IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION
ALEJANDRO GARCIA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-cv-463 (MTT) ) CHEWY, INC., ) ) Defendant. ) __________________ )
ORDER On October 27, 2025, Plaintiff Alejandro Garcia, proceeding pro se, filed his complaint. ECF 1. That same day, he filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF 2. For the following reasons, Garcia’s motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED. But Garcia’s complaint lacks important factual allegations that Garcia may have omitted because of his pro se status. Thus, the Court ORDERS Garcia to amend his complaint by November 21, 2025. I. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Proceed IFP 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) governs motions to proceed IFP. It provides: [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.1
1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004). When considering a motion to proceed IFP filed under § 1915(a), “the only determination to be made by the court is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation modified). A plaintiff is not required to show he is “absolutely
destitute.” Id. (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). Rather, “an affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Id. “A court may not deny an IFP motion without first comparing the applicant’s assets and liabilities in order to determine whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Jud. Cir., 574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307–08). However, § 1915(a) “should not be a broad highway into the federal courts.” Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984). Rather, it “conveys only a privilege to proceed without payment to only those litigants unable to pay costs without
undue hardship.” Mack v. Petty, 2014 WL 3845777, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2014) (citations omitted). District courts have “wide discretion” in deciding whether a plaintiff can proceed IFP, and “should grant the privilege sparingly,” especially in civil cases for damages. Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1306 (citation omitted). The Court has reviewed Garcia’s IFP affidavit. ECF 2. While it may not show Garcia is “absolutely destitute,” it nevertheless establishes that he cannot afford to pay the costs of this proceeding without undue hardship. Garcia’s affidavit shows he expects to lose his employment at the end of next month and that he is struggling to pay his bills on time. Id. at 5. Consequently, Garcia’s motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED. B. Frivolity Review Section 1915 does not create an absolute right to proceed IFP in civil actions. “Where the IFP affidavit is sufficient on its face to demonstrate economic eligibility, the court should first docket the case and then proceed to the question of whether the
asserted claim is frivolous.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (citation modified). When allowing a plaintiff to proceed IFP, the Court shall dismiss the case if the Court determines that the complaint (1) “is frivolous or malicious;” (2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous if it “has little or no chance of success,” meaning that it appears “from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). “A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is governed by the same standard as a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).”2 Thomas v. Harris, 399 F. App’x 508, 509 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). However, because Garcia is proceeding pro se, his “pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). Even so, “the district court does not
2 To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). On a motion to dismiss, “all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Galectin Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 843 F.3d 1257, 1269 n.4 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)). have license to rewrite a deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Here, Garcia brings claims for disability discrimination and retaliation against his former employer, Chewy, Inc. ECF 1. But Garcia does not set forth sufficient facts to
support his claim. For example, the complaint does not allege when Garcia worked for Chewy, Inc. or in what capacity. Nor does it state the nature of Garcia’s disability or when and how Garcia notified Chewy, Inc., of his disability. In addition, while the complaint alleges, “Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process,” it does not provide any facts showing how so. Id. ¶ 10. In its current condition, Garcia’s complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Nevertheless, given Garcia’s pro se status, the Court will afford him an opportunity to amend his complaint to state viable claims. See Duff v. Steub, 378 F. App’x 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“When it appears a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, if more carefully drafted, might state a claim, the district court
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION
ALEJANDRO GARCIA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-cv-463 (MTT) ) CHEWY, INC., ) ) Defendant. ) __________________ )
ORDER On October 27, 2025, Plaintiff Alejandro Garcia, proceeding pro se, filed his complaint. ECF 1. That same day, he filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF 2. For the following reasons, Garcia’s motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED. But Garcia’s complaint lacks important factual allegations that Garcia may have omitted because of his pro se status. Thus, the Court ORDERS Garcia to amend his complaint by November 21, 2025. I. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Proceed IFP 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) governs motions to proceed IFP. It provides: [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.1
1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004). When considering a motion to proceed IFP filed under § 1915(a), “the only determination to be made by the court is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation modified). A plaintiff is not required to show he is “absolutely
destitute.” Id. (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). Rather, “an affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Id. “A court may not deny an IFP motion without first comparing the applicant’s assets and liabilities in order to determine whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Jud. Cir., 574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307–08). However, § 1915(a) “should not be a broad highway into the federal courts.” Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984). Rather, it “conveys only a privilege to proceed without payment to only those litigants unable to pay costs without
undue hardship.” Mack v. Petty, 2014 WL 3845777, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2014) (citations omitted). District courts have “wide discretion” in deciding whether a plaintiff can proceed IFP, and “should grant the privilege sparingly,” especially in civil cases for damages. Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1306 (citation omitted). The Court has reviewed Garcia’s IFP affidavit. ECF 2. While it may not show Garcia is “absolutely destitute,” it nevertheless establishes that he cannot afford to pay the costs of this proceeding without undue hardship. Garcia’s affidavit shows he expects to lose his employment at the end of next month and that he is struggling to pay his bills on time. Id. at 5. Consequently, Garcia’s motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED. B. Frivolity Review Section 1915 does not create an absolute right to proceed IFP in civil actions. “Where the IFP affidavit is sufficient on its face to demonstrate economic eligibility, the court should first docket the case and then proceed to the question of whether the
asserted claim is frivolous.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (citation modified). When allowing a plaintiff to proceed IFP, the Court shall dismiss the case if the Court determines that the complaint (1) “is frivolous or malicious;” (2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous if it “has little or no chance of success,” meaning that it appears “from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). “A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is governed by the same standard as a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).”2 Thomas v. Harris, 399 F. App’x 508, 509 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). However, because Garcia is proceeding pro se, his “pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). Even so, “the district court does not
2 To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). On a motion to dismiss, “all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Galectin Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 843 F.3d 1257, 1269 n.4 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)). have license to rewrite a deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Here, Garcia brings claims for disability discrimination and retaliation against his former employer, Chewy, Inc. ECF 1. But Garcia does not set forth sufficient facts to
support his claim. For example, the complaint does not allege when Garcia worked for Chewy, Inc. or in what capacity. Nor does it state the nature of Garcia’s disability or when and how Garcia notified Chewy, Inc., of his disability. In addition, while the complaint alleges, “Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process,” it does not provide any facts showing how so. Id. ¶ 10. In its current condition, Garcia’s complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Nevertheless, given Garcia’s pro se status, the Court will afford him an opportunity to amend his complaint to state viable claims. See Duff v. Steub, 378 F. App’x 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“When it appears a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, if more carefully drafted, might state a claim, the district court
should give the pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint instead of dismissing it.”). Consequently, Garcia is ORDERED to amend his complaint to include all facts that he wishes to make a part of these proceedings and cite the appropriate statutory or constitutional authority for bringing his claims. Garcia shall have until November 21, 2025, to file his amended complaint. In the “statement of claims” section of his amended complaint, Garcia must link any claims he makes to the named defendant. If Garcia fails to link the named defendant to a claim, the claim will be dismissed; if Garcia makes no allegations in the body of his complaint against the named defendant, that defendant will be removed from the action and dismissed. Garcia must provide enough facts to plausibly demonstrate that the defendant’s actions or omissions resulted in the violation of his rights under a specific law. It is also recommended that, when drafting his “statement of
claims,” Garcia list numbered responses to the following questions (to the extent possible): (1) What did the defendant do (or not do) to violate his rights? (2) When did each action occur? (3) How was Garcia injured as a result of the defendant’s actions? The amended complaint will take the place of and supersede Garcia’s original complaint. Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the filing of an amended pleading renders the previous pleading a “legal nullity”). Garcia may not refer to, or incorporate by reference, his previous complaint. The Court will not look back to the facts alleged in the original complaint once the amended complaint is
filed; the Court will only consider the facts in the amended complaint when it conducts the frivolity review required by § 1915(e)(2)(B). II. CONCLUSION Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and for the reasons set forth above, Garcia’s motion to proceed IFP (Doc. 2) is GRANTED, and Garcia is ORDERED to amend his complaint no later than November 21, 2025. SO ORDERED, this 31st day of October, 2025. S/ Marc T. Treadwell MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT