1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Cindy Alegre, et al, Case No.: 16-cv-02442-AJB-KSC
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DENYING JOINT MOTION TO 14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., SEAL, (Doc. No. 205); 15 Defendants. (2) GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO 16 STRIKE, (Doc. No. 207); 17 (2) DENYING JOINT MOTION TO 18 SEAL AS MOOT, (Doc. No. 207); and 19 (3) DENYING JOINT MOTION FOR 20 SANCTIONS (Doc. No. 207) 21 22 Presently before the Court is the parties’ joint motions to: (1) seal their joint motion 23 to strike with exhibits, (Doc. No. 205); (2) strike and/or seal a letter from Emilio Reyes and 24 all exhibits attached to Mr. Reyes’ letter, (Doc. No. 207)1; and (3) sanction Mr. Reyes, 25 26
1 George Manahan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, informed Plaintiffs’ attorney Chapman that “the United States 27 joins the motion as to Section I and the request to strike[.]” (Doc. No. 207 at 2, n.1) Mr. Manahan indicated he did not review Sections II through VI of this motion and would not be filing any briefing as to these 28 1 (Doc. No. 207). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds the matters suitable 2 for decision on the papers and without oral argument. As explained more fully below, the 3 Court DENIES the parties’ joint motion to seal their motion to strike, GRANTS the 4 parties’ motion to strike, DENIES AS MOOT the parties’ motion to seal, and DENIES 5 the parties’ motion for sanctions against Emilio Reyes. 6 I. MOTION TO SEAL 7 First, the Court addresses the parties’ joint motion to seal their motion to strike with 8 exhibits, (Doc. No. 207). (Doc. No. 205). Courts have historically recognized a “general 9 right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and 10 documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978). “Unless a 11 particular court record is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of 12 access’ is the starting point.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 13 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th 14 Cir. 2003)). To overcome this strong presumption, a party seeking to seal a judicial record 15 must articulate justifications for sealing that outweigh the public policies favoring 16 disclosure. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79. “In turn, the court must ‘conscientiously 17 balance[ ] the competing interests’ of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain 18 judicial records secret.” Id. at 1179 (citation omitted). 19 “After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial records, 20 it must ‘base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis for its 21 ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.’” Id. (quoting Hagestad v. Tragesser, 22 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)). However, where the material is, at most, “tangentially 23 related” to the merits of the case, the request to seal may be granted on a showing of “good 24 cause.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC., 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016). 25 Here, the parties fail to assert why sealing the motion to strike, (Doc. No. 207), is 26 justified. Although the parties state “[t]he subject matter of this requested in-chambers 27 matter is being filed separately with a request to seal said documents under seal[,]” (Doc. 28 No. 205), they have failed to do so. As such, the Court DENIES WITHOUT 1 PREJUDICE the parties’ joint motion to seal their motion to strike, (Doc. No. 207). 2 II. MOTION TO STRIKE 3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the court may “strike from a pleading 4 an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The function of a Rule 12(f) motion is “to avoid the expenditure of 6 time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those 7 issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 8 2010). Rule 12(f) motions to strike are generally regarded with disfavor because of the 9 limited importance of pleading in federal practice, and because they are often used as a 10 delay tactic. See Cal. Dep’t Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 11 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Motions to strike are generally not granted unless it is clear 12 that the matter sought to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter 13 of the litigation. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 609, 614 14 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Any doubt concerning the import of the allegations to be stricken weighs 15 in favor of denying the motion to strike. Id. 16 On or around November 8, 2021, a non-party to this case, Emilio Reyes, mailed a 17 letter to this Court, (Doc. No. 201), which was thereafter filed with the Court on 18 November 12, 2021, in the interests of transparency, (Doc. No. 200). The parties assert the 19 letter should be stricken and/or sealed because it is irrelevant to this case and contains “very 20 defamatory remarks and false statements.” (Doc. No. 207 at 2.) Additionally, the parties 21 state that Mr. Reyes has used “the Court system to further harass, defame, slander, and libel 22 Ms. McIntosh.” (Id. at 3.) For these reasons, the Court agrees with the parties and finds the 23 letter scandalous and immaterial to this case. As such, the Court GRANTS the joint motion 24 to strike the letter from Emilio Reyes in its entirety. (Doc. No. 207.) The letter is Doc. 25 No. 201. The Court further DENIES AS MOOT the parties’ motion to seal Mr. Reyes’ 26 letter. 27 III. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 28 Next, the parties’ motion seeks the issuance of sanctions against Mr. Reyes. (Doc. 1 No. 207 at 13.) The parties fail to specify under which rule they seek sanctions, and thus 2 interprets this motion under the Court’s inherent power to sanction, as Rule 11(c) and Rule 3 37 are inapplicable here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (setting forth requirement that attorneys 4 and pro se litigants conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law and facts before signing 5 pleadings, written motions, and other documents); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (providing 6 sanctions for failure to obey discovery orders). 7 Rules 11 and 37 are not the only source of sanctions available to the Court. Under 8 the Court’s inherent power, the court may levy sanctions for “‘willful disobedience of a 9 court order’” or when a party has “‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 10 oppressive reasons.’” Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Roadway 11 Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 776 (1980)). The Court’s inherent authority to
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Cindy Alegre, et al, Case No.: 16-cv-02442-AJB-KSC
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DENYING JOINT MOTION TO 14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., SEAL, (Doc. No. 205); 15 Defendants. (2) GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO 16 STRIKE, (Doc. No. 207); 17 (2) DENYING JOINT MOTION TO 18 SEAL AS MOOT, (Doc. No. 207); and 19 (3) DENYING JOINT MOTION FOR 20 SANCTIONS (Doc. No. 207) 21 22 Presently before the Court is the parties’ joint motions to: (1) seal their joint motion 23 to strike with exhibits, (Doc. No. 205); (2) strike and/or seal a letter from Emilio Reyes and 24 all exhibits attached to Mr. Reyes’ letter, (Doc. No. 207)1; and (3) sanction Mr. Reyes, 25 26
1 George Manahan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, informed Plaintiffs’ attorney Chapman that “the United States 27 joins the motion as to Section I and the request to strike[.]” (Doc. No. 207 at 2, n.1) Mr. Manahan indicated he did not review Sections II through VI of this motion and would not be filing any briefing as to these 28 1 (Doc. No. 207). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds the matters suitable 2 for decision on the papers and without oral argument. As explained more fully below, the 3 Court DENIES the parties’ joint motion to seal their motion to strike, GRANTS the 4 parties’ motion to strike, DENIES AS MOOT the parties’ motion to seal, and DENIES 5 the parties’ motion for sanctions against Emilio Reyes. 6 I. MOTION TO SEAL 7 First, the Court addresses the parties’ joint motion to seal their motion to strike with 8 exhibits, (Doc. No. 207). (Doc. No. 205). Courts have historically recognized a “general 9 right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and 10 documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978). “Unless a 11 particular court record is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of 12 access’ is the starting point.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 13 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th 14 Cir. 2003)). To overcome this strong presumption, a party seeking to seal a judicial record 15 must articulate justifications for sealing that outweigh the public policies favoring 16 disclosure. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79. “In turn, the court must ‘conscientiously 17 balance[ ] the competing interests’ of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain 18 judicial records secret.” Id. at 1179 (citation omitted). 19 “After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial records, 20 it must ‘base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis for its 21 ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.’” Id. (quoting Hagestad v. Tragesser, 22 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)). However, where the material is, at most, “tangentially 23 related” to the merits of the case, the request to seal may be granted on a showing of “good 24 cause.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC., 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016). 25 Here, the parties fail to assert why sealing the motion to strike, (Doc. No. 207), is 26 justified. Although the parties state “[t]he subject matter of this requested in-chambers 27 matter is being filed separately with a request to seal said documents under seal[,]” (Doc. 28 No. 205), they have failed to do so. As such, the Court DENIES WITHOUT 1 PREJUDICE the parties’ joint motion to seal their motion to strike, (Doc. No. 207). 2 II. MOTION TO STRIKE 3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the court may “strike from a pleading 4 an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The function of a Rule 12(f) motion is “to avoid the expenditure of 6 time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those 7 issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 8 2010). Rule 12(f) motions to strike are generally regarded with disfavor because of the 9 limited importance of pleading in federal practice, and because they are often used as a 10 delay tactic. See Cal. Dep’t Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 11 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Motions to strike are generally not granted unless it is clear 12 that the matter sought to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter 13 of the litigation. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 609, 614 14 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Any doubt concerning the import of the allegations to be stricken weighs 15 in favor of denying the motion to strike. Id. 16 On or around November 8, 2021, a non-party to this case, Emilio Reyes, mailed a 17 letter to this Court, (Doc. No. 201), which was thereafter filed with the Court on 18 November 12, 2021, in the interests of transparency, (Doc. No. 200). The parties assert the 19 letter should be stricken and/or sealed because it is irrelevant to this case and contains “very 20 defamatory remarks and false statements.” (Doc. No. 207 at 2.) Additionally, the parties 21 state that Mr. Reyes has used “the Court system to further harass, defame, slander, and libel 22 Ms. McIntosh.” (Id. at 3.) For these reasons, the Court agrees with the parties and finds the 23 letter scandalous and immaterial to this case. As such, the Court GRANTS the joint motion 24 to strike the letter from Emilio Reyes in its entirety. (Doc. No. 207.) The letter is Doc. 25 No. 201. The Court further DENIES AS MOOT the parties’ motion to seal Mr. Reyes’ 26 letter. 27 III. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 28 Next, the parties’ motion seeks the issuance of sanctions against Mr. Reyes. (Doc. 1 No. 207 at 13.) The parties fail to specify under which rule they seek sanctions, and thus 2 interprets this motion under the Court’s inherent power to sanction, as Rule 11(c) and Rule 3 37 are inapplicable here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (setting forth requirement that attorneys 4 and pro se litigants conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law and facts before signing 5 pleadings, written motions, and other documents); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (providing 6 sanctions for failure to obey discovery orders). 7 Rules 11 and 37 are not the only source of sanctions available to the Court. Under 8 the Court’s inherent power, the court may levy sanctions for “‘willful disobedience of a 9 court order’” or when a party has “‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 10 oppressive reasons.’” Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Roadway 11 Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 776 (1980)). The Court’s inherent authority to
12 sanction willful conduct also includes “the authority to sanction the conduct of a nonparty 13 who participates in abusive litigation practices, or whose actions or omissions cause the 14 parties to incur additional expenses.” In re Avon Townhomes Venture, 433 B.R. 269, 304 15 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, No. BAP NC-11-1068-HDOD, 2012 WL 1068770 (B.A.P. 16 9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2012), aff’d, 575 F. App’x 715 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Chambers v. 17 NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50–51 (1993)) (other citations omitted). See also Corder v. 18 Howard Johnson & Co., 53 F.3d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[E]ven in the absence of 19 statutory authority, a court may impose attorney’s fees against a non-party as an exercise 20 of the court’s inherent power to impose sanctions to curb abusive litigation practices.”). 21 The Court does not find Mr. Reyes’ conduct here to be in bad faith, vexatious, 22 wanton, or for oppressive reasons, nor does the Court find that Mr. Reyes willfully abused 23 the judicial process or unreasonably caused the parties to bear additional costs. Mr. Reyes’ 24 only connection with this lawsuit is in submitting a letter to the Court, which is insufficient 25 here to trigger sanctions against a non-party. See Corder, 53 F.3d at 232. As such, the Court 26 DENIES the parties’ motion for sanctions against Emilio Reyes. 27 /// 28 /// 1 |}IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated, the Court: 3 1. DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the parties’ motion to seal their 4 joint motion to strike, (Doc. No. 207). (Doc. No. 205.) 5 2. GRANTS the parties’ motion to strike the Reyes letter, (Doc. No. 201). 6 (Doc. No. 207.) 7 3. DENIES AS MOOT the parties’ motion to seal the Reyes letter, (Doc. 8 No. 201). (Doc. No. 207.) 9 4. DENIES the parties’ motion for sanctions against Emilio Reyes. (Doc. 10 No. 207.) 1] IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 Dated: December 1, 2021 © Jer : 13 Hon, Anthony J.Battaglia 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28