IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1246 Filed January 9, 2025
ALEJANDRO GARCIA, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister,
Judge.
An applicant for postconviction relief appeals the district court’s order
granting the State’s motion for summary disposition and denying his application.
AFFIRMED.
Karmen Anderson, Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Langholz, J., and Carr, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2025). 2
CARR, Senior Judge.
Alejandro Garcia appeals from the district court’s order granting the State’s
motion for summary disposition and denying his application for postconviction relief
(PCR), as well as the district court’s subsequent order denying reconsideration.
The essential holding of our supreme court affirming his conviction on direct appeal
is controlling and forecloses relief. We affirm the PCR court’s dismissal.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Following a 1998 bench trial, Garcia was convicted of first-degree murder.
The district court found that Garcia and four other men were hired in 1998 to beat
up the victim. They did so, and the incident ended with Garcia shooting the victim
four times.
The victim was taken to a hospital where he was treated for his injuries.
Necessary procedures included the removal of part of one of his lungs. This left
him unable to breathe on his own and he had a tracheal tube put in place. While
shaving him, a hospital employee nicked that tube. A physician decided the tube
needed replaced but swelling in the victim’s neck prolonged the process of
swapping out the tubes. The victim died from asphyxiation before a new tube was
put in place.
Before his trial Garcia hired an expert to testify the treating doctors were
negligent—grossly so—in the decision to remove and replace the tube. The trial
court excluded this evidence, reasoning the proximate cause of death was the
gunshots, not later negligent treatment. The district court found Garcia guilty. Our
supreme court affirmed on direct appeal, agreeing the gunshots were the
proximate cause of death and correspondingly that proffered expert testimony 3
concerning claims of medical malpractice was inadmissible. State v. Garcia, 616
N.W.2d 594, 597–99 (Iowa 2000) (“A person who inflicts a mortal or dangerous
wound upon another is generally held criminally liable for the victim’s resulting
death, even in those instances where medical negligence or mistreatment also
contributed to the victim’s death.” (citation omitted)).
Procedendo on that direct appeal was issued October 6, 2000. Garcia filed
this PCR application on January 5, 2022. On the State’s motion, the district court
granted summary disposition and denied Garcia’s PCR application.
Garcia now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review summary dismissal of a PCR action for errors of law. Moon v.
State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Iowa 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate when
“‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show . . . there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”
Id. (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3)). The moving party has the burden to show
no genuine issue of material fact is present. Id. “We view the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
III. Discussion
Garcia argues that, although he applied for PCR after the statutory period
ended, a ground of fact that could not have been raised within the applicable period
has been discovered. Iowa Code section 822.3 (2022) provides that a
postconviction application must be filed within three years from the date the
conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date 4
procedendo is issued.1 “However, this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact
or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period.” Iowa
Code § 822.3.
For that exception to apply, the newly found ground of fact must be “relevant
to the challenged conviction.” Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 143. That means “the
applicant must . . . show a nexus between the asserted ground of fact and the
challenged conviction.” Id. (citation omitted). It must be relevant, defined as
having “the potential to qualify as material evidence for purposes of a substantive
claim under section 822.2.” Id. (citation omitted).
If the bar of the limitations period is avoided, a substantive claim of newly
discovered evidence under section 822.2(1)(d) requires a proof that the evidence
(1) “was discovered after the verdict;” (2) “could not have been discovered earlier
in the exercise of due diligence;” (3) “is material to the issues in the case and not
merely cumulative or impeaching”; and (4) “probably would have changed the
result of the trial.” Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003) (citation
omitted).
By definition, newly discovered evidence refers to evidence which existed
at the time of the trial proceeding. Benson v. Richardson, 537 N.W.2d 748, 762–63
(Iowa 1995). “Acts or events occurring subsequent to trial do not generally qualify
as newly discovered evidence.” Grissom v. State, 572 N.W.2d 183, 184 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1997). But an exception exists “in extraordinary cases when an ‘utter failure
1 Garcia concedes that, absent the statutory exception under section 822.3, his
PCR application would be barred by the statute of limitations. 5
of justice will unequivocally result’ if the new evidence is not considered or where
it is no longer just or equitable to enforce the prior judgment.” Id. at 185.
Garcia contends that the doctor under whose care the victim died rendered
negligent medical care many times after the victim’s death. He refers to “a plethora
of malpractice claims” against the doctor “from 2000-2007” that resulted in patient
deaths during that period.
Garcia’s proposed malpractice evidence is simply not relevant to his
conviction. That alone prevents us from considering the evidence. Moon, 911
N.W.2d at 143. At trial, the district court excluded evidence relating to the doctor’s
malpractice, and our supreme court affirmed that exclusion because malpractice
could not have been the sole proximate cause of the victim’s death. See Garcia,
616 N.W.2d at 599. Evidence of malpractice occurring after the trial could only
advance the proposition that one of the victim’s treating physicians caused his
death. However, this is the same proposition ruled inadmissible and thus irrelevant
by the trial court and affirmed on direct appeal. See id. As such, the required
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1246 Filed January 9, 2025
ALEJANDRO GARCIA, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister,
Judge.
An applicant for postconviction relief appeals the district court’s order
granting the State’s motion for summary disposition and denying his application.
AFFIRMED.
Karmen Anderson, Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Langholz, J., and Carr, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2025). 2
CARR, Senior Judge.
Alejandro Garcia appeals from the district court’s order granting the State’s
motion for summary disposition and denying his application for postconviction relief
(PCR), as well as the district court’s subsequent order denying reconsideration.
The essential holding of our supreme court affirming his conviction on direct appeal
is controlling and forecloses relief. We affirm the PCR court’s dismissal.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Following a 1998 bench trial, Garcia was convicted of first-degree murder.
The district court found that Garcia and four other men were hired in 1998 to beat
up the victim. They did so, and the incident ended with Garcia shooting the victim
four times.
The victim was taken to a hospital where he was treated for his injuries.
Necessary procedures included the removal of part of one of his lungs. This left
him unable to breathe on his own and he had a tracheal tube put in place. While
shaving him, a hospital employee nicked that tube. A physician decided the tube
needed replaced but swelling in the victim’s neck prolonged the process of
swapping out the tubes. The victim died from asphyxiation before a new tube was
put in place.
Before his trial Garcia hired an expert to testify the treating doctors were
negligent—grossly so—in the decision to remove and replace the tube. The trial
court excluded this evidence, reasoning the proximate cause of death was the
gunshots, not later negligent treatment. The district court found Garcia guilty. Our
supreme court affirmed on direct appeal, agreeing the gunshots were the
proximate cause of death and correspondingly that proffered expert testimony 3
concerning claims of medical malpractice was inadmissible. State v. Garcia, 616
N.W.2d 594, 597–99 (Iowa 2000) (“A person who inflicts a mortal or dangerous
wound upon another is generally held criminally liable for the victim’s resulting
death, even in those instances where medical negligence or mistreatment also
contributed to the victim’s death.” (citation omitted)).
Procedendo on that direct appeal was issued October 6, 2000. Garcia filed
this PCR application on January 5, 2022. On the State’s motion, the district court
granted summary disposition and denied Garcia’s PCR application.
Garcia now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review summary dismissal of a PCR action for errors of law. Moon v.
State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Iowa 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate when
“‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show . . . there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”
Id. (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3)). The moving party has the burden to show
no genuine issue of material fact is present. Id. “We view the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
III. Discussion
Garcia argues that, although he applied for PCR after the statutory period
ended, a ground of fact that could not have been raised within the applicable period
has been discovered. Iowa Code section 822.3 (2022) provides that a
postconviction application must be filed within three years from the date the
conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date 4
procedendo is issued.1 “However, this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact
or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period.” Iowa
Code § 822.3.
For that exception to apply, the newly found ground of fact must be “relevant
to the challenged conviction.” Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 143. That means “the
applicant must . . . show a nexus between the asserted ground of fact and the
challenged conviction.” Id. (citation omitted). It must be relevant, defined as
having “the potential to qualify as material evidence for purposes of a substantive
claim under section 822.2.” Id. (citation omitted).
If the bar of the limitations period is avoided, a substantive claim of newly
discovered evidence under section 822.2(1)(d) requires a proof that the evidence
(1) “was discovered after the verdict;” (2) “could not have been discovered earlier
in the exercise of due diligence;” (3) “is material to the issues in the case and not
merely cumulative or impeaching”; and (4) “probably would have changed the
result of the trial.” Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003) (citation
omitted).
By definition, newly discovered evidence refers to evidence which existed
at the time of the trial proceeding. Benson v. Richardson, 537 N.W.2d 748, 762–63
(Iowa 1995). “Acts or events occurring subsequent to trial do not generally qualify
as newly discovered evidence.” Grissom v. State, 572 N.W.2d 183, 184 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1997). But an exception exists “in extraordinary cases when an ‘utter failure
1 Garcia concedes that, absent the statutory exception under section 822.3, his
PCR application would be barred by the statute of limitations. 5
of justice will unequivocally result’ if the new evidence is not considered or where
it is no longer just or equitable to enforce the prior judgment.” Id. at 185.
Garcia contends that the doctor under whose care the victim died rendered
negligent medical care many times after the victim’s death. He refers to “a plethora
of malpractice claims” against the doctor “from 2000-2007” that resulted in patient
deaths during that period.
Garcia’s proposed malpractice evidence is simply not relevant to his
conviction. That alone prevents us from considering the evidence. Moon, 911
N.W.2d at 143. At trial, the district court excluded evidence relating to the doctor’s
malpractice, and our supreme court affirmed that exclusion because malpractice
could not have been the sole proximate cause of the victim’s death. See Garcia,
616 N.W.2d at 599. Evidence of malpractice occurring after the trial could only
advance the proposition that one of the victim’s treating physicians caused his
death. However, this is the same proposition ruled inadmissible and thus irrelevant
by the trial court and affirmed on direct appeal. See id. As such, the required
nexus between the new ground of fact needed to avoid the bar of the statute of
limitations and Garcia’s conviction cannot exist.
It does not matter whether Garcia has now uncovered stronger evidence of
the doctor’s malpractice—it is evidence of the same type that was excluded by the
district court. Even if we accepted that this evidence unequivocally shows the
doctor engaged in malpractice, it would not change the fact that Garcia’s actions
were a proximate cause of the victim’s death—which is why the malpractice
evidence was excluded at trial. Garcia would need to show through newly
uncovered evidence that his actions were not a proximate cause of the victim’s 6
death. He cannot accomplish that task through evidence of the doctor’s
malpractice, especially in relation to the doctor’s completely separate later
patients. Thus, he has failed to establish a nexus between the new ground of fact
and his conviction, and the exception to the general three-year bar of the statute
is not available to him.
Further, even in the absence of the bar of the statute, to prevail on a claim
of newly discovered evidence under section 822.2(1)(d), the new evidence must
be material to the issues in the case. Our discussion of a new ground of fact above
demonstrates that the new evidence is not material to the issues in the case.
Garcia’s claim must fail even if the time bar is avoided.
Because the newly proposed evidence is not relevant—having already
been deemed inadmissible—and resultingly cannot form a basis for relief as newly
discovered evidence, we need not consider the effect of its non-existence at the
time of trial. See Grissom, 572 N.W.2d at 184–85.
We affirm the order of dismissal entered by the trial court.