. Standard of Review Under the standard set forth in Brooks v. State, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893,

912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.)1 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979));

Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d). Our rigorous legal sufficiency review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring). We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Further, the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and may “believe all of a witnesses’ testimony, portions of it, or none of it.” Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We give “almost complete deference to a jury’s decision when that decision is based on an evaluation of credibility.” Id. (quoting Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

In our review, we consider “events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d

1 Although Brooks is a plurality opinion, in unanimous opinions issued after Brooks, the Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed the Courts of Appeals that, in light of Brooks, we should not address an appellant’s factual sufficiency claims. See Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 528 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Alcala, J. not participating); Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 742 n.30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Garcia recognizes the holding in Brooks, but argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals may revisit its holding in that opinion in a case that was before that court when he filed his brief. Therefore, he invites us to consider his factual sufficiency claim in this case. However, on October 19, 2016, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided Walker without addressing whether the Brooks opinion should be overruled. Walker v. State, No. PD-1429-14, 2016 WL 6092523, at *4 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (not designated for publication). Therefore, Brooks remains the controlling precedent, and we should not address factual sufficiency claims. Accordingly, we overrule Garcia’s second point of error.

107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). It is not required that each fact “point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Id. Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be established by circumstantial evidence alone. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).

Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically-correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The “hypothetically correct” jury charge is “one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.

The indictment charged that, on December 23, 2013, in Gregg County, Texas, (1) Garcia intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Chavez by striking him with a bat, or (2) with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to Chavez, Garcia committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of Chavez by striking him with a bat. Therefore, based on the indictment and the statute, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, on or about December 23, 2013, in Gregg County, Texas, Garcia, either (A) (1) intentionally or knowingly (2) caused the death (3) of Chavez (4) by striking him with a bat; or (B) (1) with the intent to cause serious bodily injury (2) to Chavez (3) committed an act clearly dangerous to human life (4) that

caused the death of Chavez (5) by striking him with a bat. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (West 2011).2 B. The Evidence at Trial At trial, Airam Vasquez testified that she had known Chavez about three years and that he had lived with her family for about a year before his death. She said that Chavez sold cocaine and that his suppliers were upset with him because he had had “a thousand dollars’ worth of drugs” stolen from him and could not repay them. She told the police that these people had threatened to kill Chavez and harm his family if he did not pay them back. Although she did not know the man making the threats, she told the police that he drove a vehicle similar to a Suburban, but smaller. She also testified that Chavez was in the Crips gang, but that he was short and skinny3 and was not scary.

According to Vasquez, Chavez was in a relationship with a girl named Monica Ayalin, whom he had met on Facebook approximately two weeks before his death. Monica had sent Chavez a friend request on Facebook, and within one week they began to exchange private messages, such as “I love you” and “Can’t wait to see you,” and announced on Facebook that they were in a relationship. Neither she nor Chavez had met Monica before she sent Chavez the Facebook friend request, and she thought the way in which Monica’s Facebook account was

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